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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the Chinese Shanxi piaohao, arguably the most important 
Chinese indigenous financial institutions in the nineteenth century, which emerged in 
one particular province. Concentrating on their governance structure, business 
strategy, and historical development, my thesis explores the emergence, growth and 
decline of the piaohao, and asks how they solved the commitment problem and 
developed their business by means of modern economists’ tools, such as path 
dependency and the principal agent model. This study uses a wealth of micro-
economic data, which, although published, had not been digitized and properly 
analysed before.  
My work reveals that the emergence of the Shanxi piaohao shows reactive sequence 
path dependence. In a situation which gave little protection to shareholders’ capital, it 
imposed a highly centralized management structure, and a tenure- and performance-
based incentive structure to discipline distant employees. Moreover, through 
establishing a widespread branch network, providing services to a wide range of 
clients, inventing various types of draft, and pricing remittance fees on diverse factors, 
the Shanxi piaohao were soon successful and controlled the Chinese remittance 
market for many decades. 
However, as it expanded and as China’s social and business environment became 
more unpredictable, the piaohao’s head managers reached the limits of their 
competence and its centralized management structure began to show diminishing 
returns. High financial leverage and a narrowed profits margin also indicated the 
hidden risks to the piaohao. When the 1911 Revolution broke out and ended China’s 
last feudal dynasty, many piaohao branches encountered immense losses from looting, 
bad loans and deposit withdrawals. It was during this time that modern Chinese banks 
and foreign banks penetrated the Chinese remittance market and poached the 
piaohao’s staff. Because the piaohao shareholders shared unlimited liabilities, when 
these threats materialized, many of them went bankrupt, while others turned to 
investments elsewhere and abandoned the piaohao. 
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Notes to the reader 
Currencies and exchange rates 
Tls. stands for Tael (liang 两) which is a Chinese ounce. Before 1935, the silver tael, 
copper coin, and coined silver dollar were the most commonly used methods of 
payment in the Qing Dynasty. Copper coins and silver dollars are measured in 
counted units with ‘wen’ and ‘yuan’ as the base unit, while the silver tael is measured 
as a unit of weight with ‘tael’ (Tls, hereafter) as the base unit.  In general, Tls. 1 = 40 
gram =1,000 wen =1.5 yuan. 
Foreign languages and dates 
Chinese names and places in English in this dissertation are given generally not in 
Wade-Giles but in Hanyu Pinyin, except where the former occurs in contemporary 
news of account.  
All dates before October 1911 conform to the Chinese lunar calendar.  
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Prologue: Setting the scene 
“A group of Shanxi piaohao merchants have arrived at Beijing recently and visited 
the Financial Minister Zhou Ziqi. The purpose of this business trip is to ask the 
government for help to maintain their business. The Minister highly praises the 
piaohao’s great contribution to the country’s financial activities for a long time, 
and expresses his sincere wish to help the piaohao in its current difficulties. 
However, because detailed arrangements need to be settled, the Minister has 
promised that he will try his best to negotiate with others.” 
—‘Shanxi merchants have arrived at Beijing for the government bailout’, 
Shenbao Newspaper [申报], 22rd March 1914 (Huang, 2002a p.507.). 
The above news report is one of the last remaining pieces of information about the 
Shanxi piaohao; after this, they disappeared collectively from the Chinese financial 
market, leaving numerous stories, legends and studies about their history. As a 
descendant of a Shanxi merchant, I explore in this dissertation, based on new archival 
findings and economic models, the mythical and controversial history of the Shanxi 
piaohao with detailed and comprehensive analyses. 
Introduction 
In 1823, in a small town in Shanxi, a remote inland province of China, there emerged 
a firm named Ri Sheng Chang [RSC, hereafter]. The name combines Ri [Sun 日], 
Sheng [rise 升], and Chang [prosperity 昌]. For the first time we see a firm naming  
itself a piaohao [票号], which means a business enterprise [hao 号] that specialises in 
transmitting drafts [piao 票]. Following this, a group of piaohao sprang up in three 
towns in the same province, Pingyao, Qixian and Taigu, which quickly opened 
branches all over China. As China’s first financial intermediaries specialising in 
remittances, these Shanxi piaohao for decades played an important role in the Chinese 
financial market. However, in the early 20th century, almost a hundred years after the 
first Shanxi piaohao was set up, their whole system collapsed and the piaohao 
disappeared from history.  
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Before the Shanxi piaohao were established, there was no financial intermediary who 
specialized in remittances.
1
 Networks of trade and markets drew support from various 
financial institutions which all provided different functions. At the national level, 
there were native banks [qianzhuang 钱庄]2 and credit-debt bureaux [zhangjv 账局] 3 
carrying out deposit and loan functions and issuing silver notes [yinpiao 银票] for 
local circulation. In rural areas, pawnshops issued small loans against a variety of 
collateral, with about 25,000 establishments throughout China and an average of 
approximately 10 establishments in each county (Ma, 2011 p.17.) Merchants would 
ship silver in convoy to cover large interregional transactions, and would use silver 
notes to clear intra-city transactions (Huang, 2002b pp.5-10.).
4
 
After the 1760s, China’s commercial and trade activities boomed. 5  A thriving 
international and domestic trade increased the demand for inter-provincial silver 
                                               
1
 “As early as the Tang dynasty (618-907AD), merchants could travel around the country 
without carrying metal cash but with a paper proof of ownership called flying money [feiqian
飞钱]. Unlike the later drafts, which were issued by merchants, flying money was issued by 
the government to solve the problem of carrying copper coinage rather than of settling 
payment. Moreover, the policy of flying money lasted only for the short period of ten years”, 
in 山西票号史 (A history of the Shanxi Piaohao), Jianhui Huang, (修订本, 山西经济出版社 
(Revised Edition, Shanxi Economic Press)), 2002b, p.12. 
2
 Native banks, amounting to 15,000 operated mainly in the Yangzi Delta region in the late 
Qing era.上海市地方志办公室 [Shanghai Local Chronicles] 
<http://www.shtong.gov.cn/node2/node2247/node4578/node79494/node79515/userobject1ai1
03895.html>, accessed 7th May 2012. 
3
 “Credit-debt bureaux were set up in northern China and run mainly by Shanxi merchants. 
It has been estimated that about 273 credit-debt bureaux were operating in the cities of 
Beijing and Tianjin in the early nineteenth century”, in Huang, A history of the Shanxi 
Piaohao, p.14. 
4
 “The earliest drafts used for commercial settlement in China date back to 1683, but they 
began on a very small scale and only between acquaintances”, in Huang, A history of the 
Shanxi Piaohao, p.14. 
5
 “China’s international trade can be divided into seaborne and land trade. It has been 
estimated that in the sixty years between 1760-4 and 1820-4 the seaborne export trade 
increased from Tls. 4 million to Tls. 15 million per annum. In the same period, the total 
import and export trade on land rose from Tls. 713,000 to Tls. 10 million ,” in中国近代经济
史统计资料选辑 (Selections of Modern Chinese Economic History Statistics), Zhongping 
Yan, (科学出版社  (Science Press)), p.45. Although there are no reliable statistics for 
domestic trade in the period, an increase in export/import trade would have driven an increase 
in the domestic trade. 
17 
 
shipping.
6
 However, at the same time the spread of bandits and refugees from famine 
often stole silver en route, and it was in this situation that the Shanxi piaohao was 
established to meet the ever increasing demand for remittances.
7
 
During their existence, the Shanxi piaohao made a great contribution to the Chinese 
economy. By remitting and advancing hundreds of millions of taels of commercial, 
government, and private funds, these piaohao not only supplied the need for a Chinese 
remittance market but also accelerated the flow of commodities, alleviated 
government financial constraints, and enabled ordinary people to transfer money.
8
  As 
an important part of the Chinese financial sector, the Shanxi piaohao was in its growth 
provoked as well as restrained by the Chinese political and economic environment. 
Therefore, an examination of the Shanxi piaohao could increase our understanding of 
Chinese economic history in this era.  
 
Besides their contribution to the economy, the significance of the Shanxi piaohao also 
lies in the unique trajectory of their development. As native-born financial institutions, 
the piaohao developed with their own business strategies and wisdom, inherited from 
a century of business experience. During their existence, they over-depended on 
neither the government nor foreign banks, and therefore their growths to some degree 
reflect the achievements and destinies of typical Chinese merchants at the time. 
 
                                               
6
 “China’s insurance industry started in the 1840s when the British set up insurance 
schemes as a sideline of trade. Before this, no insurance company could insure traders against 
silver shipping loss”, in中国保险史 (A history of China's insurance industry), 中国保险史编
委会 (Editorial committee of a history of China's insurance industry), (中国金融出版社 
(China Finance Publishing House)), 1998. 
7
 Under the peaceful Qing, China’s population doubled from 150 million in 1650 to 300 
million in 1800. A greatly increased population and fragmented landholding resulted in 
massive numbers of famine refugees (Ebrey 1981). At the turn of the nineteenth century, the 
White Lotus Rebellion [白莲教起义] (1794-1804) occurred in northern China, and the 
Tenrikyo Religion Rebellion [天理教起义] (1812/3) disrupted the Zhili, Shandong and 
Henan provinces 
8
 Before the Shanxi piaohao emerged, ordinary folk could rely only on acquaintances to 
convey their money to relatives living at a distance, in Huang, A history of the Shanxi 
Piaohao, p.36. 
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In addition, the Shanxi piaohao are also important for understanding how a traditional 
Chinese merchant group solved the principal/agent problem in a legal context, 
avoiding expensive court fees and the weak enforcement of judicial decisions. By 
designing formal and informal rules and constraints, they successfully disciplined and 
incentivised faraway employees to begin with, but failed to modify this governance 
structure when the organisation expanded and conditions drastically changed.  
Although the Shanxi piaohao is important in China’s economic history, no systematic 
and comprehensive study has so far been written. Until the primary sources became 
accessible, studies were handicapped by scattered qualitative documents or patchy 
balance sheets. Undoubtedly, drawing on analyses of such sketchy sources led to 
conflicting or inconsistent arguments.  However, the present dissertation, based on a 
wealth of micro-economic data together with economic models as analytical tools, 
explores more confidently the development of the Shanxi piaohao. 
This dissertation hypothesises that a firm’s performance depends on its governance 
structure and business strategy; on this basis it proposes the following two big 
questions:  
1. How did the piaohao merchants solve the agency problem in their long 
distance business? 
2. What business strategy did they adopt in order to control the remittance 
market and how did they change over time? 
In this and the next six chapters this thesis seeks to address these questions. Chapter 1 
outlines the historical background of the Shanxi piaohao, including their position in 
China’s financial market, historical development and ways of doing business. The 
next two chapters focus on the piaohao’s governance structure. Chapter 2 examines its 
management structure and Chapter 3 studies the internal incentive structure. They 
show that, by imposing a centralized vertical and a horizontal collective punishment 
management structure, the piaohao merchants successfully overcame the problem of 
commitment. Moreover, a tenure- as well as performance-based incentive structure 
motivated employees to be loyal and work hard. Using the RSC piaohao as a case 
study, Chapter 4 focuses with statistics on the piaohao’s business strategy, i.e. its type 
19 
 
of client and draft and the factors determining remittance commissions. Chapter 5 
scrutinizes the dynamic change of the piaohao’s government business, business 
volume, income/expense structure and profits. Before drawing conclusions, Chapter 6 
attempts to explain the decline of the piaohao by focusing on the impact of the 1911 
Revolution and the expansion at the time of foreign and modern Chinese banks.
9
 
Drawing from extensive primary sources with economic tools, this dissertation makes 
an original contribution by developing a unique data set and incorporating economic 
models and quantitative analyses in the study of the Shanxi piaohao. My work places 
the governance structure of the Shanxi piaohao in the theoretical context of the theory 
of the firm and reveals how the piaohao could manage a widespread branch network 
over distance to protect shareholders’ capital at a time when legal sanctions were 
weak. Using quantitative techniques, this dissertation also takes the opportunity to 
examine the Shanxi piaohao’s business strategy for the first time and shows how the 
piaohao overcame various obstacles and expanded its business.  
Moreover, based on my data set, this dissertation completes the statistics of the 
Shanxi piaohao, i.e. the annual business volumes, incomes and profits. This provides 
the available literature with reliable quantitative references for scrutinising the growth 
of the piaohao. Just as important, my thesis illustrates the decline of the Shanxi 
piaohao by comparing it with its rivals, the modern Chinese banks and foreign banks. 
This innovative study is important for understanding Chinese economic history and 
business history in general, and provides a comparative perspective from which to 
assess the differences between Chinese and foreign financial institutions. 
Data and sources 
Most of the primary and secondary sources of the Shanxi piaohao are published or 
preserved in one of the following three places: an archival book ‘Archival materials of 
the Shanxi piaohao [Shanxi piaohao shiliao 山西票号史料] (Huang, 2002a)’, the 
                                               
9
 The 1911 Revolution was the uprising which ended the Chinese imperial system and 
established a republican government in China. 
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University of Tokyo, and private collections. The piaohao’s sources in my thesis are 
also from these places. 
Data collection for piaohao scholars is a challenging task. This is because many of the 
Shanxi piaohao business records were either destroyed or lost in endless military and 
political turmoil after their decline in the 1910s. Therefore, piaohao scholars before 
the 1990s could undertake their studies only on the basis of rare patches of evidence 
and two illustrated books published during the Republic era (1912-49).
10
 
It the 1990s, under the sponsorship of the People’s Bank of China Shanxi provincial 
branch, the piaohao materials were eventually made available to scholars.  After ten 
years’ hard work, these scholars had gathered almost all the available piaohao 
materials scattered in China and published an archival book ‘Archival materials of the 
Shanxi piaohao’ (edited by Huang, 2002a).  
This archival book contains 1,300 pages of piaohao documents and can be divided 
into three main parts. The first part provides records of the Shanxi piaohao’s historical 
developments compiled chronologically. Not only does it contain comprehensive 
official documents, i.e. government archives, official memorandums and local 
gazetteers to provide a government perspective on the piaohao’s history, it also 
reproduces substantial public and private reports, such as journals and newspaper 
articles of its time to illustrate the piaohao’s operations over time.  
The second part is a collection of documents related to the institutional arrangements 
and business of the piaohao. The sources for this section are rather diverse. Some 
come from contracts, regulations, codes, or lists of payments to the piaohao. Other 
documents are from the oral recollections of people who were once employees of the 
piaohao, or their descendants. It also includes epitaphs of famous piaohao merchants, 
foreign embassies’ reports and foreign scholars’ descriptions at the time. The third 
part of the book includes business correspondence, ledgers, wage and lists of dividend 
distributions left by the RSC, Wei Tai Hou (WTH, hereafter), and Bao Feng Long 
                                               
10
 These two books are: 山西票庄考略 [A general study on the Shanxi piaohao] (Chen, 
1937) and山西票号史 [A history of the Shanxi piaohao] (Wei, 1944). 
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(BFL, hereafter) piaohao. Among them, those left by the RSC are the most 
comprehensive, consisting of more than 200 pages. These letters cover the period 
from the 1840s to the 1900s and comprise correspondence between the twenty 
branches and their head office in Pingyao. 
The primary sources from this book used by my thesis appear in several forms. First, 
this book preserves and my thesis constructs an extensive data set based on more than 
1,200 business letters showing the RSC and WTH daily’s operations in the 1840s, 
’50s, ’60s ’90s and 1900s. The information contained in this data set covers ‘the 
places where their drafts were used’, with ‘the names of the clients’, ‘the amounts and 
types of the silver they dealt in’, ‘and ‘the fees they charged’, etc. 
Moreover, in examining the piaohao’s relationship with the government, official 
memorandums and government archives in this book not only enable me to study the 
interactions between the piaohao merchants and the government, but also allow me to 
construct annual statistics on the Shanxi piaohao’s government business. 
Besides, the piaohao’s institutional arrangement and governance structure, contracts, 
regulation codes, payroll and lists of dividend distribution preserved in the book are 
crucial for the theoretical framework developed in this study. Oral recollections and 
epitaphs are valuable in showing individual-level earnings profile for analysis.  
However, it should be mentioned here that, since this book has collected almost all the 
available piaohao documents dispersed in China, some of them may contain 
misleading or even inaccurate sources. For example, when recording the piaohao 
business, this book (Huang, 2002a p.742.) extracts descriptions from Chen (1937), 
who asserted that most of the Shanxi piaohao’s business sources came from the Qing 
court. However, the later studies, i.e. Liu (2007) and my thesis (2.2) refute this 
argument by estimating the piaohao’s government business. Moreover, when 
collecting piaohao payment lists, this book uses a Japanese work entitled An 
Overview of the Commerce in China [Qingguo Shangye Zongan 清国商业总览] 
which stated that the monthly payment for piaohao employees varied from Tls. 6 to 
Tls. 24 (Huang, 2002a p.565.).  However, from the piaohao’s payroll lists, I have 
identified that it was the annual payment rather than the monthly payment that had 
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this value (Huang, 2002a p.605.). Since all these mistakes occurred in the secondary 
sources of the book, I have in referring them been critical about using them.  
In addition, because this archival book has been available for more than ten years, 
during which time a museum on Shanxi merchants [Jinshang Bowuguan 晋商博物馆] 
was established in Beijing and a private collector Li Jinzhang published a book on the 
Shanxi merchants’ ledgers [Jinshang Laozhang 晋商老账] (Li, 2012), in December 
2012, I went back to Shanxi and Beijing to do field work. Most of the documents 
exhibited in the museum were about the Shanxi merchants trade in the Ming and early 
Qing eras and were not for open public use, and Li’s collections also focus on Shanxi 
merchant’s trade, the most valuable primary source I collected during this field trip 
was a selection of the Shanxi piaohao business letters from Dr. Wang Yonghong of 
the Shanxi Social Science Academy. These letters have been used in compiling my 
piaohao business data set for the thesis. 
As the thesis notes, besides the archival book and private collections, the Shanxi 
piaohao’s documents are also preserved at the Advanced Library of Asia Studies, 
University of Tokyo; therefore, I collected primary sources from this library also. The 
library preserves two selections relating to the piaohao’s business correspondence, 
fourteen account books of the RSC, twelve of the WTH, two of the Zhong Xing He 
(ZXH, hereafter), five of the Yuan Feng Jiu (YFJ, hereafter) and two of the Ri Xin 
Zhong (RXZ, hereafter) piaohao. The two selections of piaohao’s business 
correspondence have been published by Hamashita (Hamashita, 1990, Hamashita, 
2004) and have been encoded into my dataset, on account of the research scope of this 
study; for this reason, I have collected the fourteen account books of the RSC 
piaohao.  
On the basis of these account books, I have compiled one monthly and thirteen annual 
balance sheets of different RSC branches in the 1840s, ’50s, ’60s ’90s and 1900s to 
study the piaohao’s business, income, and expenses structures over time. Since these 
900-sheet account books contain comprehensive daily transactions of the RSC, they 
have not only enabled me to study the piaohao’s book-keeping methods in detail, but 
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have also shown me changes in the piaohao’s business, income and expenses 
structures over time.  
A review of the literature  
Discussions about the Shanxi piaohaos became popular soon after their decline in the 
1910s. Early researchers focused on narratives of their history (Li, 1917, Chen, 1937, 
Wei, 1944, Tamagna, 1942, Yang, 1930, Wagel, 1915), which provided valuable 
information on the way in which these piaohao emerged, developed and declined. 
Among them, Wagel (1915) and Tamagna (1942) praised the Shanxi piaohao as the 
first financial institutions in China to have introduced a system of remittances, and 
maintained that the fall of the piaohao was chiefly due to competition from foreign 
banks. Li (1917) and Chen (1937) attributed the success and failure of the piaohao to 
their arrangements for dealing with personnel.
11
According to these authors, the 
piaohao’s cultural beliefs in brotherhood and loyalty promoted their success but when 
they faced competition from foreign and modern banks, inaction on the part of the 
head office managers accelerated their decline. 
However, after 1945, a period of political turmoil and social unrest ensued in China 
forcing the study of the Shanxi piaohao to be called off for almost forty years, and it 
was not until the 1980s that scholars once again were able to think about research on 
this subject. Compared with the previous writers, studies after the 1980s bring up 
more primary sources and their histories of the Shanxi piaohao concentrate more on 
the piaohao’s relationship with the Qing government (Kong, 1984, Zhang, 1989, 
Deng, 1997, Shi, 1994). For example, Kong (1984) claimed that the course of the 
piaohao is and inextricably linked with the Qing court through government 
remittances. With the end of the Qing regime in 1911; when the piaohao lost this 
business umbrella, it declined. This claim soon led to criticism. Zhang (1989) 
proposed that, since the Shanxi piaohao’s government remittance persisted for long in 
                                               
11
 Besides the personnel arrangements, Chen (1937) also proposed that advances in public 
transport enabled people to carry currency more easily, and therefore, reduced the demand for 
the piaohaos’ services. Moreover, as the piaohao absorbed deposits from northern China and 
lent them out in the south, when the 1911 Revolution occurred and southern China declared 
independence, many loans in the south turned bad, and deposits in the north were withdrawn. 
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only a few provinces, its growth should not be explained by its relationship with the 
government.
12
 Shi (1994) suggested that the piaohao’s vigorous growth should be 
attributed to the rapid growth of China’s trade volume rather than its relationship with 
the government.
13
 
The release of the book ‘Archival materials of the Shanxi piaohao’ in 2002 brought a 
series of quantitative analyses of the piaohao. Li (2005) examined the share of 
piaohao business brought by each type of client,
14
 Qiao (2006) studied the employees’ 
levels of expertise,
15
 Liu (2007) examined the piaohao’s business volumes,16 and Yan 
(2008) estimated their total profis.
17
 Moreover, based on qualitative materials 
contained in the Archival Book, i.e. official memorandums, a body of literature 
elaborated the growth of the piaohao from a historical perspective (Faure, 2005, Faure, 
2006, Jang, 2006, Wang, 2014, Song, 2006). Faure (2005) and Wang (2014) held 
similar views that the reason for the piaohao’s decline may have been that their capital 
power could not meet the financial reform requirements of the Qing government, 
which were gradually distributed elsewhere. Jang (2006) and Song (2006) contended 
                                               
12
 Zhang (1989, pp.98-100) explained that provinces such as Fujian, Guangdong, Zhejiang 
and Sichuan continued to remit government funds after the 1860s when the Taiping Rebellion 
was suppressed, while the remaining provinces ceased to deal in government remittances and 
delivered government funds by conventional silver shipping. However, in his analyses Zhang 
(1989) fails to consider that many provinces after the 1890s resumed government remittances 
in order to pay indemnities for the First Sino-Japanese War (1894/5). 
13
 Shi (1994) examined the number and paid up capital of newly established factories, as 
well as China’s import and export figures from 1895 to 1913 to reach his conclusions. 
14
 Li (2005) estimated the piaohao’s business structures in 1823-61, 1862-93 and 1894-
1911 and found 90% of the business were from commercial sectors and 10% was the 
government. 
15 
Qiao (2006) examined the dividends payment lists of Da De Tong and Xie Cheng Qian 
discovered that about 30%-40% employees could receive expertise shares. 
16
 Liu (2007) estimated Shanxi piaohaos’ annual business volumes in the 1850s, 1870s and 
1900s and found that they rose from Tls. 46 million in the 1850s to Tls. 118 million in the 
1870s and peaked at Tls. 466 million in the 1900s. 
17
 According to Yan’s estimates (Yan 2008), the annual profits of all the Shanxi piaohao 
increased from Tls. 0.46 million in the 1850s to Tls. 1 million in the 1870s, reached a peak of 
Tls. 2 million in the 1900s and only then began to suffer deficits. 
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with each other on whether the decline of the piaohao should be blamed on the 
Chinese currency reforms which began in 1907.
18
 
In addition to surveys from a historical point of view, other studies applying economic 
tools to the same subject started from 2002. Employing organizational theory (Jensen, 
1998), Morck and Yang (2002) studied the relationship between the piaohao 
shareholders and head office managers, and praised it as a dual-class equity structure 
that prevented insider fraud and raised the piaohao to empire-wide success.
19
 Yang 
(2002) modified an efficiency wage model designed by Greif (1994) and applied it to 
the piaohao’s collective punishment mechanism, arguing that this mechanism doomed 
them to failure.
20
 Putting the piaohao’s institutional arrangements into a theoretical 
framework of institutional change (North, 1990), Liu (2005) showed how the informal 
and formal rules and regulations promoted the piaohao’s growth at first but 
endangered them later.
21
   
Zhou (2008) considered the piaohao’s incentive structure and argued that, although 
this incentive structure was effective initially, they declined when the piaohao 
                                               
18
 Jang (2006) argued that the piaohao earned substantial profits by handling the inter-city 
exchange of silver taels which differed in weight and purity. As the currency reforms began in 
1907, the silver taels were gradually replaced by coined silver dollars of fixed silver weight 
and purity; hence the profits made by the Shanxi piaohao shrank rapidly and it declined. 
However, Song (2006) refuted this argument and maintained that the more complex a 
currency is, the greater the transaction costs of trading. Thus, a uniform currency would lower 
transaction costs and therefore encourage trade, which in turn would promote the remittance 
business. The real reason for the piaohao’s decline was their limited working capital and 
competition from the other institutions. 
19
 Morck and Yang (2002) claimed that giving piaohao head office managers expertise in 
stocks incentivised them to maximize value for shareholders. Limiting those managers’ rights 
in daily business operations avoided the risk of managers’ having sufficient stakes to affect 
decisions on employment policy. 
20
 Yang (2002) found that under a collective punishment mechanism the piaohao lacked 
the incentive to design a mechanism for reducing one-off gains by fraud. Therefore, with the 
expansion of the business compounded with a changing environment, managers’ one-off 
frauds increased, and the multilateral punishment mechanism became ineffective when such 
gains exceeded an honest manager’s lifetime income. 
21
 Liu (2005) argued that the piaohao was established on a nexus of formal and informal 
institutional arrangements. At first, these arrangements coordinated well with each other in 
regulating employees. However, with the changing environment, the inadaptability of the 
original formal institution arrangements emerged, causing potential danger to the Shanxi 
piaohao. 
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merchants failed to adjust this incentive structure to suit the changed environment.
22
 
Yan (2012) designed a simplified game theory model and specified that, under a 
collective punishment mechanism, it is only when managers feel extremely 
pessimistic about the prospects for the piaohao that they cheat; otherwise, they will 
remain honest. 
The above studies form the core literature which applies modern economic models to 
analyse the institutional arrangements of the Shanxi piaohao. As well as research 
based on economic theories, some documents also focus on describing the piaohao 
managers’ career paths (Chen, 2011), or comparing its incentive structure with that of 
the European family business enterprises (Lou, 2007),
23
 which are intriguing for the 
present dissertation.  
My contribution to the existing literature 
After critically examining the literature on the Shanxi piaohao, my thesis identifies 
the following issues, which the previous research did not focus on. First and foremost, 
the small amount of data resulted in no systematic and precise quantitative analyses 
on the piaohao business which in turn raised long unsolved controversial arguments. 
For example, when refuting Kong’s claims (1984) on the piaohao’s intimate 
relationship with the government, neither Zhang (1989) nor Shi (1994) could put 
forward strong enough proof of the size of the governmental and commercial share in 
the piaohao’s total business. In consequence, many mainland China scholars (Wang, 
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 Zhou (2008) compared the governance structure of the Shanxi merchant group and the 
Anhui merchant group in the Ming and Qing eras and analyses how culture and belief affect 
the mode of a governance structure. The author put this governance structure in an incentive 
framework designed by Holmstrom and Weiss (1985), who proposed that if a governance 
structure is effective, its internal incentive instruments will be consistent and complementary 
to the governance structure. Based on this argument, Zhou (2008) argued that, although the 
piaohao’s incentive structure was effective at first, they eventually declined because they 
failed to adjust their structures to suit the changed environment. 
23
 Lou (2007, p.57.) compared the Shanxi piaohao incentive mechanism with that of the 
mediaeval Italian family business firms and discovered that, unlike the Shanxi piaohao 
expertise shareholders, who did not have to pay the losses of the piaohao but only enjoyed the 
dividends, the agents in Italian firms had dividend payments but had to bear the loss if firms 
were in deficit. 
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2012, Wang, 2007) still believed that the piaohao’s decline was related to the collapse 
of the Qing court. 
Even Li (2005) and Liu (2007), which estimated the share of government remittances 
in the piaohao’s total business, obtain different results.24 My thesis conjectures that 
the reason for this inconsistent estimation seems to have been the differences between 
the balance sheets examined by these two scholars and between the periods they 
worked on. Li (2005) used only four balance sheets from four different piaohao to 
generalise the piaohao’s business structures in 1823-61, 1862-93, and 1894-1911, 
while the periods worked on by Liu (2002) were the 1850s, 1870s and 1900s. Lack of 
access to data also caused other deficiencies in exploring determinants for the 
piaohao’s decline beyond the fluctuations of government business.25  
When examining the governance structure, Yang (2002), Liu (2005), and Zhou (2008) 
pointed out that the piaohao’s institutional arrangements that endangered their 
survival by failing to adapt to a changing environment. However, due to the limited 
scope of their research, these scholars do not provide further explanations to show 
why the piaohao did not modify their governance structure to suit the changing 
environment.  
After identifying these gaps in the research, this dissertation examines the piaohao’s 
governance structure and business strategies in the following ways. First, to examine 
the piaohao’s governance structure my thesis places the piaohao’s historical narrat ive 
                                               
24
 Li (2005) estimated 10% of the piaohao’s business was from the government, while this 
share, for Liu (2007), is 2%. 
25
 Jang (2006) and Song (2006) debated whether a currency reform in 1907 deprived the 
piaohao from making huge profits in handling inter-city silver tael exchanges and led to their 
fall. However, these authors overlook a key element, namely, how heavily did the income 
from silver tael exchange impact the piaohao’s performance. Moreover, Faure (2005) argued 
that, since the piaohao made no provision for bad debts in their methods of bookkeeping, 
which is a mechanism to keep track of capital, it hastened their decline when they were 
confronted with risks. However, when examining their balance sheets, I found that the 
piaohao had an item on ‘bad loan amortization [piepizhang 撇疲账]’ when tracking capital 
flow. This finding is contradicted by Faure (2006). 
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within the analytical framework of the theory of the firm.
26
 Employing theories of 
transaction cost and principal/agent, this dissertation proposes that two principal/agent 
relationships were central to the Shanxi piaohao: the relationship between 
shareholders and head office managers, and the link between head office managers 
and distant employees. Since the former relationship has been examined by Morck 
and Yang (2002), the focus of my dissertation will be the latter. 
Moreover, in order to explore why the piaohao’s governance structure worked well in 
disciplining distant employees at first but became dysfunctional when they faced the 
risk of elimination, this dissertation modifies Greif’s efficiency wages model(Greif, 
2006).
27
 It finds that when the piaohao had business in prospect and the employees 
had no other work opportunities, a collective mechanism is self-enforcing. However, 
when the employees perceived the decline of the piaohao and were able to work in 
other financial institutions, the collective mechanism became ineffective. 
Unlike previous accounts which refer to few data to generalise arguments, this 
dissertation puts the piaohao’s business strategy in a longitudinal context with a 
wealth of micro-economic data. Focusing on the RSC piaohao, for the first time, not 
only do I spot dynamic changes in the piaohao’s client and draft types, but also 
identify what factors determined their remittance fees over time. Again, for the first 
time, by estimating all the Shanxi piaohao’s annual government business, my thesis 
shows that the government business volume never exceeded 10% of the piaohao’s 
total business, and the income from this business occupied only about 2% of the 
piaohao’s total income. Therefore, one needs to reconsider whether the piaohao’s 
decline should be attributed to its relationship with the Qing government. 
  
                                               
26
 The method of incorporating theory as a tool with which to analyse a historical narrative 
is described by Bates (1998) as Analytical Narrative. 
27
 Greif (2006，p.37, pp.88-9.) placed the motivation to follow rules at the centre of the 
analysis and studied the Maghribi merchants who operated a collective punishment 
mechanism. From his efficient wage model, Greif (2006 p.37, pp.88-9.) has found that the 
wage paid by a Maghribi merchant for an honest agent was lower than what he paid to an 
employee who cheated. Therefore, a collective mechanism was self-enforcing. 
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 An overview of the Shanxi piaohao  Chapter 1.
This chapter provides an overview of the Shanxi piaohao with the aim of setting the 
scene for the remaining chapters. It shows how the Shanxi piaohao emerged and 
developed as a consequence of reactive sequences path dependency. Moreover, as an 
introductory chapter, this chapter also examines ways that these piaohao enforced 
drafts, the currencies they traded in and their bookkeeping methods. These analyses 
attempt to provide some background information on the way in which the Shanxi 
piaohao originated and established their business. 
1.1 Historical pattern: Reactive sequence path dependence 
The province of Shanxi is located in the North China region. The name Shanxi [山西] 
literally means “Mountain west”, which refers to the province’s location west of the 
Taihang Mountains [太行山]. Shanxi borders Hebei province to the east, Henan 
province to the south, Shaanxi province to the West and Mongolia to the north. 
Figure 1-1: Location of the Shanxi province 
 
Sources：Chinese GIS in 1820s 
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Shanxi is made up of a plateau bounded partly by mountain ranges. As a province 
located in central China, Shanxi has abundant iron and coal, and is famous for 
handicrafts and silk production. However, 80% of the land in Shanxi consists of arid 
mountains and hills which were then unsuitable for farming, and in consequence the 
Shanxi people tended to leave their home towns and travel far afield undertaking 
commercial business. 
For centuries Shanxi served as the centre of trade, with the term Shanxi merchant 
[Jinshang 晋商 ] once synonymous with wealth. Shanxi merchants constituted a 
historical phenomenon that lasted for centuries, from the Han dynasty (206-220 BC) 
to the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912 AD). The earliest business of the Shanxi merchants 
was to sell salt from a saline lake in the province (Zhang, 2001 p.20.).  During the 
Spring and Autumn periods [chunqiu 春秋时期 ] (771-476 BC), salt probably 
provided the Shanxi people with reliable income by attracting trade. Given the 
closeness of the border with Mongolia, during the Han dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD), 
Shanxi locals traded with Mongols across the Great Wall for commodities of all kinds.  
The exploration of the Silk Road in this era further linked the Shanxi merchants with 
Westerners. They left home carrying silk, tea and porcelain to exchange for Indian 
spices, ivories and precious stones, and the Roman Empire’s gold, silver, fine 
glassware and jewels. After importing these exotic goods, the Shanxi merchants 
would resell them in their retail stores (Zhang, 1989 pp.20-6.).  
During the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 AD), the Shanxi merchants, benefiting from the 
Kaizhong Law [kaizhongfa 开中法 ], got a monopoly of the government’s salt 
production and sale.
28
 As a product of highly inelastic demand, salt gave the Shanxi 
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 “During the Ming period (1368-1644), persistent incursions by Mongols, Turks and 
other northern barbarians caused the Ming to man its northernmost borders with about 
800,000 troops. To provide military supplies, the Qing court privatized salt production and 
granted salt quota certificates to the merchants who transported the troop supplies to the 
northernmost areas. These certificates conferred the right to buy salt from the state salt works 
and sell it. Taking advantage of their geographical position, the Shanxi merchants dominated 
this business and accumulated substantial wealth”, in 晋商兴衰史: 称雄商界 500 年 (The 
rise and decline of Shanxi merchants: Dominated the business world for 500 years, 
Zhengming Zhang, ((山西古籍出版社 (Guji press)), 2001, p.82. 
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merchants substantial profits. The Shanxi people had a culture of saving rather than 
spending fortunes; after several generations’ trade and commerce, therefore, they had 
accumulated substantial wealth. 
By the Qing dynasty (1644-1912 AD), the Shanxi merchants had established their 
retail shop networks all over China; their trade included cottons, silks, tea, leather, 
pigments, coal, iron products, wood, tobacco, etc. Moreover, they operated most of 
the pawnshops and credit-debt bureaux in northern China (Huang, 2002b p.28.). 
For a long time, these Shanxi merchants used armed escorts for transporting sums of 
silver to settle their balances. However, from the 1800s, with more and more frequent 
social riots, traditional methods of shipping silver became increasingly dangerous. In 
this situation, a chain of dyeing shops, the Xi Yu Cheng [西裕成, XYC, hereafter] 
began to accept requests from their acquaintances to remit silver to their branch 
locations.
29
 
In order to remit silver, the acquaintances needed to submit silver to a XYC branch, 
so that the branch would issue a draft and inform the branch in receipt of it to pay in 
silver as soon as they saw the draft. At first, the XYC only did this as a favour, but the 
convenience and safety of the procedure attracted a growing number of people to ask 
for the same. It was at this stage that the XYC began to charge a fee (Huang, 2002 
p.11.).  
In the 1820s, the XYC was inherited by an ambitious young entrepreneur, Li Daquan, 
who appointed Lei Lvtai, the manager of the XYC in Hankou as the head office 
manager. Like Li Daquan, Lei Lvtai was innovative and believed that a remittance 
business would be much more profitable to run than a firm of dyers. Inspired by this 
idea, Lei bravely suggested that Li should convert the XYC to a remittance firm. In 
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 “XYC was established around 1775 by a Li Wenbin in Pingyao. By the 1820s, the firm 
had branches in Baoding, Tianjin and Hankou, Tongzhou, etc. From several public 
construction donation epitaphs in Beijing and Pingyao, the XYC can be traced as the largest 
donor. This indicates the strong capital power of the firm. For example, in the ‘Epitaph for the 
City Gate Tower Rebuilding Donation List, 1813’, the XYC was already on the donation list 
and made the largest donation, Tls. 24,” in Huang, A history of the Shanxi piaohao, pp.46-51. 
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response, Lei invested Tls. 300 thousand to establish the Ri Sheng Chang piaohao 
[RSC, hereafter] in 1823 (Deng, 1997, p.58.). The RSC set up its headquarters in 
Pingyao Town with twelve branches spread nationwide.   
The unique service provided by the RSC won them quick success. At almost the same 
time, a nationwide postal service developed by the Ningbo merchants facilitated the 
RSC’s remittance business.30 While the RSC enjoyed a great triumph, its vice-head 
manager Mao Hongsui left the firm due to conflict with Lei Lvtai, his superior. As a 
consequence, Mao was hired by Hou, a silk merchant and transformed his chain of 
silk shop into four Shanxi piaohao: Wei Sheng Chang, Xin Tai Hou, Wei Feng Hou, 
and Wei Tai Hou around 1826.
31
  From then on, the Shanxi piaohao spread in great 
numbers. 
From the above historical narratives, it can be seen that the emergence of the Shanxi 
piaohao followed the pattern of reactive sequence path dependence.
32
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 “China’s postal system was established around 1800. Before Civil Postal Bureaux 
[minxinjv民信局] were established, mainly by Zhejiang merchants, there was no civil postal 
service in China and commoners could rely only on acquaintances to bring letters. So the 
Shanxi piaohao’ emergence was inseparable from a new postal system”, in Huang, A history 
of the Shanxi Piaohao, p.40. 
31
 Later, in 1864, he invested in another Shanxi piaohao, Tian Cheng Heng. Together with 
the previous four, these piaohao were known as the Wei Piaohao Group [Weizi wulianhao 蔚
字五联号].   
32
 According to Mahoney (2000), path dependence can be classified into self-reinforcing 
sequences and reactive sequences. Reactive sequences are chains of temporally ordered and 
causally connected events. In a reactive sequence, each event in the sequence is both a 
reaction to antecedent events and a cause of subsequent events. 
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Figure 1-2: Reactive sequence explanation of the emergence of the Shanxi piaohao  
A B F
E
D
G
H
Business sequence
C
Environment 
sequence
I
Contingency event
Contingency event 
 
Note: 
A. Trade and retail business  
B. Credit and debt business  
 
C. Trade volume increased 
D. Silver shipping increased 
E. Silver being looted or robbed 
 
F. A postal system set up 
 
G. First Shanxi piaohao was set up 
H. The conflict between the RSC head and vice head manager. 
I.  More Shanxi piaohao set up 
As Figure 1-2 suggests, the origins of the Shanxi piaohao can be broken down into 
three main sequences: a business sequence, an environment sequence, and an 
economic sequence. A business sequence is triggered by certain features unique to the 
Shanxi piaohao. Shanxi merchants built up their long distance trade and retail 
business [A]. To solve the financing problems in the trade, the Shanxi merchants 
established financial institutions such as pawnshops and credit-debt bureaux [B] to 
provide credit. Undertaking trade business enabled them to develop business rules and 
customs for long distance trading and operating pawnshops also provided the piaohao 
with ample experience of operating financial institutions. All these are essential for 
the piaohao business. 
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In terms of the environmental sequence of changes, the boom in China’s trade volume 
[C] increased the frequency of silver shipping [D]. A growing number of famine 
refugees and rioters [E] endangered conventional forms of silver shipping. At this 
time, a contingency event, China’s postal system, was set up [F]. Pegged to this event, 
this first Shanxi piaohao RSC was established [G]. Although the RSC intended to 
monopolise the remittance business by protecting its business secrets, another 
contingent event, the conflict between the RSC head and vice head managers [H] 
resulted in the departure of the latter from the RSC and the establishment of four more 
Shanxi piaohao. This set off the boom of the Shanxi piaohao [I]. 
The intersection of the two sequences (i.e. B and E) is necessary for the emergence of 
the piaohao. However, without the contingency event F, it is possible that the first 
Shanxi piaohao might not have been set up. Another contingency event, H, further led 
to more Shanxi piaohao being established.  
As a group, these Shanxi piaohao enjoyed rapid development between 1820 and 1850 
by transferring domestic mercantile funds (Huang 2002a, pp.742-751). However, with 
the spread of the Taiping Rebellion (1852-64), they experienced their first business 
retreat from southern China.
33
 Although the piaohao suffered in this uprising, it also 
provided another business opportunity for them. As the rebellious troops cut off the 
official silver shipment routes from south to north, the Qing authorities in 1862 began 
to allow the piaohao to remit governmental funds on a large scale. Although 
government remittances faced several bans from the central government, the piaohao 
managed to continue remitting government funds until the Great Qing Bank was 
established in 1907.
34
 Moreover, as the Taiping Rebellion was suppressed, and the 
number of treaty ports grew, the Shanxi piaohao obtained a relatively peaceful 
business environment for further development between the 1870s and the 1890s. 
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 The Taiping Rebellion (1850-64) was an anti-Qing rebellion in southern China. During 
more or less the same period, the Nian Rebellion (1851-68) in central China broke out; it was 
later joined by the Taiping armies. 
34
 The government business will be studied in Chapter 5. 
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At the turn of the century, the Shanxi piaohao encountered another business 
withdrawal due to the Boxer Rebellion (1900/1)
35
 and the ensuing eight-county relief 
expedition.
36
 However, since this turmoil was limited mainly to Beijing and Tianjin, 
and many piaohao had already shut down their branches before the war started, they 
were able to recover as soon as it ended. The peaceful situation lasted for another ten 
years until the 1911 Revolution broke out. Unlike the previous uprisings, the 1911 
Revolution occurred overnight and overthrew the Qing court. Moreover, it cast China 
into endless civil wars and social chaos before the Nationalist government was 
established in 1927. It was in these circumstances that the Shanxi piaohao dissolved 
one after another, and finally disappeared from history in the 1930s.  
Here it is worth mentioning that, following in the footsteps of the Shanxi piaohao, 
merchants in southern China also started a remittance business in the 1860s, known as 
the Southern piaohao [nanbang piaohao 南帮票号], but most of them were short 
lived.
37
 As well as their over issuing drafts and mismanagement, another reason for 
the southern piaohao’s decline may have been the Shanxi piaohao’s advantages as 
first mover to the market. Moreover, unlike the Shanxi piaohao which assisted each 
other with intra-piaohao business, those Southern piaohao were run more 
independently.  
Table 1-1 shows a list of all the Shanxi piaohao who operated from first to last. Their 
headquarters divided the Shanxi piaohao into three factions: Pingyao, Qixian and 
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 The Boxer Rebellion (1900/1) was an anti-imperialist uprising which took place in 
Shandong and Zhili provinces. 
36
 In response to the Boxer Rebellion which was at first supported by the Qing, an 
international coalition set up by Japan, Russia, the British Empire, France, the United States, 
Germany, Italy and Austria-Hungary declared war on the Qing court and occupied Beijing 
and Tianjin in 1900. The war ceased with the signing of Treaty of 1901. 
37
 “The Piaohao managed by southern merchants were collectively known as the Southern 
piaohao [nanbang piaohao 南帮票号]. The Southern piaohao on a scale comparable to the 
Shanxi piaohao were: Fu Kang [阜康] (1865-84), Yuan Feng Run [源丰润] (1889-1910), and 
Tian Shun Xiang [天顺祥] (1875-1911)”, in山西票号史料 (Archival Materials of the Shanxi 
piaohao), Jianhui Huang, 山西经济出版社 (Shanxi Economic Press), p. 66. 
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Taigu.
38
 The Pingyao faction was the largest of the three and the Taigu faction was 
the most profitable (Huang, 2002a, p.22.). 
Table 1-1: A list of all the Shanxi piaohao 
No. 
Existing 
Period 
Name Headquarters 
Paid-up capital 
(Tls.) 
Number of 
shareholders 
1 1823-1914 Ri Sheng  Chang Pingyao 360,000 1 
2 1826-1921 Wei Tai Hou Pingyao 240,000 1 
3 1826-1922 Wei Feng Hou Pingyao 100,000 1 
4 1826-1921 Wei Sheng Chang Pingyao 120,000 2 
5 1826-1921 Xin Tai Hou Pingyao 160,000 2 
6 1830s-1914 Zhi Cheng Xin Taigu 34,000 2 
7 1850-1914 Hui Tong Yuan Taigu 81,000 3 
8 1850-1903 Xie He Xin Pingyao 100,000 1 
9 1856-1913 Xie Tong Qing Pingyao 360,000 2 
10 1859-1889 Yuan Feng Jiu Qixian 100,000 1 
11 1860-1913 Xie Cheng Qian Taigu 60,000 7 
12 1860-1918 Bai Chuan Tong Pingyao 160,000 3 
13 1860-1907 Qian Ji Sheng Pingyao 100,000 3 
14 1861-1912 Da De Yu Taigu 200,000 3 
15 1861-1920 Xu Cheng De Taigu 150,000 2 
16 1864-1920 Wei Chang Hou Pingyao 150,000 2 
17 1864-1921 Tian Cheng Heng Pingyao 100,000 2 
18 1860s-1910s San Jin Yuan Qixian 200,000 1 
19 1860s-1916 Cun Yi Gong Qixian 160,000 3 
20 1860s-1885 Jv Xing Long Qixian 100,000 2 
21 1860s-1893 Qian Sheng Heng Pingyao 100,000 1 
22 1860s-1911 Qi De Chang Pingyao N/A 1 
23 1880-1884 Hui  Yuan Yong Pingyao 60,000 1 
24 1882-1917 Jin Sheng Run Taigu 32,000 1 
25 1883-1911 Heng Long Guang Taigu 150,000 2 
26 1884-1888 Da De Yuan Qixian 100,000 1 
27 1885-1914 Zhong Xing He Qixian 60,000 2 
28 1884-1940s Da De Tong Qixian 100,000 5 
29 1880s-1932 Da De Heng Qixian 60,000 1 
30 1892-1900 Yong Tai Qing Taigu 60,000 2 
31 1893-1921 Shi Yi Xin Taigu 200,000 1 
32 1906-1921 Bao Feng Longa Pingyao 260,000 3 
Sources: Based on Huang (2002a, pp.1278-80) 
a
 Unlike the other Shanxi piaohao which were solely invested in by Shanxi merchants, one of 
the three shareholders in the Bao Feng Long piaohao was Zhao Erxun [赵尔巽], who had 
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 “Pingyao, Qixian and Taigu are three towns of city level in Shanxi province. As Shanxi 
province’s three trading centres, these towns gathered most of the richest merchants in 
Shanxi”, Huang, A history of the Shanxi Piaohao, p.109. 
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been Shanxi’s Provincial Governor (1902/3) and was promoted to Sichuan Viceroy in 1906 
(Huang, 2002a p.577.). 
As Table 1-1 illustrates a piaohao normally had no more than three shareholders with 
unlimited liabilities. Unlike other traditional Chinese financial institutions which had 
family members to run the day to day business, the Shanxi piaohao hired experienced 
non-family members to take charge of daily operations.
39
  Normally it was only after 
three to four years, which the piaohao called the ‘Grand Fiscal Cycle [dazhangqi 大帐
期 ]’, that shareholders would decide which head managers should be retained, 
according to their past performance. 
Based on Table 1-1, Figure 1-3 plots the cumulative number of operating piaohao in 
each period.  It can be found that this number increased steadily from five in the 
1820s to eight in the 1850s. Over the 1860s, this number grew by 2.5 times and it 
reached a peak of 27 in the 1900s. Within a decade of the 1910s, the number of 
operated piaohao plummeted from 23 to 8, and by the 1930s, no more than three were 
left. 
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 “The tradition of employing non-family may date back to the Ming Dynasty (1368-
1644); they named this institutional arrangement ‘cooperation between shareholders and 
employees [donghuo hezuo zhi东伙合作制]’ ”, in Huang, Archival Materials of the Shanxi 
piaohao, p. 563. 
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Figure 1-3: Cumulative number of operating piaohao in each period, 1820s to 1930s 
 
Sources: Ibid.  
1.2 Draft enforcement  
In an environment which had few commercial laws to regulate and protect the interest 
of financial institutions, the piaohao designed a number of regulations to ensure the 
credibility and enforcement of their drafts. A typical draft enforcement procedure was 
for client X to submit silver to a piaohao branch A; then A would issue a draft to X 
who would then send the draft to another client, Y, to cash it in another branch, B.
40
  
This draft is a uniform invoice in triplicate: the counterfoil [piaogen票根] was kept in 
the branch that issued the draft, the payment order [songpiao 送票] was given to the 
client who would cash the draft, and a receipt was given to the client who sent the 
draft. Here it should be noted that, unlike bills of exchange, the Shanxi piaohao’s 
drafts could not be endorsed. Instead they circulated only between buyers and sellers.  
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 From the RSC business letters (Huang, 2002a pp.833-1100.), I have found in a few 
cases that the RSC helped other Shanxi piaohao to cash their drafts. 
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Figure 1-4: A triplicate uniform invoice of the Da De Heng piaohao 
 
 
Source: Huang (2002a p.685). 
To prevent counterfeit drafts, the piaohao merchants used a special type of paper and 
printed delicate watermarks on their drafts.  In addition, they created a method named 
‘secret signals [miya密押]’. Initialled by the RSC head manager, Lei Lvtai, the RSC 
chose China’s nine provinces yan [兖], qing [青], xu [徐], yan [扬], jing[荆], yu [豫], 
liang[梁], and yong [雍] to indicate the numbers one to nine; they used a twelve word 
line from a ballad such as ‘Be cautious of counterfeit drafts [谨防假票冒取], and do 
not forget to check stamps [勿忘细视书章 ]’ to signify the twelve months. To 
represent days, a poem thirty words long was applied (Deng, 1997 p.63). Learning 
from the RSC, other Shanxi piaohao also adopted the secret signal method, using 
different poems and ballads. 
41
  
These secret signals were usually written in the back of a draft corresponding to the 
information written on the front. Therefore, when a branch staff member received a 
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 From the archival book (Huang, 2002a p.681), I have found that the DDH piaohao used 
a five-character poem to indicate numbers one to ten, while the WTH piaohao used an 
antithetical couplet to refer to these numbers. 
Receipt  
Payment 
order 
Counterfoil 
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draft from another branch, he could check whether the information on the front and 
the words on the back were consistent. These passwords had to be recited by the staff 
and were changed periodically (Deng, 1997 p.63). Moreover, to prevent other people 
from faking drafts, the piaohao also insisted that each branch should only have one 
staff member to write the drafts and thus make sure that staff in other branches could 
recognize his handwriting (Wei, 1944 pp.108-9.).    
When a draft was lost, a client had to report to his local magistrate, and then the local 
magistrate would authorize a member of the local piaohao guild to check with the 
relevant piaohao. After receiving confirmation by letter [存照] for retention from the 
local court, the piaohao and the client would collectively announce in a public 
newspaper that this draft was no longer valid.
42
     
There were two ways to cash drafts: one was called ‘on-demand payment [见票立付]’, 
which means that the piaohao had to pay upon sight of the draft; the other was ‘long-
term payment’, which means the piaohao could postpone a remittance to a promised 
day (Wei, 1944 pp.108-9.). For some clients, the piaohao also provided remittances in 
advance. Customers could ask the piaohao to remit a certain amount of money by 
borrowing from the piaohao, and would repay it on a promised day (Chen, 1937 
p.144.). 
To reduce the cost of shipping silver,
43
 the Shanxi piaohao created a unique type of 
draft, the ‘inverse draft [nihui 逆汇 ]’ (Huang, 2002a p.677.). An ‘original draft 
[shunhui顺汇]’ is set up for a client who gives silver to branch A and can cash it in 
branch B, while an ‘inverse draft’ is set up for a client who gives silver to branch B 
and can receive it in branch A.  
These two types of draft appealed equally to clients. However, the inverse drafts 
largely improved the piaohao’s capacity to mobilize silver without shipping it. From 
                                               
42商部奏折附片[Memorandum of the Board of Revenue], 财政金融类 [Finance and 
Monetary], 1908, in Huang, Archival materials of the Shanxi piaohao, p.686.    
43
 “Shipping silver in an armed convoy would cost 2 to 3 per cent of its value”, in 
Tradition and Transformation, John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), p.333. 
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their business letters, I have observed that when one branch, A, was short of silver, its 
manager would request other branches to send more inverse remittance drafts to 
him.
44
 As with their development, the Shanxi piaohao also incorporated deposit and 
loan business with their inverse and loan drafts. Based on business letters of the WTH 
and RSC piaohao, Table 1-2 summarizes all the types of draft in the Shanxi piaohao. 
Table 1-2: Types of draft in the Shanxi piaohao 
Type Operation 
Direct original draft A client who gives silver to branch A and can cash it in branch B 
Direct loan draft 
A client who borrows from branch A for remittance to branch B will 
pay it back to A 
Inverse original 
draft 
A client who gives silver to branch B and can cash it in branch A 
Inverse loan draft 
A client who borrows from branch A for remittance to branch B which 
is paid back to branch B 
Sources: Compiled based on WTH and RSC business letters (Huang, 2002a, pp.833-1214.) 
The table shows Shanxi piaohao had direct original, direct loan, inverse original 
drafts, and inverse loan four types of drafts. A ‘direct original draft’ refers to a client 
who gives silver to branch A and may receive it in branch B; a ‘direct loan draft’ 
refers to a client who borrows from branch A for remittance to branch B and will pay 
it back to branch A in the future; an ‘inverse original draft’ refers to a client who 
gives silver to branch B and may receive it in branch A;  an ‘inverse loan draft’ refers 
to a client who borrows from branch A for remittance to branch B and pays it back to 
branch B in the future. By designing different types of draft, the piaohao not only 
provided their clients with more choices for their services, but also lowered their 
transaction costs through the market. 
1.3 Ways of sending drafts  
Besides designing four types of draft, the Shanxi piaohao also gave clients three 
optional ways to send their drafts: by paper draft [piaohui票汇], letter draft [xinhui信
汇], or telegram draft [dianhui电汇]. A paper draft, the most commonly used form, 
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 This observation is made on the basis of analysing 824 RSC piaohao drafts and 126 Wei 
Tai Hou piaohao drafts (Huang, 2002a pp. 833-1214.).  
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refers to a client X who submits silver to branch A, and sends the draft to a client Y 
who can go to branch B to cash the draft. A letter draft means that client X submits 
silver to a branch A. This branch would then write a letter to branch B, stating that a 
client Y would cash the draft with a letter. At the same time, client X also writes a 
letter to inform client Y that he should carry the letter with him to cash the draft. 
Having received the letter, Y would bring it to branch B to cash the silver. The 
piaohao did not issue a draft but a letter in this process. Letter drafts were only 
permitted to major clients of long standing (Huang, 2002a p.690).  
With the spread of telegraph in the 1880, the piaohao began to use telegram drafts in 
addition. With these, after a client X submitted silver to branch A, the branch would 
send a telegram to branch B to cash the draft when it saw the telegram. Compared 
with the paper and letter drafts, telegram drafts shortened clients’ waiting time but in 
doing so reduced the length of time between a piaohao’s receiving and paying out 
silver. As the branch manager of the WTH piaohao in Beijing stated in a business 
letter: “Although we helped our clients to get out of their emergencies, the profits we 
made from this business are small. Using the telegraph not only reduced the length of 
time for us to mobilize the silver, it also makes it easy to counterfeit drafts. Therefore, 
apart from exceptional cases, we should in future avoid using the telegraph to send 
drafts (Huang, 2002a, p.678.)”.45 In addition to the WTH, of 3,642 transactions of the 
RSC piaohao, I have found only 28 drafts that were sent by telegram. 
1.4 Traded currencies 
The monetary system in Qing China may have been the most complicated one in the 
world at the time (Cheng, 2003 p.95.). There was a bimetallic currency system with 
numerous silver taels, copper coins, and paper notes as the medium of exchange. 
Copper coins are measured in counting units with ‘wen’ as the base unit while silver 
taels are measured in weighed units with ‘tael’ as the base unit. Both of these 
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 In the Qing dynasty, the cost of sending a letter varied from 24 wen to 100 wen, and it 
could be delivered within 8 to 15 days. The cost of sending a telegram varied from Tls.1 to 
Tls. 5 (Tls. 1 ≈ 1,000 wen), and it can be received instantly.  
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mediums of exchange had plenty of local variations in purity and weight.
46
 Silver 
taels were normally used in large business transactions such as trade and taxation, and 
copper coins were used as the means of exchange in small matters (Peng, 2007). Since 
most of the transactions in the Shanxi piaohao were paid in silver, this dissertation 
introduces below the types of silver that the piaohao dealt in.  
Because the Qing authority did not have a systematic silver mint bureau, different 
places had their own silver taels which differed in purity, shape and weight(Ma, 2011 
p.4.). In general, four types of silver were in circulation: ‘baoyin [宝银]’ which was 
made in the shape of an ingot, with each ‘baoyin’ roughly equalling Tls. 50. 
‘Xiaoyuanbao[小元宝]’ which was smaller than the ‘baoyin’ and equalled Tls. 10; 
‘xiaoguo[小綶]’ which was cast in the shape of a bun and equalled Tls. 1-2, and 
‘silver shard [suiyin碎银]’ which was less than Tls. 1  (Peng, 2007 p.537.).  
As a payment medium, silver is measured in weight. However, China’s sets of 
weights were not standardised in the Qing era, and weights in different places were 
different. Even in a single city, a number of weights would be used. Of the various 
weights, four were widely accepted: Kuping [库平], guanping [关平], guangping [广
平] and caoping [漕平]. The silver taels measured by these four weights were also the 
most commonly circulated.
47
 Each piaohao had a set of weights named ‘benping’ [本
平].48 When clients carried their silver to a piaohao, based on the ‘benping’, the 
piaohao would check whether the clients’ silver weighed more or less than the 
‘benping’.  If it weighed less, the piaohao would deduct the difference when the silver 
was submitted silver, while if it weighed more, the piaohao would make up the rest. 
This weight difference was reflected as the ‘silver weight disparity income’ and 
‘silver weight disparity expense’ in the piaohao’s balance sheets. 
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 “Turning to copper coinage, one copper coin was called 1 wen, 1000 wen equalled 1 
diao, and the diao was the largest unit of account for copper. As regards sliver taels, Tls. 1 
equalled 10 qian, 1 qian equalled 10 fen, and 1 fen equalled 10 li.  Therefore, Tls. 1 equalled 
1,000-2,000 wen coins”, in Chinese Money and Monetary System, Debin Ma, p.8. 
47
 In public taxation, ‘kuping silver’ was used, while in the Maritime Customs employed 
‘guanping silver’, ibid. 
48
 The weight of each silver ingot and what types of weighing it could be used for were 
carved on its surface, ibid. 
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From a report of the ‘Central Bank Monthly Review [zhongyangyinhang yuebao 中央
银行月报]’ (Huang, 2002a p.697.), I have found that there were about five to six 
types of weight in each city, with about one hundred types of weight in use at the 
same time. In order to remember the difference between the ‘benping’ and other types 
of weight, the piaohao created pithy mnemonics for their staff. For example, in the Da 
De Heng [DDH hereafter] piaohao, the formula between benping and qigongping [祁
公平] is: ‘62, 124, 186, 248, 310, 272, 434, 496 and 558 (Huang, 2002a p.699.).’ This 
means that Tls. 100 qigongping silver is Tls. 0.62 smaller than the DDH benping 
silver, Tls. 200 qigongping is Tls. 1.24 smaller than the DDH benping …and Tls. 900 
qigongping is Tls. 5.58 smaller than the DDH benping.  
Table 1-3 shows the descriptive results of the weight difference between the DDH 
‘benping’ and other types of weight. It shows there were 96 different types of weight 
for the DDH to deal with. A mean of -1.31 indicates that if a client remitted Tls. 100 
of silver in DDH, he normally received Tls. 98.69 in another city. 
Table 1-3: Descriptive results of the weight difference between DDH benping and DDH 
benping (per Tls. 100) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Disparity with Benping 96 -1.31 1.71 -5.4 2.1 
Source: 中央银行月报 Central Bank Monthly Review, volume 6, No. 12 (Huang, 2002a 
pp.699-701.). 
Here it may be worth pointing out that, although each piaohao had its own weights, 
differences between each one’s were very small. Table 1-4 illustrates the descriptive 
results of another Shanxi piaohao, Da De Tong (DDT, hereafter), on its ‘benping’ and 
the differences with other types of weight, which show that only Tls. 0.17 difference 
can be found in Tls. 100, and such a small difference was probably a matter of  
indifference to clients (Huang, 2002a p.712).  
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Table 1-4: Descriptive results of the difference between DDT benping and other types of 
weight (per Tls. 100) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Disparity with Benping  32 -1.48 1.89 -5.31 1.66 
Sources: Ibid. 
Like the weight, the purity of the silver in different places also varied. For the 
convenience of accounting, the Qing authority set an imaginary silver tael, the 
wenyin, which stood for a silver coin of 100% purity. However, in practice no wenyin 
existed; other types of silver represented wenyin for accounting purposes (Ma, 2011 
p.8.). 
In contrast to ‘wenyin’, ‘baoyin’ was the name of the actual silver pieces in 
circulation. These baoyin had different names according to their place of origin and 
purity. For example, Tianjin circulated baibaoyin while Suzhou used subaoyin for 
transactions (Huang, 2002a p.695.). Table 1-5 gives the descriptive results of the 
silver with different levels of purity that the DDH piaohao dealt in. These reveal that 
27 different levels of purity could be found in its currency. A mean of 98.3 % 
indicates that this coinage on average contained 98.3% pure silver. In a market with 
thousands of different types of silver in circulation, this high purity to some degree 
ensured the piaohao’s reputation. 
Table 1-5: Descriptive results of silver types 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Purity  27 98.3% 0.03    85.6% 100% 
Sources: Ibid. 
1.5 Account books and book-keeping methods  
To record business, the piaohao had three types of accounts: running accounts 
[liushuizhang流水帐], itemized accounts [xiliuzhang细流帐] and the general ledger 
[zongqingzhang总清账]. A running account is a basic account; it documented every 
transaction as it occurred. Since the handwriting in the running accounts was 
imperfect and hasty, at the end of every month, each branch would transcribe all the 
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transactions from the running accounts to the itemized accounts to compile a monthly 
balance sheet [yueqing月清]. At the end of every year, these branches would prepare 
the general ledger and submit it to the head office. According to these general ledgers, 
the head office would compile a general annual balance sheet [zongqing 总清] and 
distribute dividends (Li, 2012 p.45.).  
In recording their transactions, the piaohao used a bookkeeping method called the 
‘four pillars [sizhufa四柱法]’. This method consisted of four parts, namely, revenue 
[shou 收], submission [jiao 交], assets [cun存] and liabilities [gai该].  
The ‘revenue’ by definition was all the amounts in silver that the piaohao had 
received in the past year. It included ‘silver in received drafts [shouhui 收汇 ]’, 
‘income received from interest [dexianliyin 得现利银]’, ‘fees for the remittance 
service [detiefeiyin得贴费银]’, and ‘income from the weight and purity of the silver 
[dexianseyin 得现色银 ]’, together with all other income. Under the heading of 
‘submission’ was all the silver that the piaohao paid out, including the ‘silver in 
posted drafts [jiaohui 交汇 ]’, ‘property rents [fangzu 房租 ]’, ‘board expenses 
[zashiyin杂使银]’, ‘amortization of bad loans [pizhang撇疲帐]’, and so on.  ‘Assets’ 
covers ‘all the loans [waigai外该]’, the ‘interest receivable on them [yingshouliyin应
收利银]’, and the ‘cash reserve [xiancun 现存]’. ‘Liabilities’ stood for ‘deposits 
[gaiwai该外]’ and the ‘interest payable on these [yingfuliyin应付利银]’ (Li, 2012 
pp.44-47.). For a Shanxi piaohao, at the end of every year, the difference between 
‘revenues’ and ‘submissions’ had to equal the change in its net assets (i.e. difference 
between ‘assets’ and ‘liabilities’).  Table 1-6 is an example of an annual balance sheet 
of an RSC piaohao, the Yangzhou branch in 1867, which indicates that in 1867 the 
‘revenues’ for this branch totalled Tls. 0.33 million, with a ‘submissions’ of Tls. 0.30 
million, ‘assets’ worth Tls. 0.31 million, and ‘liabilities’ standing at zero. 
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Table 1-6: Annual balance sheet of the RSC Yangzhou branch in 1867 (Tls) 
Item Amount  Total 
Opening balance of deposits –liabilities from the previous year 0.00 0.00 
Revenues  331,299.17 
Drafts received 324,132.50 
 
Income from remittance service fees 7,083.67 
Income from silver weight and purity disparities  83.00 
Submissions  300,275.31 
Submitted drafts 297,744.54 
 
Property rents 200.00 
Board expenses 1,152.32 
Travel expenses 15.22 
Office expenses 5.86 
Entertainment expenses in government business  42.08 
Escort expenses to Suzhou 56.57 
Expenses in escorting Zhang Xidai’s coffin to 
Qingjiangzhen 
12.80 
Renovation cost of the East gate 51.78 
Heating costs 84.30 
Interest paid 909.84 
Assets  31,024.86 
Deposit with the head office 31,024.86 
 
Liabilities 0.00 0.00 
Source: RSC 1867 Yangzhou branch annual balance sheet (Advanced Asia Studies Library, 
University of Tokyo).  
Based on Table 1-6, Table 1-7 shows the corresponding profits statement of the 
Yangzhou branch. It appears that this branch had a total income of Tls. 7,166 with 
total expenses of Tls. 2,529, which left Tls. 4,636 as profit. 
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Table 1-7: Profits statement of the RSC Yangzhou branch in 1867 (Tls) 
Item Amount  Total 
Income  7,166.67 
Income from remittance service fees 7,083.67 
 
Income from silver weight and purity disparities  83.00 
Expense  2,529.77 
Property rents 200.00 
 
Board expenses 1,152.32 
Travel expenses 15.22 
Office expenses 5.86 
Entertainment expenses in government business 42.08 
Silver escorting expenses to Suzhou 56.57 
Expenses in escorting Zhang Xidai’s coffin to Qingjiangzhen 12.80 
Renovation cost of the East gate 51.78 
Heating costs 84.30 
Interest paid 909.84 
Profit 4,636.90 4,636.90 
Source: RSC 1867 Yangzhou branch annual balance sheet (Advanced Asia Studies Library, 
University of Tokyo). 
1.6 Concluding remarks  
As introductory material, the piaohao’s historical pattern, draft enforcement, traded 
currencies and bookkeeping methods were examined in this chapter. A geographically 
based merchant group which specialized for centuries in long distance trading, the 
Shanxi piaohao emerged on a path of reactive sequence path dependency. By 
incorporating deposit and loan business and designing four types of draft, the piaohao 
not only enlarged the scope of their business, but also reduced transaction costs. Beset 
by a chaotic currency system, the Shanxi piaohao coped with remittances and at the 
same time seized profits by dealing in different types of silver. As it did so, it 
produced three schemes of accounting and employed a ‘four pillar’ bookkeeping 
method which enabled the firm’s financial condition to be understood at all times. 
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 Management mechanism: how did the piaohao Chapter 2.
discipline their distant employees? 
The traditional Chinese legal apparatus had long been an integral part of the 
bureaucratic administrative system within the hierarchy. Hence, the Qing authority 
developed little legislation in regulating and protecting firms (Faure, 2006, p.46.). In a 
situation where no law guaranteed the shareholders’ property, an effective governance 
structure was indispensable for the success of the piaohao.    
This chapter examines the piaohao’s management structure and is organized as 
follows. First, it introduces the state of the law in China in the late Qing era and asks 
why the Shanxi piaohao made an effort to develop comprehensive rules for managing 
its employees. Section 2.2 examines the piaohao’s management structure by analysing 
the personnel arrangements and the vertical and horizontal management structure; 
section 2.3 goes on to explore the  risks entailed by this structure. 
2.1 Absence of commercial and customary law in late Qing China  
2.1.1 Expensive court fees and weak enforcement of judicial decisions 
People in the Qing dynasty were litigious. A county magistrate who was responsible 
for 20,000 households might receive more than 20,000 litigation letters each year, 
about 50 letters per day. For a county magistrate this was a burden. To ease his task, 
the Qing authority designed complex and expensive court proceedings to discourage 
people from going to law (Fuma, 1993 p.393.).  
For a plaintiff, the first obstacle to formal litigation was the need to write a proper 
letter of complaint, stating the names of the plaintiff and the defendant and detailing a 
statement of the case in a reasonable and acceptable way. The case statement must 
neither exaggerate nor simplify the case. If the complaint letter was rejected by a 
county magistrate, the case would not be processed. In fact, of the 50 letters received 
per day, a county magistrate would only deal with two to three and would reject the 
remainder as incoherent. Therefore, in order to prepare suitable litigation letters, both 
plaintiffs and defendants spent much money on having them written by famous legal 
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instructors [songshi 讼师 ]. This expenditure was necessary, since most judicial 
decisions were made on the basis of the litigation letters (Fuma, 1993 p.398.).  
After writing them, all plaintiffs were required to submit them to the magistrate’s 
court in person. Therefore, if a plaintiff lived in the countryside, he had to travel to the 
town and remain there, which together cost dozens of taels (Fuma, 1993 p.398.). 
Even after the county magistrate had accepted the complaint letter and begun 
investigating the case, all the related costs, e.g. the cost of sending staff on errands to 
inform the plaintiff and defendant to attend the hearing, would also be borne by the 
plaintiff. Moreover, as most of the cases were processes by the county magistrate’s 
personal advisors [muliao 幕僚], both plaintiffs and defendants had to bribe them to 
learn how their case was progressing, which was also costly (Fuma, 1993 p.398.).  
Sometimes, due to the government’s weak enforcement, plaintiffs who won their 
cases still could not solve their problems. By examining a land dispute, Terada (1997 
p.233.) found that even after a county magistrate had made a judicial decision that the 
defendant must compensate the plaintiff, the debt remained unpaid. This was partly 
due to the defendant’s character – he was brutal and insolent – and partly to the lack 
of power to enforce these decisions on the part of the country magistrate. For Terada 
(1997), the natural mode of the Chinese judicial system was merely to tinker at the 
edge. 
2.1.2 Grounds of judgement: The Qing Law vs. private contracts and orders [约 yue] 
During the Qing era, a lawsuit could be classified either a criminal or a civil case. 
Felonies normally involved robbery or murder, and were based on the Qing Law 
[daqinglüli 大清律例]. If the case merited less than a custodial sentence (exclusive), it 
would be judged by a county magistrate.  But if the penalty included imprisonment, 
this case would be judged first by the county magistrate, and then by a provincial 
governor [xunfu 巡抚 ] who would forward it to the Ministry of Justice. After 
investigation, the Minister’s officials would report the case to the emperor, who made 
the final decision(Shiga, 1998 p.11.). During this process, if any official disagreed 
with the previous judgement or if the plaintiff or the defendant was dissatisfied with 
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the judgement, the case would be re-examined until the defendant admitted his guilt 
(Shiga, 1998 p.12.).  
Unlike criminal cases, civil cases concerned questions of marriage, land and property 
disputes, and were usually adjudicated only by a county magistrate. Moreover, again 
unlike felonies, which were judged strictly on the basis of the Qing Law, a county 
magistrate usually sought a middle ground by consulting local rules, social norms and 
conventions and common sense to solve civil disputes, as long as the Qing Law was 
not flouted (Shiga, 1998 p.13.). They did so because, first of all, on many civil 
disputes the Qing Law had no comprehensive or systematic codes (Shiga, 1998 p.13.). 
Second, county magistrates were trained in the Confucian school which advocates 
‘the doctrine of the mean [zhongcai 仲裁]’ and encourages people to use moral 
consciousness in civil questions, rather than laws. Therefore, when solving civil 
disputes, county magistrates preferred to act as a parent, taking consideration for of 
the needs of all parties concerned as well as the local customary rules, and finding a 
balanced solution for both sides of a dispute (Wang, 1998 p.437.). If either the 
plaintiff or the defendant was unhappy with the judgement, he could appeal or go to a 
higher magistrate’s court until both parties were content (Wang, 1998 p.437.). 
From the Qing Law, I have found that out of more than 2,000 articles, only 3-4 related 
to commercial disputes, while the rest concerned marriages, household registration 
and rites. Of the articles on commercial disputes, one was about setting up a firm and 
another was about a firm embezzling customers’ assets. Two articles related to the 
rules for protecting an entity firm. These were: 
1. Regulation of servants who steal their master’s property (Article 272.04): a 
servant who steals his master’s property will be convicted on an indictment of 
robbery.  
2. Regulation of indictments of robbery (Article 266.17-19): a person who robs 
other people of their assets, depending on circumstances, will receive 80 or 
100 strokes with a rod and be imprisoned for three years, or be beaten with a 
rod and imprisoned for three years and then exiled, or sentenced to death. If 
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the robber’s family knows what he has done and has shielded him, they will all 
be punished.  The robber’s property will be sold to pay the victim. 
As it can be observed, the main function of the Qing Law was to empower 
bureaucrats to mete out punishments to the extent of criminal violations and to 
oversee a process of endless appeals through the hierarchy of a bureaucracy which 
could be arbitrary and inefficient (Ma, 2006 p.6.). Understandably, to solve their 
disputes people in the Qing dynasty preferred to employ various private orders and 
contracts. 
As early as the Sui Dynasty (581-618 AD), Chinese officials had withdrawn their 
power to control social groups, which left blood-based or geographical-based groups 
with a high degree of autonomy regarding the management of the community’s 
behaviours (Mio, 1992 p.358.). People relied on these spontaneous social groups for 
public education and financial support and at the same time were required to obey 
their orders absolutely (Ma, 2006 p.13).  
When a private order had to be set up, it was usually initiated by a few persons 
[shouchang 首唱]; then middlemen would bargain and promote it all around the 
community. After a series of negotiations and modifications, with more and more 
people following this order [change 唱和], a new order was established (Terada, 1994 
p.179.). 
As important as the Qing Law itself, private orders and contracts constituted another 
aspect of the Chinese legal system (Terada, 1994, p.141.). Although these orders and 
contacts did not form part of the formal law, they were more generally employed in 
regulating behaviour within villages, clans, guilds and families. In the case of a 
lawsuit, they could be invoked as grounds in judging the case (Terada, 1994, p.142., 
Ma, 2006).  
As with other social groups in China, the Shanxi piaohao is a type of geographically 
based merchant group. In a weak legal environment devoid of laws to protect 
shareholders’ capital, the piaohao merchants formulated a series of rules and 
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regulations with the aim of solving the commitment relationship in their long distance 
business. 
2.2 Strict control on employees’ work and life 
All individuals are self-interested. Therefore, they need an effective control system 
that ties their interest closely to that of the organization. This needs a management 
system that specifies performance measurement and evaluation system for each 
subdivision of the firm and each agent (Jensen, 1998). In this section, by examining 
the piaohao’s personnel arrangements and its vertical and horizontal management 
structure, we see how the Shanxi piaohao management system was designed to lower 
the risk of employees who cheated and mitigate the commitment problem. 
2.2.1 Personnel arrangements: Strict background investigation and promotion 
process 
Shanxi people used to regard working in a piaohao as the only way to become well-
off, so entry was fiercely competitive (Li, 1937, cited in Huang 2002a, p.613). Not 
only did a candidate need to find two guarantors to recommend him but his family 
background would also be checked to ensure that his family had no record of bad 
behaviour. As a contemporary scholar recorded: 
“Before recruiting a new employee as an apprentice, the head office manager 
needs two people who would act as referees for him. These two guarantors should 
be well known and wealthy, they should be guarantors for the employees’ life-time, 
and if any guarantor terminates guarantor status, the employee should find a 
replacement for him, or else he will lose his job. If any employee causes huge loss 
to a piaohao through his misbehaviour, his two guarantors are required to repay 
the loss. The manager also needed to know the careers of the candidate’s 
ancestors for three generations back to reassure himself about their behaviour. 
Normally within a year of apprenticeship, the piaohao would decide if the 
apprentice would stay or not. For those disqualified apprentices, the piaohao 
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would dismiss them as early as possible for them to find other suitable jobs (Jie, 
1936, cited in Huang 2002a, pp. 611-614.).”49 
According to its needs, each piaohao would recruit 10-15 apprentices annually, aged 
between 15 and 17, to be trained for three years (Li, 1937, cited in Huang, 2002a, 
pp.612-3.). In the first year of their apprenticeship the young men had to clean the 
floors, fetch water and serve the head office manager all day. At night, they had to 
practise calligraphy and abacus calculation. During the year, the head office manager 
could observe whether the apprentices were loyal to him and were smart and diligent. 
After the first year’s assessment, some apprentices would be dismissed; the others 
went on to the second year.
50
  This was when the apprentices would learn accounting, 
transcribe business correspondence, and remember the weight and purity disparity 
between different types of silver. At the same time, they would work as vice street 
runners [fupaojie 副跑街] to collect marketing information and contact customers. As 
the third year drew nearer, apprentices would begin to take part in the piaohao’s daily 
operation, for instance, as assistant accountants in clearing accounts or to help as 
amanuenses [wendu 文牍] in transcribing business letters (Li, 1937, cited in Huang, 
2002a, p.591).  The head office manager would select the smartest apprentices, teach 
them ways of doing business and then send them to work in the branch offices (Qiao, 
1961, cited in Huang, 2002a, p.612-3.). Here it is worth mentioning that, to avoid 
favouritism, piaohao managers were forbidden to employ their own relatives, but they 
could act as guarantors of family members who worked in other piaohao.
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Figure 2-1 depicts the promotion process of the Shanxi piaohao. It shows that, at the 
end of their three years’ training, apprentices would be set to work as street runners 
whose job was to collect marketing information and deal with clients’ queries. Those 
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 Jie Zunsan [颉尊三] was the former head manager of the DDH piaohao (Huang, 2002a, 
p.611.). 
50
 From the RSC business correspondence, I found that in 1889 the RSC recruited 13 
apprentices, but within the first year two were dismissed (Huang, 2002a, pp.833-1100.). 
51
 Again from the RSC piaohao business correspondence, I have found a reference written 
by the manager Li Wanyuan for his employee Dai Jvshan to work in another piaohao under 
the supervision of Mr Zhen. At the same time, Mr Zhen’s son worked for Mr Li; thus they 
stood as guarantors for each other’s employees (Li, 2012 p. 92.). 
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with outstanding performance could become amanuenses [wendu 文牍] and be put in 
charge of writing business correspondence.
52
 After some years’ work experience, 
amanuenses were sometimes promoted to the post of accountant, with a status equal 
to that of a branch vice-manager. If these accountants were recommended by their 
branch office managers or were commended by the head office manager, they could 
be promoted and become managers of branch offices (Li 1937, cited in Huang 2002a, 
p.612). To give branch managers a broader understanding of the whole operation of 
the piaohao and prevent corruption, branch managers also rotated to various locations 
(Jie 1936, citied in Huang 2002a, p.611.).
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 It was during this long tenure process that 
the head office manager would select the most excellent candidates as vice-head 
office managers, who could eventually become the manager of a head office.  
Figure 2-1: Promotion process from a piaohao apprentice to a head office manager  
Apprentice
 (10-15 staff)
Street runner 
(25-30 staff)
3 years
Amanuensis
(23 staff)
Head office 
manager 
(1 staff)
Accountant 
(24 staff)
Branch 
manager
(20 staff)
Vice head 
manager
(1-2 staff)
1-2 years 2-3 years 4-5 years 4-5 years 4-5 years
20-25 years  
Source: Compiled on the basis of Li (1937, cited in Huang, 2002a, pp.591-2) and Jie (1936, 
cited in Huang, 2002a, p.591.). 
 
Note: the number of employees in the bracket is for a piaohao with about twenty branches. 
The above analyses suggest the Shanxi piaohao put the employee’s honesty as the 
highest prior first in hiring and promoting employees. An investigation on employees’ 
family background endogenously incentivised these employees’ forebear to be honest 
out of a desire to preserve their descendants’ future job prospects, and a guarantor 
system enabled the piaohao to use the employees’ family and their guarantors’ assets 
as a mortgage for any cheating behaviour. Besides a strict background investigation, 
piaohao also normally promoted employees within the firm with long tenure 
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 As the piaohao relied on business correspondence for most of their communication, their 
amanuenses had a high position. When an employee became an amanuensis, his status rose 
(Li, 1937, cited in Huang 2002a, p.591). 
53
 From the RSC business correspondence, I found they frequently mentioned employees 
who had been transferred from one branch to another, e.g. RSC 1899 business letters form 
Guangzhou to Pingyao (Huang, 2002a p.1029.). This can be also evidenced in the business 
letters of the WFH piaohao. 
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promotion. This process not only gave head office managers enough time to evaluate 
employees’ intelligence and loyalty, but also incentivised employees to be honest and 
work hard if they wanted promotion. Besides these personnel arrangements, the 
piaohao also imposed a centralized vertical management structure to control distant 
employees, a structure which is illustrated in the next section.  
2.2.2 Centralized vertical management structure  
2.2.2.1 A centralized M-form structure 
In the Shanxi piaohao all branches were administered under the supervision of the 
head office manager [dazhangui 大掌柜], who had the right to take absolute decisions 
and control operation over the whole piaohao.  The head office manager was assisted 
by the vice-head manager [erzhanggui 二掌柜], who would carry out and supervise 
his decisions and the manager’s secretary [sanzhanggui 三掌柜] who functioned as 
the support of the vice-head manager. Moreover, the manager’s secretary was 
responsible for the front desk business in the head office (Li, 1937, cited in Huang 
2002a, p.612). 
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Figure 2-2 Vertical management structure of the Shanxi piaohao  
Accountant 
 (4 staff)
Amanuensis
 (3 staff)
Street runner
 (4-6 staff)
Accountant 
 (1 staff)
Amanuensis
(1 staff) 
Street runner
(1-2 staff) 
Head office manager
(1 staff) 
Branch manager
(1 staff) 
Vice-head manager
(1 staff)
Manager’s secretary
(1 staff)
Branch manager
(1 staff) 
Branch manager
(1 staff) 
 
Source: Compiled on the basis of Li (1937, cited in Huang, 2002a, pp.591-2.) and Jie (1936, 
cited in Huang, 2002a, p.591.). 
As Figure 2-2 illustrates both the Shanxi piaohao head office and branches were self-
contained units and had their own functional departments. Branches were independent 
of each other and the branch managers had some autonomy to exercise daily operation 
and decision rights. If we apply the devising of the structure of the firm, the Shanxi 
piaohao built to a quasi-multidivisional form (M-form).
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 A typical M-firm is the sub-
firm managers are given operational and decision rights by making use of local 
information, and the central manager is in charge of the overall strategies for the 
business. But it could be risky when the head manager gave too much power to the 
branch office and lost his control over the firm.  Unlike the typical M-form, the 
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 “A multi-divisional firm is one where the parent firm owns the sub-firms and each sub-
firm operates under the same name as the parent firm and has its functional departments and 
operates autonomously. The key difference for this dissertation to differentiate a M-form and 
U-form firm is the former is a parent company owns smaller companies, while the latter is 
under the head firm there were different function departments which takes care of strategic 
and decision making process in Coordinating Changes in M-form and U-form 
Organizations,Yingyi Qian, Gerard Roland and Chenggang Xu, paper for the Nobel 
Symposium, 1999, p.3.  
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Shanxi piaohao imposed a highly centralized management structure which gave the 
head office manager supreme rights over the whole piaohao. 
In fact the piaohao head managers separated the right of decision from the right of 
operation as regards the branch managers. Branch managers had daily operation rights 
such as monitoring the accounts, accepting deposits, issuing loans and taking 
remittance business under certain limited amounts.  But when the branch managers 
met large business transactions, they were required to report to the head office 
manager for permission. Besides this, the branch managers had to send business 
correspondences every 7-10 days to the head office and other branches to report their 
business conditions. Based on the information that the branch office sent to the head 
office, the head office manager made operative decisions and allocated funds 
according to the operative conditions of each branch.
55
 If any branch managers did not 
obey the orders of the head office, they would be punished.  
Figure 2-3 shows the information of flow between the head office and branches. If a 
branch A required large an amount of silver to be shipped from a nearby branch B, it 
had to ask the head office for permission and let other branches know this request. 
After acquiring this information, based on the silver reserve in other branches, the 
head office manager would write to branch B and require its branch manager to send 
the silver. At the same time he would inform A and C of this decision. After receiving 
this order, branch B could send the silver to A, and once A received silver it would 
write another letter to inform head office and other branches.
56
 Using the above 
procedure, the Shanxi piaohao held the policy of ‘Dispatching silver from those with 
an abundance to those with a shortage [zhuoyingjixu, 酌盈济虚] and from places 
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 This can be evidenced by business letters from the RSC and WTH. Moreover, Wei 
(1944 pp.74-5) mentions similar finds. 
56
 “In the late Qing dynasty, the postal service was varied and intensive.  There were the 
national post offices run by the Qing government, foreign post offices run by the foreign 
merchants and civil postal office run by the Zhejiang merchants”, in晚清邮政近代化与中央
机关的调适—从总理衙门到邮传部 (The modernization of the postal service in the Late 
Qing dynasty—from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Post Office Department),  Ming 
Liu, 前沿 (Frontier), 2013, pp. 149-50. From their business letters, I have found that before 
telegrams were introduced to China in the 1880s, it normally took 7-15 days to deliver a 
letter; after telegrams became common, one could reach a piaohao within a day.   
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where the interest is low to those where it is high [choupizhuankuai抽疲转快]’ to 
balance silver reserves and earn profits (Chen 1937 pp.89-90.). 
Figure 2-3 Flows of information and silver between head offices and branches  
Head office 
Branch A
Branch BBranch C
1
1
1
2
3
2
2
Letter from A to B, C and 
head office to request silver
Letter from head office to 
A, B, C 
Silver from B to A 
4
4
4
Letter from A to B, C and 
head office after receiving
Source: Compiled on the basis of the RSC and WTH business correspondence (Huang 2002a, 
pp.833-1216.). 
Under a centralized management structure, the head office manager punished branch 
managers who disobeyed orders. From the RSC business letters, I found that in 1861 
the head office send a punishment notification to Werong, the Suzhou branch 
manager, who ignored the head office order to close his branch during the Taiping 
Rebellion and incurred a loss. As the letter states: 
“Among all the branches managers, only Rong did not listen to the order to close 
Suzhou branch and delayed my command as he wanted. His behaviour resulted in 
one customer Xue Lanting did not pay back his loan. Once before, when Rong 
worked as a branch manager in Chengdu, he also did not obey the order from the 
head office, which left the Chengdu branch over Tls. 2,000 in arrears to the head 
office. Since Rong is not in good health at present, consider his past performance. 
The head office has decided to dismiss Rong and his two employees (Huang 2002a, 
p.608).” 
In addition to this letter, on 24
th
, 28
th
 April and 13
th
 May 1862, the RSC head office 
sent three letters to the Guangzhou branches, to warn the branch manager who had 
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contravened the policy from the head office and continued to sending remittance 
drafts to the Kaifeng branch where there was a severe shortage of silver. The head 
office manager insisted if the Guangzhou manager continues to flouting the orders 
from head office, he will be punished for violating the regulations of the firm (Huang 
2002a, pp.853-4).  
The above letters together clearly show that it was the head office manager that has 
the absolute power in the piaohao and it was him who can make final decisions on 
business and personnel arrangement. Since the transmission of information was costly 
during the Qing dynasty, given the state of communication technology in the late 
Qing period, it was cheaper and more efficient to transmit all the information at once 
to a central point than to disseminate it item by item to everyone. For the same reason, 
it was cheaper for a central individual to make collective decisions and transmit them 
than to retransmit all the information on which the decision was based. After grasping 
the information of operations and employees behaviours of all the branches, head 
office managers could make decisions which he deserved right.  
By imposing a centralized structure, the Shanxi piaohao overcame the weakness on 
the typical M-form structure. The branch manager was given certain degree’s 
operational rights based on the local market information, at the same time, the head 
office manager was informed promptly of branch operating conditions and made 
decisions for the benefit of the whole piaohao. This structure also enabled the piaohao 
head office gather limited capital to meet different silver needs of different branches, 
at the same time, it also ensured objective consistency for the whole firm. To carry 
out head office manager orders, comprehensive and strict regulations are necessary; 
therefore piaohao regulations are reported in the next section. 
2.2.2.2 Rules, regulations and fiats 
As well as designing a centralized management structure, the Shanxi piaohao also 
imposed strict regulations to ensure head office orders could be carried out in full. 
These regulations aimed to eliminate all the possible avenues that might tempt a 
distant employee to behave opportunistically. As Williamson (1985,p.149.) points out, 
binding oneself is a privileged way of resolving the problem of weakness of will. The 
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temptation to take advantage of not being supervised could be resisted by distant 
employees if they were isolated from activities which might encourage cheating. As 
Shanxi piaohao have more or less similar regulation codes, my thesis takes DDT 
piaohao 1898-1912 regulation codes to illustrate them all:  
“A regular business correspondence reporting system to the head office and other 
branches is crucial for our business success. Only if the head office grasps the 
overall business operation condition, can it make the right decisions. Therefore, 
when making small business transactions, branch offices can make their own 
decisions. However, when making large business transactions, branch managers 
are required to report to the head office before they make decisions. Otherwise, we 
may have trouble in meeting tight silver reserve conditions. 
When employees leave home to work in the branch offices, all the head office 
should check their personal belongings. When they come home on leave, they 
should go to the head office for their personal belongings being checked again 
before going home. If these employees help other employees to carry goods home, 
these goods should be left with the head office to register and check; then the head 
office will forward these goods to the employees’ family. 
Employees are forbidden to send any goods home privately. All the goods should 
be sent to the head office first to be checked, and then the head office will forward 
these goods to their family. 
Employees are forbidden to visit the head office manager’s family and give 
presents to the head office manager. 
Employees are forbidden to marry non-Shanxi women, get married in another city 
or take family members to another city while on duty. The employees’ salaries and 
dividends are paid by the head office directly to the employees’ family members in 
Shanxi. Branch employees should dine and live in the piaohao every day. 
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Employees are forbidden to gamble, take opium, or lend money to other employees 
of the piaohao. They are also banned from setting up another business, or storing 
commercial goods such as silk and crude drugs for sale.  
If anyone breaks one of these regulations, depending on the seriousness of his 
offence, he will be punished or dismissed. If the branch managers shield 
employees’ misbehaviour or if branch managers collude with their employees, they 
will all be dismissed together and will never be employed again.  These regulations 
will be put into practice on a trial basis for three years. If the branch offices find 
any article difficult to execute, I can modify the article in the interests of earning a 
long term profit (Huang, 2002a, pp.595-602.).” 
These regulatory codes show that the Shanxi piaohao imposed stringent rules to 
discipline employees’ behaviour which were more than empty phrases. From the RSC 
business letters, I have found frequent mention, along with the business 
correspondence, of family letters or goods sent on behalf of individual employees, or 
employees who had resigned but not returned to the family, or who wanted to get 
married.
57
   
By requiring employees to marry in their hometown and forbidding them to take their 
family to the town where they worked, the piaohao were virtually treating these 
families as hostages. If any employee cheated, his family or guarantors in his 
hometown had to pay for his misdeeds (Peng, 2007, p.661.). Requiring employees to 
live and dine in the piaohao was another way to monitor their daily behaviour. These 
regulations reinforced one another and almost cut off any possibility of cheating. 
Although these rules are strict, sometimes piaohao also showed a humane side to the 
employees. For example, the DDT piaohao regulates that when urgent family matters 
arose, employees could ask for leave and the piaohao would pay his travel expenses. 
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 Among much evidence the following may be listed here: Pingyao to Guangzhou branch 
letter on 23rd January 1862 (Huang, 2002a p.850), Pingyao to Zhoujiakou branch letter on 4th 
July 1892(Huang, 2002a p.894-5.), and Pingyao to Xian branch letter on 26th May 1892 
(Huang, 2002a p.889.). 
63 
 
WFH piaohao Beijing manager Li Hongling asked the head office if the marriage 
leaves could be prolonged for one of his employees Guo Peijin, who had worked in 
the Beijing branch for two years and had not been home once (Li, 1917, p.73.). 
The above analyses suggest that the piaohao’s vertical management was centralized 
and strict. To complete this vertical structure, they also designed what this dissertation 
terms a ‘horizontal management structure’ to prevent employees from cheating. This 
mechanism is illustrated in the next section. 
2.2.3 Horizontal management structure—a guild system to collectively punish 
misbehaved employees 
Chinese merchant guilds were normally formed spontaneously by merchants who 
undertook the same business in the same city. Merchants who belonged to the 
merchant guild would enjoy the protection from the guild but also have 
responsibilities. The functions of the merchant guilds included negotiating with the 
government, accepting business on behalf of merchants, as well as drafting and 
enforcing the guild regulations (Quan, 2007,pp.1-3). As most Chinese guilds had 
strong power so that they could control the whole industry and could unite other guild 
merchants to crowd out the merchant who did not join in the guild, in order to 
undertook their business safely and efficiently, most merchants would join in as soon 
as they started their business (Peng, 1995, Liu, 1988). Moreover, in an environment 
which absence of commercial legislation, merchant guilds played roles in protecting 
and regulating commercial activities (Quan, 2007, Peng, 1995). In this situation, 
merchants would like to donate the fund regularly to the guild and obey the 
regulations in order to maintain its operation and seek the protection (Peng, 1995, Liu, 
1988).  
Similar with the other Chinese industries, the Shanxi piaohao established piaohao 
guilds in such business centres as Beijing, Shanghai, Suzhou, Guangzhou and 
Hankou. They raised funds to establish their own guild hall and built stone tablet to 
record the reason and date that they formed the guild, the location of their guild hall 
and their members. In each guild, piaohao branch managers were members and they 
would elect two to three members as directors to charge the operations of the guild. 
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To acquire the permission and support from the government, they also invited 
government officers as their honour directors. Since the Shanxi merchants worshipped 
the memory of Guangong [关公 ], a Chinese historical warrior famous for his 
righteousness and loyalty to his brotherhood, these Shanxi merchants called their 
guild hall as Guangong temple (Huang 2002a, p.671.).
58
  
In piaohao guilds, members held meetings on the first and fifteenth of every month; 
branch managers from different piaohao should attend and discuss issues in which 
they are concerned. If any member cannot be present, he should ask the guild 
chairman for leave in advance and wait for permission. Issues discussed in the 
meetings include the remittance commission rate, interest rate and local market 
conditions. If quarrels arise between piaohao, guild members should elect two or three 
chairmen to mediate (Dagong Newspaper, 1904, cited in Huang, 2002a, p.674.). 
Besides discussing business, referring to the piaohao correspondence, I found they 
also shared employees’ cheating behaviour with others. In 1895, RSC Tianjin branch 
employee Wang Yurui absconded with Tls. 1,870. He was arrested by other 
employees when he tried to run off and was detained in the branch. Tianjin branch 
manager suggested the head office send Wang to the local court for conviction, but in 
the head office manager reply letter it wrote: “During these days custody, Wang has 
paid back the silver he steal, although the Tianjin office suggest me to send him to the 
court, after discussing with other piaohao managers, we think this suggestion is 
inconvenient and may cause other trouble. Therefore, we decide to punish him based 
on our own regulation disciplines (RSC business letter from Pingyao to Tianjin, 1895, 
cited in Huang, 2002a, pp.914-915.).” 
Besides sharing employees’ cheating behaviour, piaohao also kept an eye on other 
piaohao distinguished employees. For example, in 1900 the WFH piaohao Beijing 
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 The existing evidence shows the earliest record of a piaohao guild to have been in 1876, 
when 24 Shanxi piaohao in Shanghai invested Tls. 500 each to construct a Guangong temple 
and established the Shanxi Remittance Guild Hall [Shanxi huiye gongsuo 山西汇业公所] 
(Wei 1944, p.132). Their members included all the Shanxi piaohao who had business in 
Shanghai. From the records of the piaohao guilds and their business correspondence, I have 
found piaohaos’ remittance commission rates and interest rates were similar with each other.  
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branch manager Li Hongling wrote to the head office manager to report that an 
employee named Mao Lanting who was working in the Bai Chuan Tong piaohao and 
performed very well but did not get promoted for several years. Because of this, Mao 
intended to change his job to other piaohao. As soon as obtaining this information, Li 
asked the head office manager that if he could ask Mao to work in their piaohao with 
a higher position and payment (Li, 1917 p.80.). Later on, as the guarantor, Li 
recommended Mao to work as a Changde branch manager of the WFH. Although in 
his later letters, Li indicates that Mao was not as good as he expected and was 
suspected of misbehaviour, this letter still reflects the fact that the piaohao had 
information on the behaviour of other employees at the same time.
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Since the business correspondence frequently sent by the piaohao branch managers to 
the head office managers, they could report everything discussed in the guild 
meetings. Whether an employee performed well or was guilty of cheating, 
information about him would travel quickly around a piaohao guild. On obtaining 
such information, other Shanxi piaohao could either collectively punish cheaters and 
never employ them again or poach excellent employees who were not being treated 
well in other firms. With a guild and a correspondence reporting system, the piaohao 
transcended the limits of the single piaohao to monitor employees’ behaviour and 
encouraged employees to work hard and with probity for the sake of themselves and 
their future career opportunities.
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2.3 Areas of risk—the central planners’ dilemma 
In the Shanxi piaohao, shareholders had no rights over the piaohao operation; instead 
it was the head office managers who had supreme power over it. Therefore, the 
success of a piaohao lay precisely in the morality and ability of the head office 
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Besides WFH, I have also found that other Shanxi piaohao competed to invite Re 
Licheng, the branch manager of the Tian Cheng Heng piaohao after learning that Ren had 
been treated unjustly and was planning to leave. The DDH piaohao also invited Yan Weifan, 
a common employee of the WCH piaohao, to work as the DDH head manager; he later 
became the first head manager of the Shanxi Provincial Bank (Deng, 1997 pp.172-196). 
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In traditional Chinese society, merchants preferred to hire local people, which made it 
costly for anyone who had cheated to enter a bank in another region (Landa, 1988). 
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manager. In this section, the dissertation explores the potential dangers of the 
piaohao’s management structure. 
Before the shareholders appointed a head office manager, they would investigate his 
past work experience, interview him and ask his business ideas. If the shareholder 
were satisfied with the candidate’s performance, he would invite him to become the 
head office manager (Jie, 1936, cited in Huang 2002a, p.593).  
The Shanxi people emphasised loyalty to the brotherhood, so the shareholders would 
believe in a head office manager’s character and ability when they had appointed him, 
and the head office manager would work hard to repay the shareholders’ trust. Even if 
the piaohao suffered occasional losses, shareholders would not blame the head office 
but gave the manager enough capital to start again. Except in special circumstances, 
shareholders could not dismiss the head office manager whenever they chose. It was 
only at the end of the fiscal year (3-4 years), that they could decide whether they 
would retain him (Jie, 1936, cited in Huang 2002a, p.594.). 
Most Shanxi piaohao were established during the period between the 1820s and the 
1880s, when there was no modern Chinese bank and the scale of foreign banks was 
small.
61
 At this time, the Shanxi piaohao also operated on a medium scale, each 
piaohao having 15-20 branches nationwide.
62
 Besides, unlike the later period when 
the descendants of many shareholders were addicted to opium and left the piaohao in 
the hands of the head office managers, these shareholders were still able to control the 
head office managers.
63
 In these circumstances, the agency relationship between the 
shareholders and the head office manager was relatively stable, and the head office 
manager could manage the operation of the whole piaohao.  
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 The rise of modern Chinese banks and foreign banks is illustrated in Chapter 6, below. 
62
 According to my estimation, in Figure 5-2 between the 1840s and the 1880s, the annual 
remittance volume for all the Shanxi piaohao remained under Tls. 104 million. However, this 
value grew to Tls. 187 million in the 1890s, and climbed further, to Tls. 252 million in the 
period 1902-9. 
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 As illustrated in Table 6-8, below, many of the former piaohao shareholders’ 
descendants became addicted to opium, lived extravagantly and left the head office managers 
to look after the piaohao. 
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Since the 1890s, the Shanxi piaohao’s business increased dramatically,64 and their 
branch networks also expanded to the point where each piaohao had on average 22-26 
branches.
65
 But from the 1890s official banks were set up and foreign banks 
augmented their business of international remittances to China’s domestic remittance 
business (Wang, 1983, p.188.). In this drastically changed environment, the Shanxi 
piaohao head office managers gradually reached the limits of their professional 
competence and their centralized management began to show diminishing returns. 
Focusing on their attitudes toward the piaohao reform, the following paragraphs 
outline how these head office managers’ arbitrary decisions deprived the piaohao of 
the chance to form joint-stock banks. This decision was regarded as a fatal mistake, 
leading to the piaohao’s decline (Li, 1917 p.79, Chen, 1937). 
In the face of competition from foreign banks and official banks, Beijing piaohao 
guild wrote a letter in 1908 to the head office managers: 
“Our Shanxi merchants have won fame both at home and abroad specializing in 
remittance. However, after the Boxer Rebellion, the expansion of official banks has 
deprived us of government business, and the proliferation of foreign banks into 
inland cities will certainly influence our commercial remittances. Moreover, this 
year the Ministry of Finance has promulgated the Universal Rules for Banks 
[yinhang tongxing zeli 银行通行则例] and requested us to register with them to 
qualify for business. At this rate, we shall soon be eliminated. After several days’ 
meeting, we have concluded that only by uniting together and forming a bank we 
can be saved. Forming a bank will not only enable us to compete with foreign 
banks with stronger capital power and a larger business network, but will also 
benefit us as a bank, e.g. we will be able to request loans to be backed by material 
guarantees, which as piaohao we cannot do. Moreover, as shareholders in a bank 
we would have only limited liabilities; even if we suffered loss, it would be only 
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 Based on my estimation in Table 5-4, below, from the 1880s and the 1890s, the annual 
volume of remittances for all the Shanxi piaohao increased from Tls. 104 million tls to Tls. 
187 million; this growth rate was faster than in any previous period. 
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When plotting the places where RSC piaohao operated from their business 
correspondence, I have found that in the 1880s the RSC had drafts in 22 cities, rising to 42 in 
the 1890s. 
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what we have invested—Beijing Piaohao Guild on 23rd March 1908 (Li, 1917, 
cited in Huang, 2002a, p.399.).”66 
In later letters, Li mentions that when they received no response from the head office, 
the Beijing piaohao guild elected Liang Huaiwen, the RSC Beijing manager, to return 
to Shanxi to discuss this issue with the head managers. At the same time, the Beijing 
guild sent messages to the piaohao guilds in other cities and asked them to persuade 
the head managers to reform the piaohao (Li, 1917, cited in Huang, 2002a p.400.). 
These requests quickly got a response from other branches. The piaohao guilds 
including Hankou, Chongqing, Guangzhou, Shashi, Chengdu, Lanzhou, and Jinan 
also wrote round to the head offices to persuade them to form a joint-stock bank (Li, 
1917, cited in Huang, 2002a, pp.401-9.).
67
 Beside the piaohao branch managers, 
reformists Liang Qichao, Shanxi Jining Intendant [jining daotai 冀宁道台] Ding 
Baoquan also encouraged the Shanxi piaohao to reform (北京日报 [Beijing Daily 
Newspaper], 1906, cited in Huang, 2002a, p.397.). 
However, because of the opposition of Mao Honghan, the WTH piaohao head 
manager, who was regarded as the leader of all Shanxi piaohao, none of the other 
piaohao head managers revealed their attitude to this proposal, and they decided not to 
report it to the shareholders (Li, 1917, cited in Huang, 2002a, p.409.). As Mao said: 
“Forming a bank is one of Li’s own plans to get rich. If other branches send similar 
suggestions in the future, just shelve them (Li, 1917, cited in Huang, 2002a, p.409).” 
Although there is no clear evidence to show why Mao refused to reform, this study 
would conjecture that the main blame lies with his refusal to give up his own 
unlimited power. If Mao had agreed with the Shanxi piaohao to form a bank, he and 
the other piaohao head managers would have risked not being appointed as its chief 
manager. Therefore, instead of accepting this proposal, they decided to reject it. On 
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 Li Hongling was the Beijing branch manager of the WFH piaohao, who also initiated the 
reform of the piaohao in general. 
67
 According to Li (1917, cited in Huang, 2002a p.409), although the Mao family finally 
agreed to let the Shanxi piaohao form a joint stock bank in 1921 and visited the Shanxi 
provincial officials to negotiate its terms, it was too late for them. 
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top of this, their long stay in three Shanxi towns also limited their vision and power to 
innovate in a fast-changing environment.
68
   
If we define the total organizational cost as equal to the cost incurred by the 
inconsistent objectives plus the cost of depending on poor information (Jensen 1998, 
p.116.), then in the Shanxi piaohao, which had a highly centralized management 
structure, the cost of having inconsistent objectives was low but the cost due to poor 
information increased as the reliance on it increased. 
From the WFH business letters in the 1900s, I have found that out of 88 business 
letters, about 20 mention employees’ poor performance; i.e. that they were much 
lazier than before, or they embezzled customers’ deposits. To make matters worse, 
head office managers also began to shield employees’ misbehaviour. In 1915, a 
branch office manager of the WFH piaohao Guo embezzled Tls. 30 thousand. 
Although his misbehaviour was known by others, due to his special relationship with 
head office manager Wang Xinghuan, Wang covered up for him for a long time. It 
was until other piaohao managers who had business connections with the WFH 
blamed Wang’s favouritism; Wang dismissed Guo and demanded him to pay the loss. 
At last, Guo committed suicide, which left his debt was unpaid (Li 1917, p.286.). 
Besides the WFH, the RSC piaohao head office manager Guo Dounan ran away when 
the piaohao faced squeeze and on a verge of bankruptcy in 1911 (Dagong Newspaper 
cited in Huang, 2002a p.519.).  
2.4 Concluding remarks 
The above analysis has shown how the piaohao protected shareholders’ capital by 
disciplining their distant employees in a weak legal environment. By investigating the 
employees’ background and promoting employees within the firm, the piaohao 
merchants had sufficient time to observe each one’s morality and ability. Moreover, a 
centralized quasi-M-form structure and comprehensive rules allowed their networks 
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 In his letter to the head office, Li tried to persuade the head office managers and 
shareholders to go beyond Shanxi and take a tour of the country or even overseas. However, 
there is no evidence that they did this (Li, 1917 p.74.). 
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to expand but prevented the head offices from losing control of the firm. In addition, 
by sharing employees’ behaviour through guilds and imposing collective punishments 
on cheaters, the piaohao further encouraged employees to be loyal for the sake of their 
future career opportunities. 
This management structure was effective in disciplining employees’ behaviour when 
the piaohao operated on a medium scale without competitors. However, when the 
piaohao embarked on large-scale operations and the external business environment 
became more unpredictable, the power of these managers reached the limits of their 
professional competence and this central management structure began to show 
diminishing returns. Moreover, in its later period, these head office managers misused 
their power, which corroded the piaohaos’ management structure. 
Besides a rigorous management structure, the piaohao also needed a compelling 
incentive structure to attract and keep excellent employees who would stay and work 
hard. This incentive structure is critically studied in the next chapter. 
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 Incentive mechanism: how did the piaohao unite Chapter 3.
shareholders and employees’ interests? 
This chapter examines the Shanxi piaohao’s mechanism for offering incentives. By 
examining the piaohao’s income structure, pay structure and individuals’ earning 
profiles, this chapter for the first time quantitatively demonstrates the importance of 
the expertise share in an employee’s total income. Moreover, through comparing the 
lifetime incomes for employees with different career choices, it also shows the impact 
of the emergence of modern banks and of the prospects for a Shanxi piaohao 
employee’s career path. Besides this, in this chapter, I test whether the piaohao’s 
incentive structure accords with a tournament model; that is, to improve employees’ 
performance by paying them on the basis of their rank in the firm. Before reaching a 
conclusion, the present chapter explores the dynamic change in the Shanxi piaohao 
management and incentive structure, in an attempt to explore why this governance 
structure worked well at first but began to malfunction during the last period of the 
banks’ operation. Combining much data at firm level with economic models, the 
following analyses are distinct from all those in previous studies and shed new light 
on our understanding of the piaohao’s incentive mechanism. 
3.1 Understanding the piaohao’s income and pay structure 
In the Shanxi piaohao an employee’s total income normally consisted of a basic 
allowance [yiziyin 衣资银], salary [xinjin 辛金] and expertise dividends [hongli 红
利]. The basic allowance was the money given to employees to cover their daily 
expenses. It ranged from Tls. 0.5 to Tls. 2 per month, and was paid monthly. The 
salary ranged from Tls. 30 to Tls. 100 per annum, and was paid normally every six 
months to the employee’s family in his hometown. To employees with excellent 
performance, the piaohao shareholders would grant an expertise share [shengu身股], 
which paid the same dividends per share as the shareholders’ capital share [yingu 银
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股].69 The expertise share can be further divided into a normal expertise share, which 
was paid to employees according to their performance; and a bygone share [gugu 故
股], which was normally given for past good performance for 3-4 years to retired 
employees or the families of deceased ones. Expertise share dividends were paid at 
the end of each fiscal year; the piaohao valued one share as 1 fen, and divided 1 fen 
into ten or twelve grades, each grade being called 1 li (Chen 1937, pp.87-8.).   
Table 3-1 shows descriptive results for the Xie Cheng Qian
70
 (XCQ, hereafter) and 
Bao Feng Long
71
 (BFL, hereafter) piaohao payroll lists in the years 1906 and 1910 
respectively. 
Table 3-1: Descriptive results of the XCQ and BFL piaohao’s annual payroll lists (Tls) 
  Obs Max Min Mean S.d. 
XCQ in 1903-6 
     
Staff with basic allowancea 16 6 6 6 0 
Staff with basic allowance and salary 56 108 8 40 26 
Staff with basic allowance, salary and  
expertise dividendsb 
32 2,100 278 866 569 
BFL in 1906-10 
     
Staff with basic allowancec 36 6 6 6 0 
Staff with basic allowance and salary 69 108 14 52 26 
Staff with basic allowance, salary and 
expertise dividendsd 
26 628 182 290 145 
Sources: Based on Huang (2002a, p.605, pp.1222-4.) 
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 According to Wei (1944), the decision to distribute expertise shares was made by 
shareholders who based employees’ performance on the report of the head office manager. 
Although there is no clear evidence described how the head office manager judged 
employees’ performance, it is highly likely, going by the piaohao’s account books and 
business correspondence that the head office managers evaluated branch managers’ 
performance on the basis on their branch’s profits, and the branch managers’ letters to the 
head office managers reflected branch employees’ performance. 
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 “The XCQ (1860-1913) was set up by seven Shanxi merchants in Pingyao town. Its paid 
up capital was 60,000 tls, which increased to Tls. 240,000. In its most prosperous period, it 
paid Tls. 11,000 per fen to shareholders. This piaohao closed in the wave of piaohao 
bankruptcies in 1913”, in山西票号史 (A history of the Shanxi piaohao), Jvxian Wei, (中央银
行经济研究处 (Economic Research Department of the Central Bank)), 1944, p.16. 
71
 “BFL (1906-21) was founded by two Shanxi merchants and one Qing official in Pingyao 
town. Its founding capital was Tls. 260,000”, in 平遥票号商 (Pingyao Piaohao merchants), 
Quan Deng and Zhengming Zhang, (山西教育出版社 (Shanxi Educational press)), 1997 
p.168. 
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a 
The XCQ payroll list does not provide basic allowance information on staff who were paid 
this alone, without any salary or dividend. Therefore, this dissertation assumes that these 
members of staff earned the minimum basic allowance, Tls. 0.5 per month. 
b
 In 1906 XCQ distributed Tls. 2,000 per fen as dividends. 
c 
Like the XCQ, the BFL also provides no basic allowance information on staff who were paid 
it without any salary or dividend. Therefore, this dissertation assumes that these members of 
staffs earned the minimum basic allowance, Tls. 0.5 per month. 
d
 As a newly established piaohao, in 1906 BFL distributed Tls. 520 per fen as dividends. 
The table above shows that in the XCQ, of its 104 employees, 16 received only the 
basic allowance, 56 employees had a salary in addition but no dividends; and 32 
employees had expertise shares, salary and the basic allowance. In the XCQ, as soon 
as employees moved from basic allowance to the regular payroll, their salary 
increased many times over, ranging from Tls. 8 to Tls. 100. But the most striking 
increase in their income follows their being awarded expertise shares, when their total 
income could range from Tls. 278 to Tls. 2,100. The average annual income for those 
who were paid only the basic allowance was Tls. 6 per annum, while for staff with the 
basic allowance and salary it was Tls. 40 and for staff who had all three types of 
income it was Tls. 866. 
In the BFL piaohao, Table 3-1 illustrates that, of its 131 employees, 36 earned the 
basic allowance of Tls. 6 per annum, 69 employees had the basic allowance as well as 
salary, which ranged from Tls. 14 to Tls. 108, and 26 of them earned all three types of 
income, with values varying from Tls. 182 to Tls. 628. The average annual income for 
staff with only the basic allowance was Tls. 6, for staff who had the basic allowance 
and salary it was Tls. 52 per annum, and for staff with the basic allowance, salary and 
dividends it was Tls. 290 per annum.  In the XCQ, the pay gap ratio between those 
who had the highest income and those with the lowest was 1: 525, while in the BFL 
this ratio was 1:157. 
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 When comparing these piaohao pay gap ratios with the pay gap ratio in 2012 for CEOs 
and employees in American and British investment banks, this thesis found that the latter 
varied between 1: 125 and 1:383 (Decarlo 2012). The ratio in modern Chinese listed banks in 
2012 was about 1:18 (Liu 2012). This suggests that the Shanxi piaohao payment gap is 
similar to that in American and British investment banks, and much larger than the pay gap 
ratio in Chinese listed banks nowadays. 
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Based on their dividend distribution lists, Table 3-2 illustrates the total income 
composition of the expertise shareholders in the XCQ, BFL, and DDT 
73
 piaohao in 
different years. It shows that over time the salary difference between piaohao was 
small. Annual salaries for the DDT expertise shareholders varied from Tls. 50 to Tls. 
200 and for the XCQ and the BFL these values ranged between Tls.70 and Tls.100. 
However, unlike the salary, the difference made by dividends was great. For example, 
compared with the DDT and the XCQ, the BFL distributed a relatively small dividend 
due to a short set-up period. Between 1889 and 1908 the DDT’s dividends per share 
experienced a rise from Tls. 850 to Tls. 17,000, and then declined to Tls. 8,000 in 
1925. As the Shanxi piaohao distributed its dividends according to profitability, the 
varying profits reflected different business conditions for the piaohao. Moreover, 
when comparing these expertise shareholders’ income structure, the importance of the 
dividends payment in increasing these employees’ total income is evident. With 
increases of dividend distribution per share, as employees acquired more shares, their 
total incomes increased exponentially. 
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 “The DDT (1884-1940) was established by a Shanxi merchant Qiao Zhiyong”, Huang, 
Archival materials of the Shanxi piaohao, p.559. As one of the longest surviving piaohao, this 
piaohao is further discussed in 6.4. 
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Table 3-2: DDT, XCQ and BFL expertise shareholders’ income structure (Tls) 
 
Sources: Based on Huang (2002a, p.605, pp.631-5, pp.1222-4.) 
 
a
 In 1889 XCQ distributed Tls.850 per fen as dividends 
b
 In 1906 XCQ distributed Tls.17,600 per fen as dividends
 
c
 In 1925 XCQ distributed Tls.8,000 per fen as dividends
 
d
 In 1906 XCQ distributed Tls.2,000 per fen as dividends
 
e
 In 1910 BFL distributed Tls.520 per fen as dividends 
1 li 1.5 li 2 li 2.5 li 3 li 3.5 li 4 li 4.5 li 5 li 6 li 6.5 li 7li 7.5 li 8li 8.5 li 9li 1 fen
DDT in 1884-9
      Obs 0 0 6 0 4 0 2 0 2 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
      Salary n/a n/a 50 n/a 60 n/a 70 n/a 70 80 n/a 90 n/a n/a n/a n/a 120
      Dividends
a
n/a n/a 170 n/a 255 n/a 340 n/a 420 510 n/a 629 n/a n/a n/a n/a 850
DDT in 1905-8
      Obs 0 8 4 0 14 0 5 5 7 1 3 2 0 0 1 2 3
      Salary n/a 60 70 n/a 80 n/a 100 100 100 120 120 140 n/a n/a 160 190 200
      Dividends
b
n/a 2,550 3,400 n/a 5,100 n/a 6,800 7,650 8,500 10,200 11,050 11,900 n/a n/a 14,450 15,300 17,000
DDT in 1921-5
      Obs 14 3 1 5 3 2 1 0 0 3 0 2 2 0 0 0 4
      Salary 60 60 70 70 80 80 100 n/a n/a 120 n/a 140 140 n/a n/a n/a 200
      Dividends
c
800 1,200 1,600 2,000 2,400 2,800 2,400 n/a n/a 4,800 n/a 5,600 6,600 n/a n/a n/a 8,000
XCQ in 1903-6
      Obs 7 0 2 0 8 0 6 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 3 1
      Salary 70 n/a 70 n/a 70 n/a 70 n/a 70 70 n/a n/a n/a 70 n/a 70 100
      Dividends
d
200 n/a 400 n/a 600 n/a 800 n/a 1,000 1,200 n/a n/a n/a 1,600 n/a 1,800 2,000
BFL in 1906-10
      Obs 0 0 9 0 7 0 3 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3
      Salary n/a n/a 70 n/a 70 n/a 70 n/a 70 n/a n/a 80 n/a 80 n/a n/a 100
      Dividends
e
n/a n/a 104 n/a 156 n/a 208 n/a 260 n/a n/a 364 n/a 416 n/a n/a 520
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                Figure 3-1: Proportions of each type of income in expertise shareholders’ total income 
Sources: Based on Huang (2002a, p.605, pp.631-5, pp.1222-4.) 
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Regarding the piaohao’s pay structure, Table 3-3 shows the DDT, XCQ and BFL’s 
pay structure, and summarised them in Table 3-4. 
Table 3-3: Payment structure of DDT, XCQ and BFL piaohao 
 
Sources: Based on Huang (2002a, p.605, pp.631-5, pp.1222-4.) 
Notes: Unlike the XCQ and BFL which have complete payroll lists for all members of staff, 
DDT left payroll lists of its expertise shareholders only. Therefore, the payment structure of 
the DDT applies to expertise shareholders alone. 
Table 3-4: A summary of the DDT, XCQ and BFL’s pay structure 
  
Normal 
expertise 
shareholders 
Bygone 
shareholders 
Staff with 
basic 
allowance 
and salary 
Staff with 
only basic 
allowance 
Total 
DDT in 1884-9 19 3 n/a n/a 22 
DDT in 1905-8 43 6 n/a n/a 49 
DDT in 1921-5 37 4 n/a n/a 41 
XCQ in 1903-6 27 4 91 16 122 
BFL in 1906-10 26 0 104 36 130 
Sources: Based on Huang (2002a, p.605, pp.631-5, pp.1222-4.) 
As Table 3-3 suggests, for all three piaohao, the number of employees who earned the 
highest expertise share (1 fen) was small. With every decrease in the total value of 
expertise shares, the number of employees who owned shares grew. For most 
expertise shareholders, their shares amounted to 3-4 li, except for the dividends 
distributed by the BFL, DDT and XCQ granted shares to retired employees. These 
bygone shareholders occupied about 10% of the total expertise shareholders in both of 
the latter piaohao. 
Regarding the members of staff who earned only salary and basic allowance in the 
XCQ and BFL, their pay structure followed the normal distribution: the numbers of 
employees who earned the highest (Tls. 80-100) and lowest incomes (below Tls. 9) 
Basic 
allowance 
1 fen 7-9 li 5-6 li 3-4 li 1-2 li 7li-1 fen 3-4 li 1-2 li Tls. 80-100 Tls. 50-70 Tls. 30-40 Tls. 10-20 Tls. 0-9 Tls. 6
DDT in 1884-9 2 1 3 7 6 1 1 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
DDT in 1905-8 2 6 15 14 6 2 3 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
DDT in 1921-5 3 3 2 14 15 2 1 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
XCQ in 1903-6 1 3 3 12 8 1 1 2 2 14 20 26 13 16
BFL in 1906-10 3 2 2 10 9 0 0 0 2 22 23 21 0 36
Normal expertise share Bygone share Salary and basic allowance
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were relatively small, and the number of employees who earned an income at the 
middle level (Tls. 10-70) was large. 
The ratio of expertise shareholders to salary owners and basic allowance earners can 
be seen in the XCQ to have been 3:6:1, and, in the BFL, to have been 2:5:3. These 
results indicate the most employees in these two piaohao earned salaries but no 
expertise share dividends.  
Due to the limited sources, this dissertation is able to trace only that the employees 
who earned the highest expertise share were head office managers of these piaohao; 
no further information is available on the position of other employees. However, on 
the basis of the piaohao’s vertical management structure (Figure 2-2), it can be 
inferred that the XCQ which had about 20 branches, could have one head office 
manager, two vice-head managers, and 20 branch managers. Since there were 27 
normal expertise shareholders in the XCQ at this time, it means that four employees 
who had no managerial position earned dividends as well as the managers.
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The BFL piaohao was on a similar business scale to the XCQ’s, with about 20 
branches in operation (Deng, 1997 p.168.). In 1910 it distributed normal expertise 
shares to 26 members of staff, which implies that, besides the 23 employees with 
managerial positions, three employees were entitled to dividends.  
The number of branches of the DDT piaohao was similar to those of the XCQ and 
BFL (Wei 1944, p.55.). However, except for 1889, its first fiscal year, in which 22 
employees had expertise shares, in 1908 and 1924 more than 40 members of staff in 
the DDT were entitled to dividends. These numbers indicate in addition to the head 
office and branch managers, at least ten other employees received dividends. Here it 
is worth mentioning that, unlike the other Shanxi piaohao which went bankrupt in the 
1910s, the DDT, together with two other Shanxi piaohao, survived the 1911 
Revolution and continued to operate until the 1930s. Having a different payment 
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 As my thesis illustrates, in the personnel arrangements (2.2.1), accountants and 
amanuenses had high status in the piaohao. Therefore, these four employees may have been 
accountants or amanuenses. 
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structure, not to mention its shareholders’ strong capital, may account for its longer 
survival.
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Using the DDT dividend distribution lists, Table 3-5 lists the employees who held 
expertise shares continuously from 1889 to 1925. 
Table 3-5: DDT employees who had expertise share in 1889, 1908 and 1925 (Tls) 
 
Source: On the basis of Huang (2002a, pp.631-5). 
The table shows that, from 1889 to 1908, six employees were entitled to expertise 
shares and three of them still held expertise shares until 1925, by which time the 
remaining three no longer had these shares.
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 In addition, six employees who had no 
share in 1889 had become entitled to it in 1908 and 1925.  
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 The survival of the DDT and other two Shanxi piaohao is discussed in 6.4, below. 
76
 “Gao Yu was the DDT head manager and Hao Quan was his successor”, in Huang, 
Archival materials of the Shanxi piaohao, p.573. 
Dividends Expertise share Dividends Expertise share 
Xu Tingzhu He Xianxi
1884-9 224 2 li 1889 0 None 
1905-8 15,514 9 li (bygone) 1908 5,204 3 li 
1921-5 0 None 1925 5,764 7 li
Lv Yonghe Gao Yunhan
1884-9 224 2 li 1889 0 None 
1905-8 17,224 1 fen 1908 8,624 5 li
1921-5 0 None 1925 8,224 1 fen
Hao Quan Liang Hao
1884-9 339 3 li 1889 0 None 
1905-8 177,224 1 fen 1908 5,204 3 li
1921-5 8,224 1 fen 1925 6,764 7.5 li
Gao Yu Wang Zongyu
1884-9 339 3 li 1889 0 None 
1905-8 177,224 1 fen 1908 14,634 8.5 li 
1921-5 8,224 1 fen (bygone) 1925 8,224 1 fen
Zhao Yuandiao Zong Qihan
1889 244 2 li 1889 0 None 
1908 7,774 4.5 li 1908 2,634 1.5 li 
1925 6,764 7.5 li (bygone) 1925 4,944 6 li (bygone)
Gao Yunzhao Wang Zhenduo
1889 0 None 1889 514 5 li
1908 5,204 3 li 1908 12,064 7 li
1925 5,764 7 li 1925 0 None
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Based on Table 3-5 my thesis illustrates the earnings profile of these employees 
(Figure 3-2), it becomes clear that these employees’ total income heavily depended on 
the number of expertise shares they held and how much was paid out each year in 
dividends. Employees with more expertise shares may add to their total income, but if 
the dividend payments decline, even if the shares increase in number, the employees’ 
total income may still decline.   
The reference line in Figure 3-2 represents an employee who had Tls. 100 as his total 
income per year from 1889 to 1925 but was paid no expertise share. By contrasting 
the expertise shareholders’ income with the reference employee’s income, it can be 
found that if an employee had no expertise share from 1889 to 1925, the payment gap 
between him and the expertise shareholders would widen as long as the shareholders 
acquired more expertise shares or the dividend payments increased. 
Figure 3-2: Earnings profile for the DDT expertise shareholders (Tls) 
Source: On the basis of Huang (2002a, pp. 631-635). 
Note: This figure shows earnings profile of the employees with expertise shares for at least 
for two fiscal years. It does not plot those who only had expertise shares for one fiscal year. 
The above diagram indicates that the piaohao distributed dividends were based on 
employees’ tenure and performance. Employees Zhao Yuandiao, Gao Yu, and Hao 
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Quan, who worked for the DDT for 36 years, had a steady increase in their expertise 
share. Here it should be noted that as these piaohao developed they distributed an 
increasing share of their profits as dividends (Table 3-6) and the dividends disbursed 
to the employees caught up to that of distributed to capital shareholders (Table 3-7). 
Distributing substantial sums out of their profits to some degree deprived DDT of 
other business investment opportunities.   
Table 3-6: DDT profits and total distributed dividends in 1884-9, 1905-8, and 1921-5 
(Tls) 
  
Total 
profits 
Total distributed 
dividends  
Total distributed dividends / Total profits  
1884-9 24,723 8,269 0.33 
1905-8 743,545 408,000 0.55 
1921-5 127,578 123,000 0.96 
Source: On the basis of Huang (2002a, pp.631-5). 
Note: As the XCQ and BFL did not report their profits in their payroll lists, the ratio of total 
distributed dividends / total profits for these two piaohao cannot be presented here. 
Table 3-7: Shares of capital equity and expertise equity in 1884-9, 1905-8, and 1921-5  
  Capital share  Expertise share  
1884-9 20 9.7 
1905-8 19 25 
1921-5 17.5 15.3 
Source: ibid.  
3.2 Functioning of the piaohao’s incentive structure 
The above analyses show that the expertise share played an important role in 
incentivising employees who could earn this by their excellent performance and long 
tenure. In this section, by comparing the lifetime incomes of the employees with 
different career choices and discounting these employees’ lifetime income, I explore 
the functioning of the piaohao’s incentive structure.  
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The data that this section employs come from the DDT piaohao. Based on its dividend 
distribution (Table 3-6) in each fiscal year from set-up to 1933,
 77
 I deduce that there 
were six types of employee in the DDT:  
Type 1: An employee who received an average annual salary of Tls. 100 in the DDT 
but had no expertise share and remained in the DDT until 1933, when it no longer 
distributed dividends.  
Type 2: An employee who received an average annual salary of Tls. 100 in the DDT 
but had no share and left for a modern Chinese bank in 1926 when the DDT dividend 
payment slumped. The annual income that this employee would have earned in a 
modern bank was Tls. 70 per year.
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Type 3: An employee who received an average annual salary of Tls. 100 in the DDT 
but had no share and joined a modern Chinese bank in 1913 during the Shanxi 
piaohao’s wave of bankruptcies. The annual income that this employee would have 
earned in a modern bank was Tls. 70 per year. 
Type 4: An employee who received an average annual salary of Tls. 100 in the DDT 
and had an increasing share payment. He stayed at the DDT until 1933, when it no 
longer distributed dividends.  
Type 5: An employee who received an average annual salary of Tls. 100 in the DDT 
and had an increasing share payment. He left for a modern Chinese bank in 1926 
when the DDT dividend distribution slumped. The annual income that this employee 
earned in a modern bank would have been Tls. 200 per year.  
Type 6: An employee who received an average annual salary of Tls. 100 in the DDT 
and had an increasing share payment. He left for a modern Chinese bank in 1913 
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 The reason why this thesis does not provide the DDT dividend distribution after 1933 is 
that after this year DDT suffered from deficits and left no information on their dividend 
distributions. 
78
 According to “上海银行行员服务待遇规则 [Regulations of the Shanghai Bank’s staff 
members’ salary and bonus]” that a normal member of staff was paid Tls.40-90 per annum, 
see Banking in modern China: entrepreneurs, professional managers, and the development of 
Chinese banks, 1897-1937, Linsun Cheng, (Cambridge University Press), 2003, p.178. 
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during the piaohao’s bankruptcy wave. The annual income that this employee would 
have earned in a modern bank was Tls. 200 per year.
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This assumption allows me to plot the total income difference for these six types of 
employees (see Figure 3-3, Figure 3-4, Figure 3-5, and Figure 3-6). 
Table 3-8: DDT dividend payments in each fiscal year (Tls) 
 
Source: Huang (2002, pp. 631-633). 
Figure 3-3: Total income difference for employees who stayed at the DDT until 1933 and 
those who moved to modern banks in 1926 (non-expertise shareholders) 
 
Note: Type 1 is an employee who received an average annual salary of Tls. 100 in the DDT 
but had no expertise share and remained in the DDT until 1933, when it no longer distributed 
dividends. Type 2 is an employee who received an average annual salary of Tls. 100 in the 
DDT but had no share and left for a modern Chinese bank in 1926 when the DDT dividend 
payment slumped. The annual income that this employee would have earned in a modern 
bank was Tls. 70 per year. The annual income this employee earned in a modern bank was 
Tls. 70 per year. The reason why this figure stops at 1948 is that after the People’s Republic 
of China was set up by the Communist Party, most banks were nationalised or moved to 
Taiwan.   
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 Cheng (2003, p.178.) described a normal member of staff was paid Tls.40-90 per 
annum, as many piaohao managers joined modern banks at the rank of middle level managers 
who had expertise shares, this thesis assumes that these modern banks would have paid the 
former piaohao expertise shareholders Tls. 200 per year. 
1884-9 1890-3 1894-7 1908-1 1902-4 1905-8 1909-12 1913-6 1917-20 1921-5 1926-9 1930-3
Dividends per fen 850 3,040 7,321 11,900 15,130 17,000 17,190 15,070 11,590 8,000 1,407 0
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Figure 3-4: Total income difference for employees who stayed at the DDT until it closed 
and those who moved to modern banks in 1913 (non-expertise shareholders) 
 
Note: Type 1 is an employee who received an average annual salary of Tls. 100 in the DDT 
but had no expertise share and remained in the DDT until 1933, when it no longer distributed 
dividends. Type 3 is an employee who received an average annual salary of Tls. 100 in the 
DDT but had no share and joined a modern Chinese bank in 1913 during the Shanxi 
piaohao’s wave of bankruptcies. The annual income that this employee would have earned in 
a modern bank was Tls. 70 per year. 
Figure 3-5: Total income difference for employees who stayed at the DDT and those who 
moved to modern banks in 1926 (expertise shareholders) 
 
Notes: Type 4 is an employee who received an average annual salary of Tls. 100 in the DDT 
and had an increasing share payment. He stayed at the DDT until 1933, when it no longer 
distributed dividends. Type 5 is an employee who received an average annual salary of Tls. 
100 in the DDT and had an increasing share payment. He left for a modern Chinese bank in 
1926 when the DDT dividend distribution slumped. The annual income that this employee 
earned in a modern bank would have been Tls. 200 per year. 
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Figure 3-6: Total Income difference for employees who stayed at the DDT until it closed 
and those moved to modern banks in 1913 (expertise shareholders) 
 
Notes: Type 4 is an employee who received an average annual salary of Tls. 100 in the DDT 
and had an increasing share payment. He stayed at the DDT until 1933, when it no longer 
distributed dividends. Type 6 is an employee who received an average annual salary of Tls. 
100 in the DDT and had an increasing share payment. He left for a modern Chinese bank in 
1913 during the piaohao’s bankruptcy wave. The annual income that this employee would 
have earned in a modern bank was Tls. 200 per year. 
As the above figures suggest, when the DDT dividends slumped in 1926 (Figure 3-3 
and Figure 3-5), it would have been optimal for both non-expertise shareholders and 
expertise shareholders to leave for modern banks. This is because the total incomes 
they earned after going to modern banks were larger than the incomes they would 
have earned if they had stayed in the DDT. However, hopping to a modern bank was 
not always an optimal decision for the DDT employees. As Figure 3-4 shows, if a 
non-expertise shareholder had left the DDT in 1913 during the Shanxi piaohao’s 
bankruptcy wave, the total income he would have lost from the DDT was almost 
equal to the extra income he would have earned from a modern bank. This loss would 
have been even greater for the expertise shareholder if he had left the DDT in 1913 
(Figure 3-6). Therefore, whether hopping to a modern bank was an optimal career 
decision for the DDT employee or not depended on the prospects of the DDT and the 
salary paid in the modern bank in question. If the DDT could afford high dividends in 
the long run, it would have been better to stay in the DDT, while if the DDT could not 
do so and a modern foreign bank could pay a stable, decent future income, it would 
have been better for employees to leave for such banks. 
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Besides plotting these employees’ lifetime incomes, this section also discounts these 
employees’ lifetime incomes in order to find the rationale of their career choices. 
Assuming an employee’s present value income at year t equals the discounting of his 
future remaining earnings (Jordan et al., 2001), the resulting value of a discrete 
income would be: 
𝑃𝑉𝑡 = ∑
𝐼𝑡
(1 + 𝑟)𝑇−𝑡
𝑇
𝑡
 
Equation 3-1                                
where 𝑃𝑉𝑡 is the present value of an employee’s income at year t, 𝐼𝑡 is the employees’ 
total income at year t, 𝑟  is the discount rate at year t and, 𝑇  is the year that the 
employee stops working in a piaohao.
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Based on this equation, Table 3-8 shows the present value of a DDT employee’s 
lifetime income in 1884. 
Table 3-9: Present value of a DDT employee’s lifetime income 
Type of employees  PV in 1884 (Tls.)a 
Type 1b 1,393 
Type 2c 1,438 
Type 3d  1,394 
Type 4e 9,523 
Type 5f 9,632 
Type 6g 7,571 
Source: Huang (2002, pp. 631-633). 
a
 As the DDT opened in 1884, I assume these employees were first recruited to it when it 
opened and I discount their lifetime income to this year. Moreover, as in plotting the total 
income difference for these employees, the last year for discounting is 1948, when many 
banks left for Taiwan or were nationalized by the Communist Party. 
b 
Type 1: An employee who received an average annual salary of Tls. 100 in the DDT but had 
no expertise share and remained in the DDT until 1933, when it no longer distributed 
dividends. 
c
 Type 2: An employee who received an average annual salary of Tls. 100 in the DDT but had 
no share and left for a modern Chinese bank in 1926 when the DDT dividend payment 
slumped. The annual income that this employee would have earned in a modern bank was Tls. 
70 per year. 
                                               
80
 The discount rate my thesis uses here is the average of the highest (10%) interest rate 
and the lowest interest rate charged by the Shanxi piaohao (2%) which is 6% (Huang, 20002a, 
p.628.). 
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d
 Type 3: An employee who received an average annual salary of Tls. 100 in the DDT but had 
no share and joined a modern Chinese bank in 1913 during the Shanxi piaohao’s wave of 
bankruptcies. The annual income that this employee would have earned in a modern bank was 
Tls. 70 per year. 
e
 Type 4: An employee who received an average annual salary of Tls. 100 in the DDT and had 
an increasing share payment. He stayed at the DDT until 1933, when it no longer distributed 
dividends.
 
f
 Type 5: An employee who received an average annual salary of Tls. 100 in the DDT and had 
an increasing share payment. He left for a modern Chinese bank in 1926 when the DDT 
dividend distribution slumped. The annual income that this employee earned in a modern 
bank would have been Tls. 200 per year. 
g 
Type 6: An employee who received an average annual salary of Tls. 100 in the DDT and had 
an increasing share payment. He left for a modern Chinese bank in 1913 during the piaohao’s 
bankruptcy wave. The annual income that this employee would have earned in a modern bank 
was Tls. 200 per year. 
The table shows that for the above six types of employee, Type 2 and Type 5 had the 
highest present value incomes while Type 3 and Type 6 and the lowest. These results 
are the same as the results from the above figures. When there was no modern bank, 
an employee who had no expertise share would anticipate that, if he earned the 
highest salary in the DDT, the present value of his lifetime income would be Tls. 
1,393. However, when modern banks were set up and the DDT faced a profits decline 
and was about to close, an employee would find that the present value of his lifetime 
income would be higher if he moved to a modern bank than if he stayed in the DDT. 
However, if this employee misjudged the profitability of the DDT and moved to a 
modern bank too early, then the present value of his lifetime income would be lower 
than if he stayed at the DDT. These findings are consistent with the historical 
evidence that when the Shanxi piaohao were on the verge of decline, many employees 
left for the modern Chinese banks.
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 As my thesis illustrates in 3.5, below, when the official banks and private banks were set 
up in the 1910s, members of staff in the piaohao, including the DDT manager Yan Weifan, 
the WCH manager Fan Yuanmao, and the Tian Cheng Heng piaohao manager Jia Fuchen 
jumped to modern banks to work (Fan, 1936, cited in Shanxi University of Finance and 
Economics, 2008, p.69). 
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3.3 A simplified tournament model testing the effectiveness of the 
piaohao’s incentive structure  
Tournament theory, which refers to payment differences, is due to the labourers’ 
relative productivity rather than their marginal productivity. Under it, employees’ 
salaries can be paid according to their rank in the firm, in order to persuade every 
employee to work hard to earn promotion and higher remuneration (Rosen, 1985, 
Bognanno, 2001). 
Tournament theory proposes that different tiers of tournament may exist within a firm, 
so a worker who achieved highest level position in the first level tournament enters 
the next highest level of new tier of the tournament to achieve a higher position and 
remuneration (Rosen, 1985). As employees enter a higher level of the tournament, the 
scope for their future promotion diminishes. To replace this, a sharply increasing 
remuneration gap is provided; this explains why there is a convex payment structure 
and a big wage gap between first and second level employees (O'Reilly III et al., 1988, 
Lambert et al., 1993, Eriksson, 1999).
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 Moreover, tournament wage theory also 
predicts that incentives for management should have a positive effect on corporate 
performance (Lambert et al., 1993, O'Reilly III et al., 1988).  
As my dissertation illustrates in 3.2, above, the Shanxi piaohao distributed expertise 
shares to head office managers, branch managers, accountants and amanuenses who 
had higher status in the piaohao. Therefore, in order to test whether the Shanxi 
piaohao had tournament wages in their incentive structure, this section examines the 
pay gaps between the piaohao employees’ different levels and tests if the pay gaps 
correlate with the piaohao’s performance. 
The data employed in this section are still from the DDT. Based on the Shanxi 
piaohao’s payment structure (Table 3-3), this thesis assumes that the employees who 
had a 1 fen expertise share were valued as the highest paid group (head office 
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 A convex payment structure here means that the payment difference between the first 
and second level of employees is larger than the payment difference between the second and 
third level employees and so on. 
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managers and vice-head mangers), employees who had 7-9 li expertise shares were 
treated as the second highest paid group (manager’s sectary and managers of large 
branches), employees who had 5-6 li were treated as the third highest paid group 
(managers of middle-sized branches), employees who had 3-4 li were treated as the 
fourth highest paid group (managers of small branches), employees who had 1-2 li 
were treated as the fifth highest paid group (accountants and amanuenses), and 
employees who had only salaries were treated as the averagely paid group (common 
members of staff). To measure the DDT’s performance, this dissertation employs the 
figures for the DDT paid-up capital in different fiscal years.
83
 On the basis of this, my 
thesis defines the DDT payment gap as the differences between the following six 
levels of income:  
GAP 1: income between the highest paid group and the average income of the second 
highest paid group;  
GAP 2: income between the average income of the second highest paid group and the 
average income of the third highest paid group;  
GAP 3: income between the average income of the third highest paid group and the 
average of the fourth highest paid group;  
GAP 4: income between the average income of the fourth highest paid group and the 
average income of the fifth highest paid group; 
GAP 5: income between the average income of the fifth highest paid group and the 
employees who had only average salaries of Tls. 100 per annum. 
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 “At the end of every fiscal year based on its profit, the piaohao shareholders could 
increase [beiben 倍本] or withdraw their capital. Normally, if the piaohao was profitable, the 
shareholders would invest more, but if the piaohao had a deficit and the shareholders believed 
it would not make a  profit, they would withdraw their capital”, in Wei, A history of the 
Shanxi Piaohao, pp.55-6. As my thesis surveys DDT profits for only three fiscal years and 
paid up capital for seven fiscal years’, it chooses the DDT paid up capital to measure its 
performance. 
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If the DDT’s incentive structure satisfies a tournament model, then GAP1≥ GAP2≥ 
GAP3 ≥ GAP4 ≥ GAP5, and GAP1, GAP2, GAP3, GAP4 and GAP5 are positively 
correlated with any change in the paid-up capital. 
As Table 3-9 shows, the pay gaps between the DDT employees at different levels, it 
can be found that its incentive structure satisfies the tournament model for only 
certain levels of employees: GAP2≥ GAP3 ≥ GAP4 ≥ GAP5. But the incomes of the 
highest paid group (head office managers and vice-head mangers) and the second 
highest paid group (manager’s sectary and large branches’ managers), were not 
tournament wages.
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Table 3-10: Employees’ pay gaps in the DDT (Tls) 
 
Source: Based on Huang (2002a, pp. 631-5.) and Wei (1944, pp.55-6). 
As this section further calculates the correlation coefficients between these pay gaps 
and the DDT paid up capital, it obtains the value of 0.37, which is statistically 
significant at 99% confidence level.
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 A positive correlation indicates that the DDT’s 
incentive structure during this period had a positive impact on its performance. 
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 Besides dividing DDT income level according to the above criteria, I have also tried to 
define the DDT pay gap according to other criteria. For example, the group GAP 1 contains 
the employees who had a 1fen expertise share and the average total income of the expertise 
shareholders who had 7 li-9 li shares; GAP 2 represents the average total income of expertise 
shareholders who had 7-9 li shares and the average total income of expertise shareholders 
who had 3-6 li shares; GAP3 is between the average total income of the expertise 
shareholders who had 3-6 li and average total income of the expertise shareholders who had 
1-2 li, GAP 4 is between the average total income of the expertise shareholders who had 1-2 li 
and the average income of those who only had salary but not expertise share. The result is 
similar to that of Table 3-10. 
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 “DDT paid up capital in 1884-9 was Tls. 100,000, in 1890-3 was Tls. 130,000, in 1894-
7 was Tls. 140,000, in 1898-1901 was Tls. 160,000, in 1902-4 was Tls. 180,000, in 1905-8 
was Tls. 220,000, and in 1921-5 was Tls. 300,000”, in Wei, A history of the Shanxi piaohao, 
pp.55-6. 
1884-9 1890-3 1894-7 1898-1901 1902-4 1905-8 1909-12 1913-6 1917-20 1921-5 1926-9 1930-3
GAP1 170 608 1,464 2,380 3,026 3,400 3,438 3,014 2,318 1,200 281 0
GAP2 213 760 1,830 2,975 3,783 4,250 4,298 3,768 2,898 1,500 352 0
GAP3 170 608 1,464 2,380 3,026 3,400 3,438 3,014 2,318 1,200 281 0
GAP4 170 608 1,464 2,380 3,026 3,400 3,438 3,014 2,318 1,200 281 0
GAP5 128 456 1,098 1,785 2,270 2,550 2,579 2,261 1,739 900 211 0
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3.4 Exploring the malfunction of the piaohao’s governance 
structure in its later period 
The management and incentive structure in the Shanxi piaohao at one stage 
successfully disciplined and incentivised distant employees. However, when these 
piaohao confronted competition from foreign banks and modern Chinese banks in the 
late 1900s and risked being eliminated in the 1910s, this governance structure became 
dysfunctional. In order to explore the fundamental reason for this change, the present 
dissertation modifies the efficient wage model designed by Greif (2006), who studied 
the collective punishment mechanism of the Maghribi traders. Before outlining the 
models for the Shanxi piaohao, the similarities and differences between the two 
merchant groups are briefly illustrated.  
Regarding similarities, both the Shanxi merchants and the Maghribi traders believed 
that solving conflicts in the public courts is expensive and time consuming, so they 
wanted to use private decisions to resolve the conflicts occurring in agency relations. 
Second, in their long distance business, both the piaohao merchants and the Maghribi 
merchants employed non-family members from their own ethnic group and used 
guilds to share the consequences of employees’ misbehaviour.  
The most obvious difference between the Shanxi piaohao and Maghribi merchants is 
the structure of the agent relationship. Among the Maghribi traders the principal agent 
relationship is horizontal, which means that the Maghribi merchants employed other 
Maghribi merchants as agents, and at the same time they also worked for these other 
Maghribi traders as agents themselves (Greif, 2006). In contrast, in the Shanxi 
piaohao this relationship was vertical, which means that the piaohao employed head 
managers and other members of staff as agents, but the shareholders did not work for 
them. 
Moreover, as the Maghribi merchants did not work from a complete contract in 
defining misbehaviour, they used cultural rules as references to differentiate cheating 
from honesty (Greif 2006). Unlike the Maghribi traders, the piaohao merchants 
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designed comprehensive regulatory codes which clearly defined what behaviours 
constituted cheating.
86
 Bearing these similarities and differences in mind, this thesis 
proposes the following hypotheses to explain the functioning of the piaohao’s 
governance structure. 
Model: Consider a closed career environment with P shareholders and A employees, 
where P < A, shareholders can hire more than one employees but each employee can 
work in only one firm. The reservation utility for an unemployed employee is 𝐼𝑢, a 
shareholder who does not hire an employee receives earnings 𝐼𝑛 , the payoff from 
employing an employee is 𝐼𝑜 . Assume that 𝐼ℎ  is the income which an employee 𝑖 
receives to keep him honest in each period, in this condition, his lifetime income is  𝑆𝑖 
. Normally there are ten grades in each share, and an employee can earn a maximum 
of one share. Therefore, Ih denotes the income in line with the share that an employee 
has, Ih = {I0, I1, I2 … I10| I0 < 𝐼1 < 𝐼2… < 𝐼10}, where  h is the grade of the share. If 
we assume that employee 𝑖  can work for 50 years, his lifetime income will be 
 𝑆𝑖 = ∑ 𝐼𝑡ℎ
𝑡=50
𝑗=10
𝑡=1
𝑗=0
, where 𝑡 is the year of 𝑖 work.  𝐼𝑐 is a once-off lump sum payoff for 
cheatering. If we assume 𝐻ℎ ∈ [0,1] is the probability that an honest employee will be 
rehired, while 𝐻𝑐 ∈ [0,1]  is the probability that a cheater will be rehired. 𝑆𝑖  is 
monotonically increasing in 𝐻𝑐 , 𝐼𝑢 , 𝐼𝑐  and monotonically decreasing in 𝐻ℎ (Greif 
2006). 
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 The reasons why these two merchant groups had different management structures can be 
explained as follows: First, the Maghribi traders were active during the 11-12th century, when 
communication technology was poor, so they could not rely on a hierarchic structure as the 
Shanxi piaohao could, to pass on accurate information and could use only cultural rules to 
specify what behaviour could be defined as cheating. Second, the Shanxi piaohao was a 
formal type of financial institution, that is, a firm. In contrast, the Maghribi traders did not set 
up any formal institution when they did business; they simply hired agents to buy and sell 
goods abroad, and when a transaction had finished, they decided whether to continue 
transactions in the next period on the base of agents’ past performance. 
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 This model is largely inspired by the efficient wage model designed by Greif (2006, 
p.37, pp.88-9.). By modifying Greif’s model, I can propose Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 and 
validate them with historical evidence. 
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Hypothesis 1:  A collective punishment mechanism is a self-enforcing mechanism, 
and is effective in preventing cheating.
88
 
The Shanxi piaohao shareholders wanted to hire honest employees because they 
required a lower 𝑆𝑖.  Since each Shanxi piaohao shareholder would find it optimal to 
employ honest employees, he would like to form a collective punishment mechanism 
and this mechanism would be self-enforcing. 
Hypothesis 2: An employee will be honest unless he identifies a decline of his 
piaohao. 
Assume that an employee 𝑖 starts his first job as an apprentice in a piaohao, during his 
whole career he has two options: to be honest (Ah) or cheat (Ac). If he is honest and 
works hard, he will be promoted, earn expertise share dividends or switch to another 
piaohao to earn a higher income. In this condition, his lifetime earnings will be 𝑆𝑖. 
However, if he cheats, he will receive a lump sum 𝐼𝑐 . Since the Shanxi piaohao 
imposed a collective punishment and the cost of entry to another ethnic trading 
community was high (Landa 1981, p.356), 𝐼𝑐  would be this cheater’s lifetime income. 
A rational employee will thus be honest if 𝑆𝑖 ≥ 𝐼𝑐 , otherwise he will cheat. As I 
illustrate in the piaohao’s incentive structure, 𝐼𝑖  not only depends on the performance 
of the employee, but also relies on the profitability of a piaohao in its fiscal year. 
Moreover, as I illustrated in the case studies, below, an employee’s annual income 
varied from Tls. 40 to Tls. 4,000. Therefore, if he was honest and his piaohao was 
profitable, he could expect his annual income to increase steadily.  
For a cheater, the maximum amount of the lump that sum he can obtain by 
malpractice is the shareholders’ total branch deposit.  As each piaohao branch avoided 
depositing too much silver and relied on various types of draft to balance its reserves, 
the silver reserve in each branch would have been Tls. 20,000-30,000. One silver tael 
usually weighs 37 gram, is 2.5 inches long and 1.5 inches high; hence, it would have 
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 This hypothesis is validated by Greif (2006 p.37.), who shows that the Maghribi 
merchants wanted to hire honest employees because they required a lower lifetime income. 
This argument can also be applied to the Shanxi piaohao. 
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been difficult for a cheater to embezzle more Tls. 20,000 by carrying them away. 
Bearing the above facts in mind, I assume that the maximum amount of silver that a 
cheater could embezzle would have been Tls. 20,000.  
Under these assumptions, it can be found that when the employee i perceives that the 
piaohao’s future is prosperous, he will assume that if he is honest and works hard, his 
income will increase steadily and his lump sum he gains from cheating will be smaller 
than his total income if he remains honest, that is  𝑆𝑖 ≥ 𝐶𝑖 . Therefore, he will be 
honest. However, when he realizes that the future of the piaohao is doomed; his lump 
sum from cheating is greater than his future income for working honestly, that 
is 𝑆𝑖 < 𝐶𝑖, so he will cheat. 
Hypothesis 3: When the piaohao guilds prevailed, a collective punishment 
mechanism was effective in preventing cheating behaviours. When the guild system 
decayed, however, the collective punishment mechanism evaporated. 
Adequate information is necessary to ensure that a collective punishment mechanism 
is effectively imposed.  By establishing guild and holding monthly meetings, the 
piaohao merchants could share this information. However, when the piaohao 
merchant faced threats after 1911, many of them went bankrupt and the piaohao 
merchant guilds declined. When there was no way to share the information about 
employees, this multilateral punishment mechanism was no longer valid. 
Hypothesis  4:  When career prospects close and no external career opportunities are 
offered, piaohao employees will remain honest. However, when employees have more 
job opportunities, they cheat.  
When there are no other career opportunities, 𝐼𝑢  is low, holding other variables 
constant, shareholders need only provide a low 𝑆𝑖 to keep employees honest. When 
there are other work opportunities with better treatment, 𝑆𝑖  increases, due to a higher 
𝐼𝑢 . The cost of keeping an employee honest increases. Therefore, if the piaohao 
cannot provide higher income, employees will cheat. 
Before modern Chinese banks were established, the piaohao employees had no 
alternative job opportunities, but with the establishment of official banks and private 
95 
 
banks which implemented a policy of hiring piaohao employees in preference to other 
candidates, the job opportunities for these employees suddenly proliferated.
89
   
Unlike the Shanxi piaohao, which provided high dividends but imposed strict rules on 
their employees, the welfare and pension schemes in modern Chinese banks are more 
humane (Cheng, 2003 p.178.).
90
 Moreover, because the Shanxi piaohao suffered great 
losses after the 1911 Revolution and could not afford their former salaries, the salary 
packages in the modern banks began to look more attractive. 
A report in the Central Bank Monthly Newspaper in July 1925 refers to the wave of 
departures from the piaohao:  
“As the Shanxi piaohao are on the verge of collapse, many excellent piaohao 
managers who have identified this trend have left for new jobs in government 
banks. In 1908, Jia Fuchen and Huo Keqian, managers in the Tian Cheng Heng 
piaohao to Sichuan moved to the Provincial Bank. In 1910, Wang Jingfu, the RSC 
piaohao branch manager, and Fan Yuanmao, the WCH piaohao manager, left for 
the Guangxi Provincial Bank. These two official banks will operate well under the 
management of these Shanxi managers. In addition to these moves to official banks, 
Ding Weifan, the Yishanyuan piaohao manager and Chen Dai, the  Fengyuanrun 
piaohao manager have left for new careers in the Siming Commercial Bank 
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 Sheng Xuanhuai, a politician as well as the founder of the Great Qing Bank, describes 
this in a letter: “When setting up the Great Qing Bank, I plan to hire foreigners in coastal 
branches and employ the Shanxi merchants in our inland branches. The reason for this 
arrangement is that inland branches mainly rely on the remittance business in which we are 
experts. Therefore, I ask your majesty to invite the leading piaohao merchant from Shanxi to 
Shanghai. Even if this person rejects our invitation, I have decided to employ mainly Shanxi 
merchants in our inland branches. Since you have many acquaintances in Shanxi, I sincerely 
request you to keep asking them”, in 盛宣怀未刊信稿  (Unpublished letters of Sheng 
Xuanhuai), 北京大学历史系近代史教研室 (History Department of Peking University) ed, 
中华书局 (Zhonghua Book Company), 1960, p.73.). Here worth mentioning that there is a 
shift in modern banks recruitment strategy. When they just set up, they preferred to hire 
piaohao staff, but as they developed they found piaohao employees have difficulties in 
adapting to business models, therefore, they began to recruit graduates of prestigious overseas 
universities, in Cheng, Banking in modern China, p.171. 
90
 This point will be further examined in 6.3.2, below. 
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[Siming Shangye Yinhang 四明商业银行 ] (Fan, 1936, cited in the Shanxi 
University of Finance and Economics, 2008, p.69.).” 
The above analyses show that when  the piaohao were profitable and no other career 
opportunity presented itself, the governance structure could manage employees. 
However, when these employees anticipated a possible decline and when they could 
find work in other financial institutions, this governance structure became weak. 
3.5 Concluding remarks  
From studying the piaohao’s incentive structure, this chapter has demonstrated that 
expertise share was important in incentivising the piaohao employees. The pay ratio 
between employees who had the highest expertise shares those who had only the basic 
allowance is comparable to today’s gap ratio between the pay of an investment bank’s 
CEO and that of an ordinary employee. Although expertise share is important, 
normally in a piaohao about 20%-30% of the employees were entitled to this share for 
their long tenure and good performance. Regarding different employees’ career 
choices, I have found that when the piaohao could pay high dividends it was optimal 
for its employees to stay in post. Otherwise, it was better for them to move to a 
modern bank. I have also found that, except for the pay gap between the employees 
with the highest and the second highest incomes, the pay gaps between employees at 
all other levels conform to a tournament model, which had a positive impact on the 
piaohao’s performance. 
After these explorations of the management and incentive structure of the piaohao, the 
next chapter takes the RSC piaohao as a case study to look into the business strategy 
and historical development of the piaohao as a whole. 
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 Business strategy: Factors that determined the Chapter 4.
RSC remittance fees 
The Shanxi piaohao was established to deal with remittances, but for a long time 
studies on the modus operandi of its business were far from complete. This chapter, 
however, based on my data set, investigates the factors that determined the RSC’s 
remittance fees by examining the types of client and draft dealt with in this piaohao, 
its business territory, the types of silver it accepted, and the length of time taken to 
cash a draft.  
4.1 The reason for choosing the RSC and how far it was typical 
This dissertation notes that one of the main concerns with a single case study is its 
representative and applicability to the whole population. Therefore, it is important to 
check whether the findings in a given case can be generalised to situations beyond 
itself (Hodkinson and Hodkinson, 2001 p.16.).
91
 With this in mind, this section checks 
how far the case of the RSC can reflect the situation for other piaohao. As the first and 
one of the largest Shanxi piaohao of its time, the RSC’s running model and business 
strategies were copied by other Shanxi piaohao. As Table 4-1 shows, not only was the 
organizational structure in each analogous to the others in its group, but the groups 
also met to discuss business strategies via the guild and adopted very similar business 
practices as they developed. 
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 As Hodkinson states (2001 pp.15-6.), no matter how rigorous we strive to be, case 
studies cannot cover all the facets of a population. Therefore, instead of thinking of  
‘generalisation’, we can look to good case studies to tell us about situations beyond the actual 
case that was studied.  
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Table 4-1: Common features of the RSC and other Shanxi piaohao 
Characteristic Commonalities Evidence 
Organizational structure Single proprietorship or partnership 
and a dual class equity structure. 
山西票号史[An overview 
of the Shanxi piaohao] 
(Wei, 1944 pp.15-27.) 
 
Branch distribution Clustered in large cities at first and 
spread into county and town level 
cities. 
山西票号若干分号统计
[Statistics on the Shanxi 
piaohao’s branch 
distribution] 
(Huang,2002a pp.212-
215) 
 
Types of draft Direct original, direct loan, inverse 
original, inverse loan. 
记山西票号[A survey of 
the Shanxi piaohao] 
(Junshi, 1917 cited in 
Huang 2002a, p.677.) 
 
Business structure Dominated by the remittance 
business, operated loans and 
deposits as side business. 
Annual balance sheets of 
the RSC (Collected from 
the University of Tokyo), 
Annual balance sheets of 
the QJS, WTH and WFH 
(Huang 2002a, p.218, p. 
1272.) 
 
Government business  Shared government remittances. Business letter of the 
WTH (Huang, 2002a, 
p.1173.); Memorandum of 
Sichuan Provincial 
Governor Ding Baozhen 
(Huang 2002a, pp.181-2.) 
 
Decline period Centred on the 1910s. 山西票号史[An overview 
of the Shanxi piaohao] 
(Wei, 1944 pp.15-27.) 
 
Besides this, another important reason to choose the RSC is the availability of its data 
on accounts. Unlike its peers, whose documents were lost or destroyed, the RSC had 
business records which were relatively adequately preserved, from its early 
establishment in the 1840s to its bankruptcy in the 1910s. This time span covers most 
of the Shanxi piaohao’s operation period, and allows my thesis to embark on a full-
scale detailed analyse of the piaohao business, which had been long condemned to 
over-simplified general description.  
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Although these Shanxi piaohao were similar in some ways, each piaohao would have 
its own idiosyncrasies, i.e. in business volumes and profits. However, since the 
research topic of this chapter is to investigate the Shanxi piaohao’s business strategy, 
a case study of the RSC is arguably the best approach to take to this issue.     
4.2 Types of client and draft in the RSC  
Yang (1930 pp.89-90.) recorded that the Shanxi piaohao charged remittance fees 
according to the amount of silver being remitted and the clients who remitted drafts. 
Therefore, this section examines the values of the RSC drafts in every decade from 
the 1840s to the 1900s. On the basis of this, it further investigates the RSC clients and 
types of draft. 
Table 4-2 summarises the descriptive results of the RSC drafts from the 1840s to the 
1900s: on average, the RSC remitted Tls. 1,600 to Tls. 3,500 per draft, and its means 
declined gradually from Tls. 3,173 in the 1840s to Tls. 1,702 in the 1900s. In the 
1840s a draft was worth at least Tls. 100 but in 1902-1909, the minimum value for a 
draft dropped to Tls. 1. Unlike the means and minimums which decreased over time, 
there is no clear pattern for the maximum values of the RSC drafts, which varied from 
Tls. 8,000 to Tls. 181,814.  
Table 4-2: Descriptive results of the RSC drafts from the 1840s to the 1900s (Tls) 
Period Observations Mean S.d.  Min Max 
1840s 69 3,173 4,365 101 24,500 
1850s 35 3,471 3,795 100 18,240 
1860s 36 2,819 2,016 45 10,000 
1870s 81 1,613 1,239 25 8,000 
1880s 97 1,667 3,743 10 36,001 
1890-3 1,765 2,492 6,590 1 181,814 
1894/5 761 2,194 4,276 8 50,000 
1896-9 113 3,270 7,029 20 50,400 
1900/1 122 3,372 8,116 10 49,471 
1902-9 1309 1,702 2,416 1 25,395 
Sources: Based on the RSC business correspondence from the 1840s to the early 1900s; See 
Huang (2002a pp.833-1077.); the RSC 1906 annual balance sheets of Zhoujiakou and Xian 
branches (Collected from the Advanced Asia Studies Library, University of Tokyo) 
Note: The reason why my thesis divides the 1890s into 1890-1893, 1894-1895, and 1896-
1899 is that the First Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1894-1895. Similarly, in the 1900s, the 
Boxer Rebellion splits the first decade at some point between 1901 and 1902, because it took 
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place in 1900-1901. By treating these two events as thresholds, my thesis can pinpoint their 
impact on the RSC.  
On the basis of Table 4-2, Table 4-3 shows the types of client that employed the RSC 
over time. It can be found that overall the RSC had seven types of client: ‘firms’, 
‘gentry’, ‘commoners’, ‘other piaohao’, ‘official’, ‘government departments’ and 
‘foreign banks’. In the 1850s, only ‘firm’ and ‘gentry’ employed the RSC drafts, in 
the proportion of 96% and 4% respectively. ‘Commoners’ and ‘other Shanxi piaohao’ 
are types which emerged in the 1860s in the proportion of 1% and 21% respectively, 
and ‘firms’ still had the largest share (78%). The class of ‘official’ appeared in the 
1870s business with a share of 2% and the remaining clients: ‘firm’, ‘gentry’, 
‘commoner’, and ‘other piaohao’ occupied 83%, 3%, 4% and 8% of the total of drafts 
respectively.  
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Table 4-3: Descriptive results of the RSC drafts on different types of client in the from 
the 1850s to the 1900s (Tls)
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Sources: Ibid. 
Notes: When classifying the types of client, this thesis treats names ending with ‘号[hao]’, ‘
庄[zhuang]’, and ‘行[hang]’ as ‘firms’, and treats names ending with  ‘先生[Xiansheng, 
meanings Mr]’ as ‘individual members of the gentry class’. It regards names ending with ‘老
爷 [laoye, meaning lord]’ or ‘大人 [daren, meaning Monsignor]’ as borne by officials, and 
when a name indicates no title, its owner is defined as a ‘commoner’. As the government 
department, Shanxi piaohao and foreign banks’ names are easy to identify, they are classified 
as such. ‘-’ means data are not available. 
                                               
92
 Unlike Table 4-2, Table 4-3 not describe client types in the 1840s. The reason that is in 
the 1840s the RSC did not record clients’ names and types in their letters. 
Obs Mean S.d. Min Max
%  in 
total 
drafts
Obs Mean S.d. Min Max
%  in 
total 
drafts
Firm Gentry
    1850s 30 3,657 3,905 100 18,240 96%     1850s 5 877 1,194 155 3,000 4%
    1860s 28 3,105 2,310 700 10,000 78%     1860s 0 - - - - -
    1870s 62 431 469 25 1,200 83%     1870s 3 1,463 143 324 2,500 3%
    1880s 27 4,442 5,552 11 36,001 72%     1880s 4 873 1,213 10 3,400 2%
    1891-3 1,006 2,998 4,315 6 45,200 73%     1891-3 75 931 1,568 10 10,000 2%
    1894/5 468 2,835 4,036 11 50,000 77%     1894/5 25 782 1,180 20 5,000 1%
    1896-9 42 6,797 9,921 50 50,400 63%     1896-9 5 7,053 8,257 78 20,110 13%
    1900/1 42 5,859 7,996 20 43,200 53%     1900/1 3 65 99 20 180 0%
    1902-9 879 2,046 2,364 1 25,395 82%     1902-9 40 1,089 1,298 6 5,038 2%
Commoner Piaohao
    1850s 0 - - - - -     1850s 0 - - - - -
    1860s 3 311 55 45 500 1%     1860s 4 6,250 2,500 5,000 10,000 21%
    1870s 11 431 469 25 1,200 4%     1870s 2 5,000 4,243 2,000 8,000 8%
    1880s 57 418 754 12 4,000 13%     1880s 1 1,090 . 1,090 1,090 1%
    1891-3 523 628 1,715 1 25,000 8%     1891-3 54 3,756 2,460 200 10,000 5%
    1894/5 214 540 1,176 8 10,000 7%     1894/5 7 3,789 5,244 462 15,000 2%
    1896-9 56 727 1,411 20 10,000 10%     1896-9 0 - - - - -
    1900/1 61 612 1,478 10 10,070 9%     1900/1 0 - - - - -
    1902-9 323 524 1,168 1 12,987 8%     1902-9 11 4,668 5,703 202 20,176 2%
Official Government
    1850s 0 - - - - -     1850s 0 - - - - -
    1860s 2 265 346 20 510 0%     1860s 0 - - - - -
    1870s 3 785 328 416 1,040 2%     1870s 0 - - - - -
    1880s 7 305 280 40 1,220 1%     1880s 1 20,000 . 20,000 20,000 11%
    1891-3 79 1,299 2,488 11 13,270 3%     1891-3 26 22,494 42,862 94 181,814 9%
    1894/5 33 499 677 11 4,000 1%     1894/5 11 11,009 12,982 1,000 49,050 8%
    1896-9 6 519 191 128 704 1%     1896-9 4 7,014 4,128 - 20,110 13%
    1900/1 9 6,777 2,344 50 11,677 6%     1900/1 6 29,743 10,644 750 49,471 24%
    1902-9 22 961 1,284 3 4,802 1%     1902-9 34 2,509 3,662 4 19,140 6%
    1850s 0 - - - - -
    1860s 0 - - - - -
    1870s 0 - - - - -
    1880s 0 - - - - -
    1891-3 2 7,500 3,536 0 20,000 1%
    1894/5 3 28,688 10,204 7,170 42,990 4%
    1896-9 0 - - - - -
    1900/1 1 28,800 0 28,800 28,800 7%
    1902-9 0 - - - - -
Foreign bank
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As the time went to the 1880s, it was still ‘firms’ that occupied the largest share of the 
draft (72%). Although my thesis divides the 1890s into three periods – pre-war, 
wartime and post-war, it can be found that the ‘firms’ had the largest share, followed 
by ‘government’, ‘commoners’ and other types of client. During this period, foreign 
banks emerged with a share of 1% and gradually rose to 4%.  In 1900/1, the share of 
the ‘firm’ for the first time dropped to 53%, while the share of ‘government’ 
increased to 24%. However, in 1902-9 the share of the firm recovered, to 82%, and 
the share of the government dropped to 6%.  
Besides examining proportions, from Table 4-3 it can also found most of the smallest 
transactions concerned the ‘commoners’ and most of the largest transactions were 
found to involve the ‘firms’. Besides, compared with other types of client, the 
‘government’ and ‘other Shanxi piaohao’ had larger means overall. As the Shanxi 
piaohao assisted with each other, from the RSC’s business correspondence, I have 
found if one piaohao was short of silver in a branch A, it could solve this problem by 
using the remittances of another Shanxi piaohao to remit silver from branch B to A.  
As my thesis has illustrated in Chapter 1, the Shanxi piaohao designed four types of 
draft: direct original, direct loan, inverse original and inverse loan. On the basis of this 
division, Table 4-4 displays these drafts on their types in the RSC.  
Table 4-4: Descriptive results of the RSC different types of drafts from the 1840s to the 
1900s (Tls) 
Sources: ibid.  
Obs Mean S.d. Min Max
% in total 
drafts
Obs
Mea
n
S.d. Min Max
% in total 
drafts
Direct original Direct loan
     1840s 14 2,104 2,155 101 8,000 40%      1840s 11 3,945 4,137 300 15,000 60%
     1850s 23 2,531 3,875 100 18,240 75%      1850s 2 2,500 707 2,000 3,000 6%
     1860s 13 3,654 2,478 500 10,000 51%      1860s 4 5,500 3,317 2,000 10,000 24%
     1870s 43 997 914 25 5,000 45%      1870s 16 1,763 1,087 700 5,000 30%
     1880s 49 2,019 5,855 11 36,001 71%      1880s 3 950 427 500 1,350 2%
     1891-3 637 2,026 8,190 5 181,814 52%      1891-3 180 2,944 3,613 50 25,000 21%
     1894/5 268 1,637 3,774 10 42,990 50%      1894/5 93 2,099 1,818 40 10,000 22%
     1896-9 57 2,292 4,386 20 20,110 58%      1896-9 1 5,000 . 5,000 5,000 2%
     1900/1 67 1,923 4,463 10 23,500 57%      1900/1 5 1,380 850 400 2,000 3%
Inverse original Inverse loan
     1840s 0 - - - - -      1840s 0 - - - - -
     1850s 0 - - - - -      1850s 4 3,503 2,006 2500 6,511 18%
     1860s 3 4,667 4,619 2,000 10,000 15%      1860s 2 5,000 - 5,000 5,000 11%
     1870s 0 - - - - -      1870s 9 2,614 2,392 526 8,000 25%
     1880s 0 - - - - -      1880s 8 4,758 4,582 60 10,000 27%
     1891-3 28 5,170 5,888 50 21,600 6%      1891-3 208 2,570 3,205 60 30,000 21%
     1894/5 10 2,490 2,908 500 10,000 3%      1894/5 80 2,679 3,353 100 22,000 26%
     1896-9 0 - - - - -      1896-9 11 8,286 15,207 150 50,400 40%
     1900/1 0 - - - - -      1900/1 12 7,683 11,587 1,000 43,200 40%
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Note: The reason why this table does not describe the types of draft in 1902-9 is that the data 
used for analysis in this period come from the balance sheets, which do not record the draft 
types. ‘-’ means data are not available. 
The table shows in the 1840s, there were only two types of draft with direct original 
drafts occupying 40% of the total of drafts and direct loan drafts having a share of 
60%. When the Taiping Rebellion (1852-4) broke out in the 1850s, the RSC tightened 
their direct loan drafts while the direct original drafts increased from 40% to 75%. It 
was during this period that inverse loan drafts first showed up, with a share of 18%.  
As time went on, inverse original drafts emerged in the 1860s with a share of 15%. At 
this period, original drafts, made up of direct original drafts and inverse original 
drafts occupied 66% of the total drafts and loan drafts which covered direct loan 
drafts and inverse loan drafts composed 34% of the total.  
In the 1870s, original and loan drafts each occupied 45% and 55% of the total drafts.  
Although these two types of draft shifted shares in the 1980s, in the 1890s, they were 
fixed in the proportion of 55% and 45% respectively and remained unchanged in the 
period of 1900/1.  
In the comparisons made by Table 4-4 of mean, minimum and maximum values of 
these four types of draft, it finds that in general the mean values for the loan drafts 
were larger than those of the original drafts. Moreover, from the 1840s to the 1900s, it 
is found that both the smallest transactions and the largest transactions more 
frequently occurred in direct original drafts than in other type of drafts, a fact which 
may be explained by the high incidence of this type of draft. 
As Table 4-5 plots proportions of different types of draft employed by various clients, 
it finds for the ‘official’, ‘government’, and ‘foreign banks’ that 90% of their drafts 
were direct original drafts. Although not all the time, more than 80% of the 
commoners’ drafts and 60% of the gentry’s drafts were also direct original drafts and 
the rest were made up of direct loan and inverse loan drafts. 
Compared with other types of clients, the types of draft employed by the ‘firm’ and 
‘other piaohao’ were more diversified than those of its other clients. Its original drafts 
for ‘firms’, gradually shrank from 80% to 30% between the 1850s and the 1900s. This 
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downward trend was replaced by ever-increasing loan drafts, which climbed from 
20% to 70% during the same period. 
The most feasible explanation for the RSC to have issued ever-increasing loan drafts 
to the ‘firms,’ its largest clients is perhaps that the ‘firms’, unlike other clients, 
required large amounts of working capital in their operation, which could not be self-
funded. It was this requirement that led them to ask the RSC to cash drafts by 
allowing them to borrow and repay the amount later. Another plausible reason for this 
is that the RSC charged higher remittance fees for firms than for other clients, as 
discussed below (section 4.6). 
  
105 
Table 4-5: Proportions of each type of draft employed by different types of client from 
the 1850s to the 1900s 
 
Sources: ibid  
4.3 Strategy of branch distributions 
When charging the remittance fees, the piaohao, besides the amount of silver being 
remitted Chen (1937 p.141) documented the fees charged according to the distance 
between branches and their location, etc. For Chen (1937 p.141.) the remittance fees 
in rural cities were normally several times higher than in large cities. Because no 
study has so far analysed the dynamic change in the piaohao’s branches, it will be the 
focus of this section. 
Firm Gentry
     1850s 78% 3% 0% 19% 24      1850s 32% 68% 0% 0% 5
     1860s 47% 32% 21% 0% 17      1860s - - - - 0
     1870s 47% 36% 0% 17% 53      1870s 62% 0% 0% 38% 2
     1880s 62% 2% 0% 36% 23      1880s 100% 0% 0% 0% 2
     1891-3 43% 24% 7% 26% 632      1891-3 87% 0% 0% 13% 40
     1894/5 41% 28% 3% 29% 298      1894/5 64% 13% 0% 23% 15
     1896-9 38% 3% 0% 59% 28      1896-9 100% 0% 0% 0% 4
     1900/1 30% 5% 0% 65% 31      1900/1 100% 0% 0% 0% 2
Commoner Other piaohao
     1850s - - - - 0      1850s - - - - 0
     1860s 0% 100% 0% 0% 1      1860s 60% 0% 0% 40% 4
     1870s 100% 0% 0% 0% 8      1870s 0% 0% 0% 100% 2
     1880s 100% 0% 0% 1% 33      1880s 100% 0% 0% 0% 1
     1891-3 52% 39% 0% 9% 287      1891-3 18% 3% 23% 56% 31
     1894/5 84% 14% 0% 2% 101      1894/5 13% 0% 22% 66% 6
     1896-9 100% 0% 0% 0% 28      1896-9 - - - - 0
     1900/1 91% 0% 0% 9% 38      1900/1 - - - - 0
Official Government
     1850s - - - - 0      1850s - - - - 0
     1860s - - - - 0      1860s - - - - 0
     1870s 100% 0% 0% 0% 3      1870s - - - - 0
     1880s 100% 0% 0% 0% 2      1880s 100% 0% 0% 0% 1
     1891-3 92% 0% 0% 8% 45      1891-3 89% 10% 0% 1% 16
     1894/5 100% 0% 0% 0% 25      1894/5 100% 0% 0% 0% 5
     1896-9 100% 0% 0% 0% 5      1896-9 100% 0% 0% 0% 4
     1900/1 100% 0% 0% 0% 8      1900/1 100% 0% 0% 0% 5
Foreign bank
     1850s - - - - 0
     1860s - - - - 0
     1870s - - - - 0
     1880s - - - - 0
     1891-3 100% 0% 0% 0% 2
     1894/5 100% 0% 0% 0% 1
     1896-9 - - - - 0
     1900/1 - - - - 0
Direct 
original
Inverse 
loan 
Inverse 
original
Inverse 
loan 
Direct 
original
Direct 
loan
Obs
Direct 
loan
Inverse 
original
Obs
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Table 4-6 illustrates the percentages (according to volume of business) of the places 
from which the RSC sent drafts, from the 1840s to the 1900s. It shows in the 1840s 
there were about fourteen cities that handled the RSC’s drafts. Among these cities, the 
commercial centres Suzhou and Yangzhou took up 21% and 13% of the total drafts 
respectively, while the capital Beijing occupied 18%.
93
 Besides these three cities 
which accounted for the three largest shares of the RSC drafts, Hankou, Hekou, 
Kaifeng, Lanzhou and Pingyao each occupied 6%-8% of the total drafts, and the 
remaining seven cities held 1%-3% of the RSC drafts.
94
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 Beijing, Hankou, Suzhou, and Foshan were the four largest commercial centres in China 
before the First Opium War, and were collectively called the empire’s Four Trading Centres 
[tianxia sijv天下四聚] (Huang, 2002a p.28.). 
94
 Among the cities which had less than 10% of the RSC drafts, Xian, Lanzhou, Chengdu, 
Kaifeng and Hankou were provincial capitals; Pingyao and Taigu accommodated Shanxi 
piaohao headquarters; and Hekou at the time was known as a tea trade junction. 
107 
Table 4-6: Percentages of all the places to which the RSC sent drafts from the 1840s to 
the 1900s 
 
Sources: Based on the RSC business correspondence from the 1840s to the 1900s (Huang 
2002a pp.833-1077.); RSC 1906 annual balance sheets of Zhoujiakou and Xian branches 
(Advanced Asia Studies Library, University of Tokyo) 
Note: as this percentage is accurate down to a digit, cities which have less than one percent 
are omitted from the table. These cities include Baoding, Anqing, Nanchang, Huaian, Fuzhou, 
Wuxi, and Zhenjiang, etc.  
Over time, with the approach of the 1850s when the Taiping Rebellion (1852-64) 
broke out, the number of the places that the RSC have drafts declined from 14 to nine. 
Among them the largest share of RSC drafts went to Qixian town, where the Shanxi 
piaohao headquarters of the Qixian faction were located. As a newly opened treaty 
port, Hankou began to occupy the second largest share of drafts and Hekou had the 
Places 1840s 1850s 1860-4 1865-9 1870s 1880s 1890-3 1894/5 1895-9 1900/1 1902-9
Beijing 18% 12% 4% 9% 10% 10% 10% 12% 10% 5% 5%
Changde 1% - - 2% 4% - - - - - -
Changsha - - - 3% - 8% 4% 6% 1% 3% 1%
Chengdu 4% 8% - - 11% 1% 6% 3% 2% 2% 2%
Chongqing - - - - 29% 1% 5% 3% 12% 13% 6%
Guangzhou - - 21% 1% 11% 1% 6% 8% 1% 8% 2%
Guilin - - - - - 2% 3% 2% 3% 4% 5%
Hangzhou - - - 1% - - 3% 3% 2% 3% 1%
Hankou 6% 17% 41% 9% 17% 2% 14% 13% 3% 11% 18%
Hongkong - - - - - - 1% 3% - - -
Hekou 8% 16% - - - - - - - - -
Jinyang - - - - - 1% 1% - - - -
Kaifeng 8% 2% 15% - 2% 7% 4% 6% 2% 1% 3%
Lanzhou 9% 5% 19% - - - - - - - -
Pingyao 7% - - 1% 1% 2% 2% 1% - 1% 3%
Qingjiangpu 1% - - - - - 1% 2% 1% 5% -
Qixian - 24% - - - - - - - - -
Shanghai - - - 3% - 50% 11% 6% 32% 32% 23%
Shashi - - - - 3% - 3% 9% - 1% -
Suzhou 21% 10% - 68% 5% 5% 1% 1% - - -
Taigu 1% 6% - - - - 1% 1% - - -
Taiyuan - - - - - 2% 2% 3% 1% 3% -
Tianjin 1% - - - 1% 1% 10% 8% 2% 2% 5%
Wuzhou - - - - - 2% 1% 1% 22% 2% 16%
Xian 2% - - - - - 1% 1% - 1% 1%
Xiangtan - - - 3% - 1% 4% 4% 1% 1% 5%
Yangzhou 13% - - - 3% 3% 4% 2% 2% 1% 2%
Yuzhou - - - - 2% - - - - - -
Zhoukou - - - - 1% 1% 2% 2% 3% 1% 2%
Total 
number of 
places
14 9 5 10 14 18 24 23 17 20 17
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third.
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 Provincial capitals Beijing, Chengdu, Kaifeng and Lanzhou altogether seized 
27% of the drafts and the remaining cities, such as Suzhou and Taigu, shared the last 
16% of the drafts.  
Since the Taiping Rebellion lasted until 1864, my thesis further divides the 1860s into 
1860-4 and 1865-9 two periods. It finds that when the rebellion troops were 
garrisoned in Suzhou and Yangzhou, these two cities disappeared from the RSC’s 
map. As treaty ports Hankou and Guangzhou altogether occupied more than 60% of 
the drafts, which left the rest three cities had the rest. Soon after the Taiping Rebellion 
ceased, Suzhou once again became the city with the largest share of drafts in 1865-9, 
and Shanghai first emerged on the branch sites map with a share of 3%.  
The RSC drafts in the 1870s were still centred in treaty ports and large cities. Of these 
drafts, 29% had been dealt in Chongqing, which was a rice and cotton trading centre 
and opened as a treaty port in 1875.
96
  As an increasingly booming port, Shanghai 
overtook Suzhou and Hankou in the 1880s and became the city that handled the 
largest share of RSC drafts. As in the previous periods, Beijing still took up 10% of 
the total drafts, and Changsha, Kaifeng and Suzhou each occupied 5%-10% of the 
drafts. These five cities altogether held 80% of the drafts, leaving the other thirteen 
cities such as Hangzhou, Yangzhou and Guilin share 20%. 
Before the First Sino-Japanese War (1984/5), the number of places that the RSC had 
drafts reached a zenith 24. Moreover, as these figures show, when the RSC sent its 
drafts to more places, their drafts were more equally divided. Of these drafts, 14% 
was in Hankou, 11% in Shanghai, 11% in Tianjin and 10% in Beijing. Besides these 
cities, trading centres such as Changsha, Chengdu, Chongqing, Guangzhou, Kaifeng, 
Xiangtan, and Yangzhou each seized 4%-6% of the total drafts,  and other cities such 
as Guilin, Hangzhou, Wuzhou, Taiyuan, Shashi, Zhoujiakou and Xian occupied 1%-
3% of the RSC drafts.  
Although the First Sino-Japanese War occurred in 1894, it can be inferred from the 
places where the RSC had business that the structure of its business territory in this 
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 Hankou was opened as a treaty port in 1858 to United Kingdom and France under the 
Treaty of Tianjin. 
96
 Chongqing was opened as a treaty port to Britain in 1875 under the Treaty of Yantai. 
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period changed little, apart from a slight decline in the number of places where it sent 
drafts. It was after the war that the RSC drafts centred on Shanghai
97
, Wuzhou
98
, 
Chongqing
99
 and Beijing. These four cities altogether seized 80% of all RSC drafts 
and the remaining nineteen cities shared the 20% that was left. 
During the Boxer Rebellion Shanghai still had the largest share of 33%, as it had in 
1896-9, followed by Chongqing and Hankou. In addition to these three treaty ports, 
Guangzhou, Beijing and Qingjiangpu each accounts for 5%-8% of the drafts, while 
the other 20 cities, including Yangzhou, Xiangtan and Hangzhou, each had 1%-3% of 
the drafts. Here it is worth mentioning that, unlike the Taiping Rebellion which 
garrisoned southern China, the Boxers were mainly distributed in Beijing and Tianjin, 
and this may be the reason why the RSC’s drafts in these two places declined by half 
while others kept relatively unchanged. 
When the Boxer Rebellion came to an end, the RSC drafts once again centred on 
Shanghai, Hankou and Wuzhou, and the volume of drafts in Tianjin recovered to its 
pre-rebellion level. Beside the above cities, Chongqing, Guilin, Tianjin and Xiangtan 
each occupied 5% of the drafts and Changsha, Xian, Chengdu and other seven cities 
shared the remaining 20% of them.   
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 Political and economic factors may explain why Shanghai was able to transcend other 
cities and absorb the largest share of drafts after the war. “After the First Sino-Japanese War, 
the Qing court borrowed 350 million tls of silver from Britain, Germany, Russia, and France 
to pay for the indemnity. In order to pay a value of Tls.12 million principal plus interst every 
year, the Qing court allocated the tax and the customs revenues of eighteen provinces to be 
submitted to the Shanghai Customs who then would pay the foreign banks. As my thesis will 
illustrate in the piaohao’s government business (0), the share of the foreign loans remitted by 
the piaohao out of their total governmental remittances increased from zero to 22%. Such a 
big jump could to some degree explain the RSC’s drafts in Shanghai soared. Apart from the 
political reason, economic factors played a significant role in determining Shanghai’s 
position. By the 1890s Shanghai had already become China’s financial and trading hub. As 
the largest treaty port, Shanghai’s import and export volumes took up 44% of all Chinese 
trade at the time, and the financial institutions operating in Shanghai were more numerous 
than in other places in China,” in Huang, A history of the Shanxi Piaohao, pp.343-5.  
98
 Located in eastern part of Guangxi province, Wuzhou used to be the second largest 
Chinese inland harbour and a freight centre of the Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Hunan, and 
Guangdong provinces. It first appeared in the RSC’s map in the 1880s with a share of 1% and 
kept this share throughout the war. According to the Qing court’s treaties with Japan and 
Britain, Wuzhou was opened as a treaty port in 1897, and almost at the same time the RSC’s 
drafts in Wuzhou soared to 23%. 
99
 Similar with Wuzhou, soon after Chongqing opened as a treaty port to Japan in 1895 its 
drafts also increased by several times. 
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Figure 4-1, Figure 4-2, and Figure 4-3 plot the distribution of RSC branches in the 
1840s, 1890-3, and 1902-9 and show that during their early stages the RSC’s branches 
were mainly distributed in central China in cities at prefectural level. As time passed, 
in the 1890s, its business network spread to southern and eastern China, into 
economically advanced regions. Moreover, during this period, more county-level and 
town level branches also emerged. But as the RSC went into the last decade of its 
operation in the period 1902-9, it retreated from the southwest and focused its 
business on eastern China.   
Figure 4-1: RSC branch distributions in the 1840s 
 
Sources: Based on the RSC 1840s letters from Beijing to Pingyao, and from Zhangjiakou to 
Kaifeng (Huang, 2002a pp.832-840). 
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Figure 4-2: RSC branch distribution in 1890-3 
 
Sources: Based on the RSC 1890-3 business letters from Pingyao to Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai, Hangzhou, Changsha, Xiangtan, Guilin, Shashi, Chongqing, Chengdu, Zhoujiakou, 
Kaifeng, Sanyuan, and Xian (Huang, 2002a pp.865-1065.). 
Figure 4-3: RSC branch distribution in 1902-9 
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Sources: Based on the RSC 1906 annual balance sheets of Xian and Zhoujiakou branches 
(Advanced Asia Studies Library, University of Tokyo). 
The above analyses suggest that during the operation of the RSC most of its drafts 
were sent to commercial centres and metropolitan cities. In its early development 
stages, over half the drafts were dealt in commercial centres, the capital Beijing, and 
the piaohao’s headquarters. When Hankou, Shanghai, Chongqing and Wuzhou were 
opened in succession as treaty ports, the RSC began shifting its business focuses from 
its former commercial centres to these new ones. In addition, when setting up 
branches, the RSC also took account of the social stability of the location. When 
Suzhou and Yangzhou were occupied by the Taiping armies, the RSC shut down its 
branches in these cities. Again, when the Boxers occupied Beijing and Tianjin, it 
required other branches to cancel their drafts to these two places.  These results 
altogether suggest that local business conditions determined the rule of thumb for sites 
selection by the RSC, and that a stable social environment was also important for their 
business. 
4.4 Types of silver that the RSC accepted  
Besides the location and the amount of silver being remitted, when setting its 
remittance fees, the piaohao also considered the types of silver it accepted and 
submitted (Chen 1937, p.114). Since the RSC’s business correspondence normally 
recorded only the types of silver it accepted but did not submit, Table 4-7 shows these 
silver types over time and finds that the types of silver the RSC accepted grew as the 
places where it had draft facilities increased. Although the total number of types of 
silver varied from time to time, on average they were of high purity.  
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Table 4-7: Types of silver that the RSC accepted from the 1840s to the 1900s 
 
Source: Compiled based on the RSC business correspondence from the 1840s to the 1900s 
(Huang, 2002a pp.833-1077.); RSC 1906 annual balance sheets of Zhoujiakou and Xian 
branches (Advanced Asia Studies Library, University of Tokyo). 
Note: As my thesis illustrates in 1.4, the Qing authorities did not have a systematic silver mint 
bureau and they set the silver tael ‘Wen Yin’ to stand for 100% pure silver. According to the 
place of production and level of purity, silver tael had different names. For example, Bai Bao 
Yin [白宝银] and Hua Bao Yin [化宝银] were circulated in Tianjin with a purity of 100% 
and 99.2% of pure wen yin. Cao Bao Yin [漕宝银] and Gu Bao Yin [估宝银] were used in 
Shanghai, with a purity of 92.9% and 99.2% respectively. Chuan Bai Ding Yin [川白锭银] 
was used in Chengdu, and He Bao Yin [河宝银] was used in Hekou. Fan Yin [番银] referred 
to various foreign dollars, and Gui Yin [规银] denoted to Spanish dollars. Shanxi province 
mainly used Jing Bao Yin [镜宝银] and Shaanxi province used Shan Zu Yin [陕足银]. Xia 
Lv Zu yin [下炉足银] was used in Yingkou and Yong Xiang Yin [用项银] was used in 
Changsha. Other types of silver tael, such as Yuan Se Yin [原色银], Wu Se Bao Yin [无色宝
银], Zu Yin [足银], Zu Wen Yin [足纹银] and Zu Bao Yin stood for 100% pure Wen Yin and 
were widely accepted.   
4.5 Duration to cash drafts 
The length of time between receiving and submitting silver was important for the 
Shanxi piaohao. This is because it made use of this time to minimize the cost of 
transporting and storing silver [kongqi空期], a term referring to the interval between 
Silver type 1840s 1850s 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890-3 1894/5 1895-9 1900/1 1902-9
Bai Bao Yin - - - - - - - - -
Bao Yin 1% - - - 7% 3% - 2% -
Cao Bao Yin - - - - - 3% - - -
Chuan Bai Ding Yin - - - - - - - 1% -
Fan Yin - - - - 3% - 26% 7% -
Gu Bao Yin - - - - 3% - - - -
Gui Yin - - - 35% 9% 7% 34% 54% 6%
Hua Bao Yin - - - 51% 2% 5% 2% - -
He Bao Yin - - - - - - - - -
Lao yin 53%
Jing Bao Yin - 39% 28% 2% 3% 6% 2% 1% -
Pi Piao Yuan Yin 36% - - - - - - - -
Shan Zu Yin 14% - - - - - - - -
Xia Lu Zu Yin 28% - - - - - - - -
Yong Xiang Yin - - - - 4% - - - -
Yuan Se Yin - 1% - 2% 4% - 1% 15% -
Wen Yin 7% - - 47% 1% 8% 11% 18% 18% -
Wu Se Bao Yin - 8% 1% 6% 3% 4% 3% - -
Zu Bao Yin 40% 21% 48% - 1% 2% - 1% - -
Zu Wen Yin - - 14% - 6% 12% 4% 1% -
Zu Yin - 4% 10% 2% 46% 49% 9% 1% 94%
Total types of silver 3 5 5 5 8 14 9 10 10 2
Weighted average purity 100% 94% 99% 99% 95% 96% 99% 97% 96% 100%
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silver acceptance and submission from one transaction, to meet the amount  required 
for another transaction (Huang, 2002a p.693.). Therefore, when charging the 
remittance fees, the piaohao also took account of the time required to cash drafts. 
100
 
With this argument in mind, this section examines the length of time needed for the 
RSC to cash a draft.  
As Table 4-8 shows, over time the RSC needed less time for this purpose: the average 
amount in the 1840s, 63 days, declined to 27 days in the period 1900-1901. This 
decline suggests that the RSC had less time to mobilize silver and required a deeper 
capital base to meet its silver requirements. The shortest time for the RSC to cash a 
draft would have been zero day, which means that the RSC cashed the draft at once. 
In the 1860s, the 1870s and the period 1896-9, the longest time required for the RSC 
to cash a draft was around 200 days.  
Table 4-8: Descriptive results of the drafts duration from the 1840s to the 1900s (day) 
Period
a
 Obs Mean Min Max 
1840s 20 63 0 210 
1850s 20 78 0 240 
1860s 22 41 0 105 
1870s 41 19 0 90 
1880s 23 49 0 150 
1891-3 681 36 0 220 
1894/5 347 34 0 319 
1896-9 20 13 0 90 
1900/1 25 27 0 165 
Sources: ibid. 
 
a
 The reason why there is no indication of the length of time required in 1902-9 is that the 
transactions in this period were compiled from the RSC annual balance sheet rather than 
business correspondence. Unlike its letters, the RSC balance sheets do not record the intervals 
between receiving and submitted silver for drafts. 
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 As the DDT former branch manager Qiao Dianjiao memorialised, the bank charged 
higher fees on remittances transferred by telegraph than on those transferred by drafts [票汇] 
or letters [信汇]. The reason for this is that using the telegraph shortened the interval between 
receiving and submitting silver, in which the piaohao could have uses the silver for other 
purposes, such as lending it on interest. Hence, the clients using the telegraph had to pay 
higher fees (Qiao 1961 cited in Huang 2002a, p.712).  Qiao’s arguments were also common 
to see in contemporary newspaper reports, for instance in the Da Gong and the Shenbao 
(Huang, 2002a, pp.712-4). 
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As regards the length of time with different types of client, Table 4-9 shows that over 
time it was the ‘firm’ that had the greater means and maximum values. This may have 
been because, compared with other types of client, ‘firms’ had a larger share of loan 
drafts, which required more time to be repaid. Clients who used original drafts, i.e. the 
‘commoners’, ‘officials’ and ‘foreign banks’, could cash their drafts sooner than the 
firms could. 
Table 4-9: Descriptive results of durations for different types of client from the 1850s to 
the 1900s (day) 
  Obs Mean Min Max   Obs Mean Min Max 
Firm         Gentry           
1850s 16 85 0 240 1850s 4 50 9 70 
1860s 4 61 45 90 1860s 0 - - - 
1870s 29 25 0 90 1870s 1 0 0 0 
1880s 13 81 0 150 1880s 0 - - - 
1891-3 437 51 0 220 1891-3 26 5 0 60 
1894/5 252 43 0 319 1894/5 9 22 0 100 
1896-9 9 28 0 90 1896-9 3 1 0 3 
1900/1 11 47 0 165 1900/1 0 - - - 
Commoner         Other piaohao         
1850s 0 - - - 1850s 0 - - - 
1860s 1 0 0 0 1860s 17 39 0 105 
1870s 7 0 0 0 1870s 2 30 15 45 
1880s 9 7 0 60 1880s 0 - - - 
1891-3 159 7 0 120 1891-3 23 41 0 164 
1894/5 54 5 0 100 1894/5 5 29 0 66 
1896-9 5 0 0 0 1896-9 0 0 0 0 
1900/1 11 12 0 135 1900/1 3 9 0 22 
Official         Government          
1850s 0 - - - 1850s 0 - - - 
1860s 0 - - - 1860s 0 - - - 
1870s 2 0 0 0 1870s 0 - - - 
1880s 0 - - - 1880s 1 14 14 14 
1891-3 28 12 0 120 1891-3 6 14 0 60 
1894/5 22 4 0 30 1894/5 4 53 0 90 
1896-9 3 0 0 0 1896-9 0 0 0 0 
1900/1 0 - - - 1900/1 0 - - - 
Foreign bank         
  
1850s 0 - - - 
1860s 0 - - - 
1870s 0 - - - 
1880s 0 - - - 
1891-3 2 10 10 10 
1894/5 1 10 10 10 
1896-9 0 0 0 0 
1900/1 0 - - - 
Sources: ibid.  
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Table 4-10 describes the time needed for cashing different types of draft and confirms 
the conjecture on intervals for ‘firms. From the 1840s to the 1900s the means of the 
loan drafts, including direct loan and inverse loan drafts, were greater than those of 
the original drafts. But in regard to the minimum and maximum values, the table 
shows that there were no obvious differences between the different types of draft.  
Table 4-10: Descriptive results of durations for different types of draft 1840s-1900s 
(day) 
  Obs Mean Min Max   Obs Mean Min Max 
Direct original         Direct loan         
1840s 12 50 0 210 1840s 8 84 15 180 
1850s 15 64 0 100 1850s 2 454 30 60 
1860s 13 34 0 50 1860s 4 68 0 105 
1870s 26 7 0 90 1870s 8 44 30 60 
1880s 16 39 0 150 1880s 3 22 5 30 
1891-3 376 10 0 120 1891-3 131 65 5 220 
1894/5 186 11 0 319 1894/5 82 61 3 120 
1896-9 16 4 0 36 1896-9 1 68 68 68 
1900/1 17 2 0 22 1900/1 4 71 10 165 
Inverse original         Inverse loan         
1840s 0 - - - 1840s 0 - - - 
1850s 0 - - - 1850s 3 173 70 240 
1860s 3 17 15 21 1860s 2 75 60 90 
1870s 0 - - - 1870s 7 34 15 45 
1880s 0 - - - 1880s 4 109 90 150 
1891-3 18 18 0 63 1891-3 157 77 0 220 
1894/5 6 8 0 25 1894/5 73 65 0 120 
1896-9 0 - - - 1896-9 3 41 0 90 
1900/1 0 - - - 1900/1 4 90 0 135 
Sources: ibid. 
4.6 Factors determining the remittance fees 
Making use of descriptions by previous scholars, this section describes the factors that 
might determine the RSC remittance fees. According to my data set, this section 
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designs a multiple linear regression and postulates that the piaohao’s remittance fees 
were charged on the basis of the following factors:
101
  
1. The amount of silver that the piaohao remitted: the more silver that was 
remitted, the higher the fees. 
2. The interval between receiving and submitting the silver: the longer it took the 
piaohao to submit the silver, the cheaper the fees. 
3. The distance between the branches issuing and cashing the drafts: the greater 
the distance, the higher the fees. 
4. The type of client: remittances fees for the ‘firm’ were different from those for 
the ‘government’, ‘commoner’, ‘gentry’, ‘official’, and ‘other piaohao’.102 
5. Types of drafts: remittance fees for the ‘direct original draft’ are statistically 
different for the ‘inverse original draft’, ‘direct loan draft’, and ‘inverse loan 
draft’. 
6. Location of a branch: remittance fees for prefecture level cities are statistically 
different for the county or town level cities. 
7. Methods of sending drafts: remittance fees for drafts sent by telegraph (tele) 
were statistically different for drafts sent by other methods. 
On the basis of the above hypothesis, my thesis derives Equation 4-1: 
 
 
 
where 𝑦𝑖  is the remittance fees for a transaction i, ‘amo’ denotes the amount of silver 
that is remitted, ‘dur’ represents duration, ‘dis’ refers distance between two branches, 
‘com’ denotes commoner, ‘gov’ represents government, ‘off’ refers official, ‘gen’ 
                                               
101
 It has been noted that the piaohao took into consideration the types of silver they dealt 
in when charging remittance fees. But in its business letters, the RSC often recorded only type 
of silver it accepted but not the type submitted. Therefore, the following regression does not 
include types of silver. 
102
 When describing the values of RSC drafts for different types of client, it should be 
noted that ‘foreign banks’ constitute another type; however, the remittance fees charged to 
these foreign banks were incomplete in the RSC business letters and therefore are not 
analysed here.  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥0 + 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑥1 + 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑥2 + 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑥3 + 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑥4 + 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑥6 + 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑥7 + 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑥8 + 𝑝𝑖𝑎𝑜𝑥9 +
𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑥10 + 𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑥11 + 𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑥12 + 𝑡𝑜𝑤𝑥13 + 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑥14 + 𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑥15    
4-1 
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indicates gentry, ‘piao’ is the piaohao, ‘iori’ is inverse original drafts, ‘dloan’ denotes 
direct loan drafts, ‘ior’ represents inverse original drafts, ‘tow’ means town, ‘cou’ 
represents county and ‘tele’ indicates telegraph.  
Facing this large number of predictors, before running the linear regression, I use a 
Best Subsets Regression to select variables which meet the criteria of the largest 
Adjusted R
2 and the smallest Mallows’ Cp and show the result in Table 4-11.103 
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 Best subsets regression is an automated procedure that identifies useful predictors 
during the exploratory stages of model building for linear regression. A small Mallows' Cp 
indicates that the model is relatively precise (has small variance) in estimating the true 
regression coefficients and predicting future responses. 
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Table 4-11: Best subset regression results 
number of 
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X 
8 28.8 13.6 X X X X X 
  
X 
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X 
9 28.9 12.1 X X X 
 
X X 
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X X 
9 28.9 12.3 X X X X X 
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X X 
10 29.1 11.7 X X X X X 
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X X X 
10 29.0 11.7 X X X 
 
X X 
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X X X 
11 29.2 11.2 X X X X X X 
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X 
 
X X X 
11 29.1 11.6 X X X X X 
  
X X X 
 
X X X 
12 29.2 11.1 X X X X X X 
 
X X X 
 
X X X 
12 29.1 11.8 X X X X X X X X 
 
X 
 
X X X 
13 29.1 12.0 X X X X X X 
 
X X X X X X X 
13 29.1 13.1 X X X X X X X X X X 
 
X X X 
14 29.0 15.0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Sources: Based on the RSC business correspondence from the 1840s to the early 1900s 
(Huang, 2002a pp.833-1077.); the RSC 1906 annual balance sheets of Zhoujiakou and Xian 
branches (Advanced Asia Studies Library, University of Tokyo). 
Note: the dependent variable here is a remittance fee, and the independent variables ‘amount’ 
denotes the amount of silver that is remitted, the ‘duration’ represents the term between 
receiving and submitting silver, ‘distance’ refers to the distance between two branches, 
checking ‘commoner’ denotes that a client was a commoner, checking ‘government’ 
represents a client belonging to a government department, ‘official’ signifies that the client 
was an official, ‘gentry’ indicates that a client was a member of the gentry class, ‘piaohao’ 
means that the RSC client was another Shanxi piaohao, ‘direct loan’ denotes that a draft was a  
direct loan draft, ‘inverse loan’ means that a draft was an inverse original draft, ‘inverse 
original’ indicates that a draft was an inverse original draft, ‘town’ means that a draft was sent 
to a town, ‘county’ represents that a draft was sent to a county, and ‘telegraph’ means that a 
draft was sent by telegraph. 
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The above table shows that a regression with ‘amount’, ‘duration’, ‘distance’, 
‘commoner’, ‘gentry’, ‘government’, ‘piaohao’, ‘direct loan’, ‘inverse loan’, ‘town’, 
‘county’, and ‘telegraph’ as predictors has the best regression results with the highest 
Adj-R
2 
and the smallest Mallows’ Cp. Combining this result and Equation 4-1 , my 
thesis runs a multiple linear regression and shows the estimation results in Table 4-13. 
Table 4-12: Descriptive results of the variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Remittance fee 818 39.68 102.30 -168 1237 
Amount 818 2112.27 3408.63 5 37270 
Duration 818 39.01 43.94 0 319 
Distance 818 851.58 434.85 56 2158 
Sources: Ibid. 
 
Note: The dependent variable here is a remittance fee, and the independent variables ‘amount’ 
denotes the amount of silver that is remitted, the ‘duration’ represents the term between 
receiving and submitting silver, ‘distance’ refers to the distance between two branches. 
 
Table 4-13: Multiple linear regression results 
  Twelve variables Eight variables 
 
Coef. Std. Err. T Coef. Std. Err. T VIF 
Amount 0.01* 0.001 13.9 0.01* 0.001 14.12 1.11 
Duration 0.32* 0.088 3.62 0.36* 0.081 4.52 1.38 
Distance 0.02* 0.007 2.62 0.02* 0.007 2.4 1.06 
Commoner 14.90** 8.478 1.76 14.09*** 8.262 1.7 1.22 
Gentry 35.00* 15.486 2.26 33.87** 15.401 2.2 1.04 
government -35.3 25.502 -1.38 
    
Piaohao -52.96* 17.8 -2.98 -50.96* 17.76 -2.87 1.03 
Direct loan 9.56 9.048 1.06 
    
Inverse loan 25.41* 9.493 2.68 21.20** 8.515 2.49 1.27 
Town -21.46 14.363 -1.49 
    
County -29.25 19.327 -1.51 
    
Telegraph 181.20* 31.086 5.83 178.70* 31.044 5.76 1.03 
Constant -26.16* 8.32 -3.14 -25.18* 7.823 -3.22 
 
 
Adjust R-square = 0.292 Adjust R-square = 0.288 
  F (12,805)= 29.06 F (8,809)= 42.31 
Sources: Ibid. 
 
Note: The dependent variable here is a remittance fee, and the independent variables ‘amount’ 
denotes the amount of silver that is remitted, the ‘duration’ represents the term between 
receiving and submitting silver, ‘distance’ refers to the distance between two branches, 
checking ‘commoner’ denotes that a client was a commoner, checking ‘government’ 
represents a client belonging to a government department, ‘official’ signifies that the client 
was an official, ‘gentry’ indicates that a client was a member of the gentry class, ‘piaohao’ 
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means that the RSC client was another Shanxi piaohao, ‘direct loan’ denotes that a draft was a  
direct loan draft, ‘inverse loan’ means that a draft was an inverse original draft, ‘inverse 
original’ indicates that a draft was an inverse original draft, ‘town’ means that a draft was sent 
to a town, ‘county’ represents that a draft was sent to a county, and ‘telegraph’ means that a 
draft was sent by telegraph. 
* p <0.01 
**p<0.05 
***p<0.1 
Table 4-13 displays the regression results from the best subset and an adjusted 
estimation with eight variables. From the best subset estimation, it can be found hat 
‘amount’, ‘duration’, ‘distance’, ‘commoner’, ‘gentry’, ‘piaohao’, ‘inverse loan’, and 
‘telegraph’ are statistically significant at a 99% confidence level; ‘commoner’ is 
statistically significant at a 95% confidence level. ‘Government’, ‘direct loan’, ‘town’ 
and ‘county’ are not statistically significant indicating that remittance fees for 
‘government’ are not statistically different from those for the ‘firm’, those for ‘direct 
loan drafts’ are not statistically different from those for ‘direct original drafts’, and the 
fees for ‘town’ and ‘county’ are not statistically different from those for ‘prefecture’. 
Since these were four variables which are not significant, the best subset estimation is 
modified into an eight-variable regression. 
The modified regression shows that all the variables are statistically significant and 
small VIF values indicate there is no multicollinearity among independent variables. 
Moreover, the residuals for ‘amount’, ‘distance’ and ‘duration’ also centre on zero 
and follow random patterns. These results suggest that this model is the best linear 
unbiased estimator (BLUE) of the regression and represents the best way to fit the 
data.  
 
Based on the above regression results, Equation 4-1 can be written as Equation 4-2: 
 
 
The coefficient of the ‘amount’ is 0.01 means that, keeping the other variables 
constant, 1% increases in the amount of silver being remitted yields 0.01% increase in 
the remittance fees. ‘Duration’ equalling 0.36 means that a one-day extension of the 
𝑦𝑖 = −25.18 + 0.01𝑥1 + 0.36𝑥2 + 0.02𝑥3 + 14.09𝑥4 + 33.87𝑥5 − 50.96𝑥6          
+ 21.20𝑥7 + 189.70𝑥8 
4-2 
122 
time until submission results in 0.36% rise in remittance fees. A ‘distance’ of 0.02 
indicates that one kilometre further between the branch receiving the silver and the 
one where it was submitted  resulted in a increase of 0.02% in the remittance fees.  
From the coefficients for different types of client, it can be found that, for the same 
transaction, a commoner has to pay 14.09% more than a firm does, the gentry class 
has to pay 33.87% higher than a firm, while their peers, the other Shanxi piaohao, 
paid 50.96% less than the firms did. As for different types of draft, it can be found 
that for the same transaction, the remittance fees in an inverse loan draft amounted to 
21.17% more than for a direct original draft. The coefficient for using the ‘telegraph’ 
was 179.07, revealing that, if other variables are kept constant, a draft sent by 
telegraph is 179.07% higher than it would have been if other methods had been used. 
The regression as a whole is statistically significant at a 99% confidence level, and 
about 29% of the variations in remittance fees can be explained by the above 
factors.
104
 
From the above regression results, it can also be found that the signs of ‘amount’, 
‘distance’, and ‘telegraph’ are consistent with my hypothesis, while the results for 
‘duration’ are not. This result suggests although the piaohao could use the length of 
time needed to process a transaction in silver, a longer time did yield higher 
remittance fees. On the basis of Equation 4-2, if a firm remitted a Tls. 100 direct 
original draft by letter from Beijing to Shanghai and cashed it after 30 days, the 
remittance fee that it had to pay was Tls. 10.86. 
4.7 Concluding remarks 
This chapter analyses the factors that determined the RSC drafts. In doing so, it 
examines the types of client and draft in the RSC, the distribution of its branches, the 
typed of silver types and the time needed to cash a draft. It finds that over time it was 
the ‘firm’ that constituted the RSC’s largest client group, and that about 40% of its 
drafts were loan drafts. Moreover, this chapter also reveals that, when establishing a 
new branch, the RSC took the consideration of local business conditions as its priority 
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 Other factors that affected remittance fees included local interest rate and types of silver 
that the piaohao dealt in (Huang, 2002a, p.711.). 
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and gradually expanded from cities at prefectural level to those in counties and towns. 
A growth of business sites also led to an increase in the types of silver that it accepted, 
which were all high in purity. In addition, as time went on, the interval before the 
RSC cashed a draft shortened from 63 days to 27 days. Finally, when testing the 
effect of these factors on determining the RSC remittance fees, I have found that, as 
the amount of silver being remitted increased, the length of time needed between the 
reception and the submission of silver became longer and as the average distance 
between two branches grew, the RSC would charge more in remittance fees. 
‘Commoners’ and ‘gentry’, would pay more than ‘firms’, while ‘other Shanxi piaohao’ 
would pay lower remittance fees, and drafts sent by telegram would also be much 
more expensive than those sent by letter or with papers. 
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 Historical changes in the piaohao’s business, Chapter 5.
incomes and profits 
Using the RSC as a case study, the above chapter investigates the factors that 
determined the piaohao’s remittance fees. As with the business strategy, 
comprehensive and in-depth studies on the piaohao’s business, incomes and profits 
were impossible in previous studies, due to insufficient data. On the basis of the data 
set that I have compiled, this chapter examines the historical change in the piaohao’s 
business incomes and profits.   
5.1 Understanding the piaohao’s government remittances 
The Shanxi piaohao’s relationships have long been a controversial issue in 
understanding their development.
105
By referring to official memorandums and 
compiling statistics on the piaohao’s government business, this chapter studies how 
the Shanxi piaohao’s government business developed and affected the piaohao’s 
development.  
Before it began remitting government funds through the piaohao, the Qing court had 
transported its revenues and disbursements in silver, using escorted convoys 
[zhuangshao yunxian装鞘运现]. Every year, based on its budget and a final report of 
every province, the central government’s Board of Revenue would apportion a quota 
of revenues as reserves [liucun 留存] for each province’s own disposal, and would 
instruct the provinces with a revenue surplus to ship funds [xiexiang 协饷] to assist 
other provinces with a revenue deficiency. It would then ask the governors of the 
former provinces to ship the remainder, known as capital funds [jingxiang 京饷], to 
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 For example, Chen (1937 p.132) stated that the Shanxi piaohao dealt mainly with 
remittances for the Qing government, and with its deposits. Kong (1984) also claimed that the 
destiny of the piaohao and the Qing court were inextricably linked through the government 
remittances. With the end of the Qing regime in 1911, the piaohao lost this business umbrella 
and declined. Wang (2007) and Wang (2014b) respected the arguments of these leading 
piaohao scholars. In contrast to Kong (1984), however, Zhang (1989) and Shi (1994) have 
since argued that as time passed the Shanxi piaohao’s government remittance business 
persisted in only a few provinces and the growth of the piaohao cannot be explained in terms 
of its relationship with the government. 
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Beijing (Song, 2014, p.5.). The shipping process was entrusted to local authorities, 
which were then obliged to find the men and horses to escort these funds to their 
destinations.  
In some exceptional cases, however, such as dangerous roads or a shortage of 
manpower, local officials could remit government funds in so far as they were 
permitted by their superiors.
106
 In 1862, with the Taiping rebels occupying southern 
and eastern China and looted silver having to be escorted by government forces, the 
central government for the first time officially agreed that provincial officials could 
remit government funds on a large scale.
107
 During this period twelve out of eighteen 
provinces employed the piaohao for this purpose.
108
   
However, soon after the emperor at that time allowed local officials to remit the 
government funds, oppositions appeared from the central court. Referring to official 
memorandums, Table 5-1 delineates the disputes between the central government and 
local officials on piaohao’s remittance for government funds and Figure 5-1 plots 
government remittance volumes for all the Shanxi piaohao’s from 1862 to 1911. 
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 From the ‘Archival Materials of the Shanxi Piaohao’ (Huang, 2002a, pp.74-5), I have 
found the earliest record of a the Shanxi piaohao’s government remittance dates back to 1849, 
when the Zhejiang Provincial Governor [xunfu 巡 抚 ] Wu Wenrong wrote in his 
memorandum that his subordinate, a ninth rank official Zhang Bingzhong, remitted ‘imperial 
household expenses [neiwufu jingfei内务府经费]’ for Tls. 4,460 from Hangzhou to Beijing 
without his permission. He mentioned that although Zhang had done this out of concern for 
the silver that he had no troops to escort, official Wu still asked the emperor Daoguang to 
punish official Zhang as an example to others. The above incident suggests that remitting 
government funds was not widespread in the 1840s and officials could do this only after 
obtaining permission from a high-level authority that was responsible to his superior. 
Moreover, from the business correspondence of the WTH piaohao Suzhou branch, I have also 
found this piaohao and the RSC competing to handle a government remittance in 1852, when 
silver escorting was dangerous (Huang, 2002a, p.1173.). 
107
 According to Wang (1963 p.76.), the imperial court’s annual tax revenue was about Tls. 
8 million in the 1860s, but the tax revenue received by the central court in 1861 was only Tls. 
1 million. Therefore, the Board of Revenue memorialised on 11th October 1862 that: “Capital 
funds should be remitted to Beijing either by escorting or remitting; the principal objective at 
present is that the government should have abundant silver to support our military actions.” in 
Huang, Archival materials of the Shanxi piaohao, p.75. 
108
 By examining memorandums relating to the Shanxi piaohao’s government remittances 
in the 1860s (Huang, 2002a pp.74-99.), I have found that these provinces were Fujian, 
Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, Shandong, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Gansu, 
and Guizhou. 
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Table 5-1: Contests between the central court and local officials 
Sources: Memorandum of Board of Punishment official Ma Xiangru in 1876’, ‘Memorandum 
of Investigating Censor Liu Xijin in 1877’, and ‘Memorandum of Cui Mu Zhi in 1877’, 
Memorandum of Sichuan Financial Commissioner Wen Ge on 28th March 1876’, 
‘Memorandum of Fujian-Zhejiang Provincial Governor and the General He Jing in 1878 and 
1879, Memorandum of Sichuan Provincial Governor Ding Baozhen on 24th January 1884, 
Memorandum of Fujian-Zhejiang Viceroy He Jing in 1884; Memorandum of Fuzhou General 
Mu Tushan in 1884; Memorandum of Jiangsu Provincial Governor Wei Rongguang’ in 1884; 
and Memorandum of Guangdong-Guangxi Viceroy Zhang Zhidong in 1885,  Memorandum 
of Jiangsu Provincial Governor Wei Rongguang in 1884, Memorandums collection under the 
reign of Daoguang, Xiangfeng, Tongzhi and Guangxu (Huang, 2002a, pp.167-234.) 
  
Central Court Argument Local officials Argument
1860s
Investigating Censor Xie 
Yingxi
Remitting government funds will 
breed corruption and cause 
silver shortages in Beijing
Guangdong Maritime Custom 
Governor  Yu Qing, Guangdong-
Guangxi Viceroy  Rui Lin, Fuzhou 
General  Yu Lin, Chengdu General 
Chongbao,  and Zhejiang Circuit 
Intendants Wenyu 
Their administration areas could 
not escort silver due to danger on 
the roads or because they were 
short of silver and had to turn to 
the Shanxi piaohao for advances
1870s
Investigating Censor He Bao, 
Supervising Censor of the 
Board of Punishment Ma 
Xiangru, Investigating Censor 
Liu Xijin, and Supervising 
Censor Cui Muzhi 
Fujian-Zhejiang Viceroy He Jing The type of silver circulating in 
Fujian was ‘fanyin’ silver but 
when submitting capital funds 
‘wenyin’ silver was required. 
Therefore, it was only by 
remittances that  ‘wenyin’ silver 
could be submitted in Beijing.
1880s
Guangxu emperor The overnight bankruptcy of a 
southern piaohao Fukang [阜康] 
prompted the emperor to 
promulgate a decree banning 
government remittances 
nationwide
Sichuan Provincial Governor Ding 
Baozhen
The Shanxi piaohao and the 
Southern piaohao were different. 
The former had had branches in 
Sichuan for many years and had 
never defaulted on their drafts. 
Fujian-Zhejiang Viceroy He Jing, 
Guangdong-Guangxi Viceroy 
Zhang Zhidong, and other regional 
governors 
The Shanxi merchants were 
conscientious and generous in 
advancing government funds for 
remittances.
1890s
Board of Revenue Repaying the indemnity was the 
priority and local provincials had 
to ensure that each repayment 
was submitted to the Shanghai 
Maritime Customs on time.
Remitting government funds will 
breed corruption and cause 
silver shortages in Beijing
Sichuan Province Financial 
Commissioner Wen Ge, 
Guangdong-Guangxi Viceroy Liu 
Kunyi, and Zhejiang Governor Mei 
Qizhao
Beijing was close to the 
piaohao’s headquarters in Shanxi 
province. If these piaohao 
encountered silver shortages in 
Beijing, they could always 
replenish it easily from Shanxi.
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Figure 5-1: Volumes of the Shanxi piaohao’s government remittance from 1862 to 1911 
 
Source: Statistics of the Shanxi piaohao’s government business (Huang, 2002a pp.74-138.) 
Note: By examining official memorandums, I have found that Huang’s statistic has following 
errors: In 1879, his estimation omitted that the piaohao remitted Tls. 10,000 ‘Self-
strengthening Movement’ funds in Sichuan province (Huang, 2002a p.85.). Moreover, when 
calculating sums of governmental remittance volumes, he made sum errors in 1880, 1881, 
1882, 1883, 1909, 1910, and 1911. All these mistakes have been amended in this dissertation. 
Since no statistics or memorandums remain from 1868 and 1897, the government remittance 
volumes in these two years are treated as zero.  
As the above table and figure show, although the Shanxi piaohao’s government 
remittance business faced fierce opposition from the central court, with the support of 
the local officials, piaohao’s government remittance grew over time. Between the 
1860s and 1890s, this business kept under Tls. 6 million. As the First Sino-Japanese 
War (1894-5) ended, the piaohao’s government remittance increased steadily and 
reached a peak of Tls. 22 million in 1906. However, as an official bank, Great Qing 
Bank was established in 1907, piaohao’s government remittance started to decline, 
and when the Qing court was overthrown in 1911, this business finally evaporated. 
Table 5-2 shows types of government fund remitted by the piaohao. It can be found 
that there were seven types of government funds remitted by the Shanxi piaohao: 
capital funds [jingxiang 京饷], assistant funds [xiexiang 协饷], imperial household 
expense [neiwufu jingfei 内 务 府 经 费 ], self-strengthening movement funds 
[yangwuyundong jingfei洋务运动经费], copper silver [tongbenyin铜本银], foreign 
loans [waizhai外债], and others, e.g. sales of official title donations [juanna捐纳]. 
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Table 5-2: Proportions of different types of governmental funds remitted by the Shanxi 
piaohao from 1862 to 1911 
Year 
Capital 
funds 
Assistant 
funds 
Self-
strengthening 
movement 
funds 
Foreign 
loans 
Imperial 
household 
expenses 
Copper 
Silver 
Other 
funds 
1862-4 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
1865-9 94% 2% 0% 0% 5% 0% 0% 
1870s 87% 6% 1% 1% 5% 0% 0% 
1880s 62% 18% 16% 2% 2% 1% 1% 
1890-3 61% 24% 11% 2% 3% 0% 0% 
1894/5 57% 17% 17% 0% 4% 5% 1% 
1896-9 51% 23% 2% 22% 2% 0% 0% 
1900/1 35% 16% 0% 49% 1% 0% 0% 
1902-11 12% 7% 1% 77% 1% 0% 2% 
Average 62% 12% 5% 17% 2% 1% 0% 
Source: ibid.  
Note: The local taxation revenues shipped to Beijing were called ‘capital fund’, while those to 
the needy provinces were called ‘assistant fund’. After bitter experiences of military defeat at 
the hands of Western nations, the Qing court and launched the Self-strengthening Movement 
(1861-95) which consisted of the ‘Self-strengthening movement funds’. ‘Foreign loans’ here 
mainly denotes the loans borrowed from Britain, Germany, Russia, and France to repay the 
indemnities under the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the Treaty of 1901. ‘Imperial household 
expenses’ was for the emperor’s family use and ‘Copper silver [tongbenyin铜本银]’ means 
the value of copper coins on a par with silver taels. ‘Other funds’ mainly included the sales of 
official title donations [juanna 捐纳]. 
As the table shows, over the 1860s, more than 90% of the government remittances 
remitted by the piaohao were capital funds, with imperial household expenses and 
assistant funds altogether had a share of 7%. One obvious change in types of 
government fund in the 1870s is the rise of assist funds and this upward trend 
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continued after the First Sino-Japanese War ended. This rise could be explained by 
the alteration in the imperial court’s fiscal system.109  
After bitter experiences of military defeat at the hands of Western industrial nations, 
the Qing officials realized the importance of military industrialization and launched 
the Self-strengthening Movement (1861-95) in the country which required funds to be 
transferred from one place to another to meet financial requirements of the military 
and industrial investment. As a result of this, the share of the ‘Self-strengthening 
movement’ funds soared from 1% in the 1870s to 16% in the 1880s. However, the 
lost to Japan signifies the failure of the movement. As a consequence, self-
strengthening movement funds remitted by the Shanxi piaohao plummeted drastically 
from 17% during the war to 2% after the war ended.  
Contrast to a radical decline in the share of self-strengthening movement funds, the 
share of the foreign loans grew from 2% in 1880s to 22% in 1896-9 and reached a 
zenith of 77% in 1902-11. These two growing waves could be consequences of Tls. 
230 million and Tls. 450 million indemnities under the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the 
Treaty of 1901.
110
 With a substantial increase in foreign loans, shares of capital funds 
and assistant funds slumped to 12% and 7% respectively in 1902-9. Dissimilar with 
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 Song (2014, pp.5-6.) described that before the Taiping Rebellion, the central court used 
assist funds to balance revenue surpluses and deficits among provinces. Every year based on 
the revenue and budget reports of each province, the Board of Revenue apportioned [拨] 
assist funds from surpluses to insufficient ones. However, due to local corps’ outstanding 
performance during the Taiping Rebellion, regional authorities’ military and fiscal autonomy 
was greatly increased after the Taiping Rebellion. Not only could they use the newly designed 
tax revenue likin [厘金] to support their military forces, maritime customs revenues were also 
at their disposal. When the central court officials found it hard to calculate the condition of 
local tax revenues after the rebellion, they started to estimate it. Based on their estimates, they 
changed the former policy of apportioning to amortization [摊 ]. Earlier silver recipient 
provinces, such as Sichuan and Fujian, became silver donators. Moreover, before the 
rebellion, funds to assist needy provinces were transported only once a year from the 
provinces with a surplus, but after the central court changed its policy, such funds could be 
transported central court at any time as long as a province needed silver. It was this situation 
that saw an increase in the funds that had to be remitted. 
110
 The Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed between the Qing court and Japan after the First 
Sino-Japanese War. The Treaty of 1901 was signed by the Qing court and eleven other 
countries (Britain, the United States, Germany, Japan, Russia, France, Italy, Austria-Hungary, 
Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands). Under its terms, the Qing government was required to 
pay Tls. 450 million to the above nations over the course of 39 years with an interest rate of 
4% per annum. The indemnity was guaranteed by the Chinese Maritime Customs and was 
paid monthly to foreign banks in Shanghai. 
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the above four types of funds which experienced a lot of variations, ‘imperial 
household expenses’, ‘copper silvers’ and ‘other funds’ kept a share of less than 5% 
over time.  
After this illustration of the variety of government funds remitted by the piaohao, 
Table 5-3 estimates the annual government remittance, advances to the government, 
and incomes earned from the government remittance business for all the Shanxi 
piaohao. This table also illustrates the share of the government remittance business in 
the piaohao’s total remittance volume, the percentage of advances to the government 
remittances in the piaohao’s total government remittances, and the share of income 
from these remittances in the piaohao’s total income. 
Table 5-3: Annual government remittances, advances to the government and income 
from government remittances for all the Shanxi piaohao, 1860s-1910s 
Period 
Government 
remittance 
(Tls.) 
Government 
remittance / 
total 
remittancea 
(%) 
Advances to 
government 
remittances 
(Tls.) 
Government 
remittance 
income (Tls.) b 
Government 
remittance 
income/ total 
income (%) c 
1862-4 267,184 2% 33,333 10,687 1.7% 
1865-9 2,250,512 3% 49,640 90,020 4.7% 
1870s 2,104,816 2% 174,076 45,254 0.9% 
1880s 2,480,861 2% 502,959 7,443 0.1% 
1890-3 5,061,411 3% 1,182,044 50,614 0.5% 
1894/5 4,593,371 3% 460,260 45,934 0.5% 
1896-9 6,669,838 3% 836,755 66,698 0.3% 
1900/1 6,262,445 9% 348,201 53,220 3.1% 
1902-11 12,135,798 5% 116,610 103,133 0.4% 
Average 4,647,360 4% 411,542 52,556 1.4% 
Source: Ibid. 
a
 The piaohao’s total remittance volume is illustrated in 5.2, below. 
b 
Since the commission fees that the Shanxi piaohao charged on government remittances 
depended on factors such as the duration and types of draft, my research thesis has found 
from official memorandums and piaohao business letters that in the 1860s the Shanxi piaohao 
on average charged Tls. 4 per Tls. 100 on government remittances. This value was Tls. 2 per 
Tls.100 in the 1870s, Tls.0.3 / Tls.100 in the 1880s and Tls. 0.1 / Tls. 100 in the 1890s and the 
1900s. 
c   The piaohao’s total remittance income is illustrated in 5.3,below. 
Table 5-3 shows that soon after 1862, when the central government commissioned the 
piaohao to remit government funds on a large scale, the piaohao’s annual government 
remittances begin to increase and continued all through the 1860s. This volume 
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remained almost unchanged over the 1870s and the 1880s and grew rapidly in the 
1890s and 1900s. On average, the Shanxi piaohao remitted Tls. 4.6 million in 
government funds per annum.  
When the study examines the piaohao’s advances for the government remittance, the 
above table shows that, unlike the government remittances, which kept relatively 
unchanged between the 1870s and 1880s, the advances to government remittance 
increased four times over from the same period, when the central court imposed a 
strict ban on government remittances. Again, as the central government lifted this ban 
after the 1890s, the piaohao’s advances to government declined. 
Based on the average commission fees that the Shanxi piaohao charged on 
government remittances, the fifth column of Table 5-3 shows the income that the 
Shanxi piaohao earned from dealing in government remittances. It finds that this 
value increased steadily from the 1860s but plummeted in the 1870s and reached its 
nadir in the 1880s. As their government remittance volume recovered after the 1890s, 
however, the income from this business rebounded.  
As the last column shows in illustrating the percentage of government remittance 
income out of the Shanxi piaohao’s total income, on average the government 
remittance income occupied only 1.4% of the piaohao’s total income. However, it is 
worth mentioning that, although the explicit income that the Shanxi piaohao earned 
from government remittances was small, the large invisible income that this business 
brought to the Shanxi piaohao should not be overlooked. As my thesis has illustrated, 
the Shanxi piaohao used the empty time between accepting silver from one 
transaction and submitting it to meet the silver requirements of another transaction; 
moreover, the intervals in government remittances varied from 14 to 90 days (Table 
3-8), the Shanxi piaohao earned appreciable amounts from such commissions.
111
  This 
substantial invisible income explains why, despite the small explicit income from 
government remittances, the Shanxi piaohao still worked hard to keep this business. 
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 From its business letters, the present research has identified when Suzhou, the branch 
manager of the WTH piaohao, wrote his letter to Beijing in 1852, he mentioned that because 
the WTH had failed to remit government funds that time, the RSC earned a 50-day interval 
for a government remittance of  Tls.70,000 (Huang 2002a, p.1175). 
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At present there are no complete data on the value of the Qing government’s capital 
funds, assistant funds and funds of other types, but, according to Song (2014, p.30.), 
in 1893 the Qing court reported Tls. 18.5 million capital funds and Tls. 18.4 million 
assistant funds. According to my statistics, it can be seen that the capital funds and 
assistant funds remitted by the Shanxi piaohao occupied about 15% and 8% of the 
Qing court’s total capital funds and assistant funds respectively in 1893. 
From the above analyses it follows that the Shanxi piaohao’s government remittance 
business developed as the result of confrontation between central and local officials. 
The types of government monies remitted by the Shanxi piaohao started as few but 
gradually multiplied. Although the Shanxi piaohao government remittances increased 
over time, their proportion in the piaohao’s total business never rose above 10%. 
Moreover, although the income from the government remittances was small, this 
business gave the Shanxi piaohao intervals in which to use the silver for other 
transactions. 
5.2 Estimates of the volume of annual remittances, deposits and 
loans  
The Shanxi piaohao started with the remittance business and as they developed they 
began to undertake deposits and loans. However, how large these three types of 
business were in relation to the piaohao’s total business and what roles they played in 
piaohao’s total business has remained relatively unexplored owing to the lack of data. 
Now, however, on the basis of the RSC’s correspondence and balance sheets, this 
section can estimate the historical changes in these three types of business and their 
proportion they took up of the piaohao’s total business and show the results in Table 
5-4. 
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Table 5-4: Annual average remittance, loan and deposit volumes for one branch, one 
piaohao and all the Shanxi piaohao (Tls. 1,000) 
 
Sources: RSC business correspondence from the 1840s to the 1900s (Huang, 2002a pp.833-
1077.);Annual balance sheets of the RSC 1849 one unnamed branch, 1852 
Qingjiangzhen,1853 Jiangxi branch, 1906 Xiangtan, 1906 Zhoujiakou, 1906 Kaifeng, and 
1906 Changsha branch (Advanced Asia Studies Library, University of Tokyo). 
 
Note: When estimating the average annual remittance volumes, my thesis uses the RSC 
business letters and balance sheets. In employing the business letters, it first calculates the 
remittance values contained in one letter, and, according to the number of letters sent by one 
branch in a year, it calculates the remittance volume for one branch.  Combining the annual 
remittance volume of a branch and the number of branches in each period, it estimates the 
annual remittance volume for a piaohao. Then, according to a piaohao’s annual remittance 
volume and the number of Shanxi piaohao, I estimate the annual remittance volume for all the 
Shanxi piaohao. To improve the accuracy of my estimation, this thesis also uses annual 
balance sheets of the RSC’s different branches to estimate the remittance volume for one 
branch, one piaohao, and all the whole Shanxi piaohao. On the basis of the estimation results 
from the balance sheets and business letters, I calculate the average and use this value as the 
annual remittance volume in each period. The piaohao’s business letters do not record its loan 
and deposit business. Therefore, when estimating the loan and deposit business, this thesis 
mainly uses the RSC balance sheets. ‘-’ means data are not available. 
a
 From its balance sheets, this thesis has found that in the 1850s, the RSC depositors included 
gentry, commoners and officials. But in the 1900s three of their four depositors were firms, 
with one member of the gentry class. The average duration of a deposit in the 1850s was 19 
months but had dropped by half in the 1900s. On average the RSC paid 3 li per month to their 
depositors, without regard to type of client.
112
 
b Regarding the borrowers, both in the 1850s and the 1900s, most of the piaohao’s clients 
were firms, with one member of the gentry class, and one commoner in the 1900s. The 
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 When classifying the types of client, this thesis treats names ending with ‘号[hao]’, ‘庄
[zhuang]’, and ‘行 [hang]’ as ‘firms’, and treats names ending with ‘先生 [Xiansheng, 
meanings Mr]’ as ‘individual members of the gentry class’. It regards names ending with ‘老
爷 [laoye, meaning lord]’ or ‘大人 [daren, meaning Monsignor]’ as borne by officials, and 
when a name indicates no title, its owner is defined as a ‘commoner’. As the government 
department, Shanxi piaohao and foreign banks’ names are easy to identify, they are classified 
as such. 
1840s 1850s 1860-4 1865-9 1870s 1880s 1890-3 1894/5 1896-9 1900/1 1902/9
Average per branch
Remittance 736 241 102 311 223 241 289 253 333 125 519
Deposit a 25 7 - - - - - - - - 14
Loanb 12 4 - - - - - - - - 74
Average per piaohao
Remittance 8,826 4,092 1,118 5,286 3,448 4,344 7,511 6,322 8,329 2,627 9,346
Deposit 294 116 - - - - - - - - 324
Loan 146 64 - - - - - - - - 1,744
All the Shanxi piaohaoc
Remittance 110,327 69,571 17,888 84,575 89,654 104,254 187,765 158,049 208,213 68,303 252,342
Deposit 4,412 1,974 - - - - - - - - 68,302
Loan 2,184 1,084 - - - - - - - - 34,859
The number of branches 12 17 11 17 17 18 26 25 25 21 18
The number of Shanxi piaohao 15 17 16 16 26 24 25 25 25 26 27
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average duration for these loans in the 1850s was 9 months, which had gone down to 5 
months in the 1900s. In both periods, the RSC charged 8 li per month regardless of client 
type. 
c 
Business volumes for all the Shanxi piaohao are calculated by multiplying average business 
volumes per piaohao with number of Shanxi piaohao in operation in each period. 
From Table 5-4 it can be found that the average annual remittance volume for one 
piaohao branch plummeted between the 1840s and 1850s when the Taiping Rebellion 
(1852-64) broke out. After this, business recovered, being only slightly affected by 
the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-5); the Boxer Rebellion (1900-1), however, had a 
heavy impact on it.  Overall, between the 1840s and the 1910s, the annual remittance 
volume for one piaohao branch dropped from Tls. 736 thousand to Tls. 519 thousand. 
During the same period, the annual deposit volume dropped by half while the annual 
loan volume increased by six times.  
Like the piaohao branch, one Shanxi piaohao experienced similar growth in these 
three types of business, except for the volume of annual remittances. Due to an 
increase in piaohao branches, the annual remittance volume for one Shanxi piaohao 
grew slightly, from Tls. 8.8 million to Tls. 9.3 million between the 1840s and 1910s.  
As with the piaohao branch and the RSC, all the Shanxi piaohao lived through three 
troughs in their annual remittance, deposit and loan values during the Taiping 
Rebellion (1852/64), the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), and the Boxer Rebellion 
(1900-1). But because more Shanxi piaohao were set up, from the 1840s to the 1900s 
these three types of business expanded. However, unlike the remittance and loan 
which experienced substantial increases, the growth in deposits was small. 
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Figure 5-2:  Volume changes of all the Shanxi piaohao’s annual remittance, loan, and 
deposit from the 1840s to the 1900s 
 
Sources: Ibid. 
Based on Table 5-4, Figure 5-3 illustrates the RSC business structure in the 1840s, 
1850s and 1900s in sequence.  
Figure 5-3: Business structure of the RSC in the 1840s, 1850s and 1900s (Tls)  
 
Sources: ibid.  
Note: The size of each stacked column is the proportion of different businesses, and the figure 
next to the column is the value of the business. 
As the figure suggests, the remittances were consistently the backbone for the piaohao. 
As time went on from the 1840s to the 1900s, the loan business increased its share, 
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while deposits were relatively constant over time. Recall the illustration, above, of the 
types of draft handled by the RSC in Table 4-4: with the remittances the loan drafts 
occupied 60%, 25% and 45% respectively of the total drafts in the 1840s, 1850s, and 
1902-9 and original drafts occupied the rest. Therefore, if we divide the remittance 
into loan and original drafts and plot the proportions of deposit, original drafts, loans 
and loan drafts of the RSC shown in Figure 5-4, it can be found that the loans and 
loan drafts altogether took up 62%, 26% and 57% of the piaohao’s total business in 
the 1840s, 1850s, and 1902-9 respectively and the original drafts and deposit occupied 
the rest in these periods.  
Figure 5-4: Proportions of deposit, original drafts, loan, and loan drafts of the RSC in 
the 1840s, 1850s, and 1900s  
 
Sources: ibid. 
If we define the piaohao’s total liability as equal to deposits plus original drafts and 
total assets as loans plus loan drafts, then it can be calculated that the debt/asset ratios 
in the 1840s, 1850s and 1902-9 for the RSC were 0.6, 2.8 and 0.8 respectively. Such 
high financial leverage indicates that high financial risk existed in the piaohao. 
5.3 Incomes and profits 
Besides its business structure, the Shanxi piaohao’s sources of income and expenses 
have also been neglected in previous studies, but are important for understanding their 
historical development. On the basis of the balance sheets from different branches of 
the RSC and the number of branches operating in different periods, Table 5-5 
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summarises the RSC annual revenues and expenses in the 1840s, 1850s, 1860s, and 
1900s.  
Table 5-5: Estimates of the revenues and expenses for the RSC in the 1840s, 1850s,  
1865-9 and 1902-9 (Tls) 
  1840s 1850s 1865-9 1902-9 
Revenues 
    
Interest income 92,372 22,703 0 150,031 
Remittance service income 42,747 18,927 120,422 855,205 
Silver weight and purity disparity 
income 
7,126 7,610 1,411 0 
Other income 1,039 4,999 0 19,123 
           Sum of revenues 143,285 54,240 121,833 1,024,359 
Expenses 
    
Property rents 1,206 3,007 3,400 3,526 
Board expensesa 5,952 15,322 19,589 45,713 
Paid interest 6,073 15,530 0 125,749 
Paid remittance service fees 0 0 15,346 567,767 
Expenditure of weight and purity 
disparity 
11,979 0 0 1,112 
Postage, banquet, and office 
expenses 
0 0 0 38,643 
Bad loan amortization 0 1,615 0 5,256 
Other expenses 5,959 2,920 4,463 15,034 
      Sum of expenses 31,170 38,395 42,798 802,799 
Profits  112,115 15,845 79,035 221,560 
Expenses/ Revenues ratio 0.22 0.71 0.35 0.78 
Sources: RSC annual balance of 1849 Pingyao, 1852 Qingjiangpu, 1853 Jiangxi,1856 
Suzhou,1867 Yangzhou,1906 Xian, Kaifeng, Zhoujiakou, Hangzhou, Guilin, Guangzhou, 
Changsha, Xiangtan, Guangzhou and Chongqing branches (Advanced Asia Studies Library, 
University of Tokyo). 
Note: On the basis of the RSC balance sheets in different periods, this thesis first estimates 
the average values for each income and expense item for one branch. Then, based on the 
number of branches that the RSC had in the corresponding period, the thesis estimates these 
values for the RSC. For example, in the 1900s the RSC had balance sheets for 10 branches. 
Based on these, the average values of each income and expense item for one branch can be 
calculated. Since the RSC had 18 branches in this period, I multiply by 18 the averages for 
each income and expense item to obtain the RSC annual incomes and expenses for each item 
in the 1900s. 
a 
Board expenses represent expenditure on employees’ food, accommodation and salaries. 
The table shows that the RSC’s revenues included ‘income from interest’, ‘remittance 
service fees’, ‘silver weight and purity disparity’ and other items, such as ‘occasional 
currency exchange income’, and ‘sales of official title donations income’. Annual 
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expenses involved ‘property rents’, ‘expense’, ‘paid interests’, ‘paid remittance 
service fee’, ‘paid silver weight and purity disparity’, ‘bad loan amortization’, 
‘postage, banquet and office expenses’ as well as other expenses, such as ‘silver 
escorting fees’ and ‘travel expenses’. Between the 1840s and the 1900s, the sums of 
income increased from Tls. 143 thousand to Tls. 1 million and the sum of expenses 
grew from Tls. 31 thousand to Tls. 802 thousand. The ratio of expenses/revenues 
grew from 0.22 to 0.78 during the same period. These results suggest that as the RSC 
revenues rose, its expenses also increased. Although a mounting expenses/revenues 
ratio indicates that the RSC profit margin narrowed, its annual total profits doubled 
from Tls. 112 thousand in the 1840s to Tls. 222 thousand in the 1900s.  
On the basis of Table 5-5, Figure 5-5 and Figure 5-6 depict the RSC annual income 
and expenses structure respectively. 
Figure 5-5: Income structure for the RSC in the 1840s, 1850s, 1865-9 and 1902-9(Tls) 
 
Sources: Ibid. 
Note: The size of each stacked column is the proportion of different businesses, and the figure 
next to the column is the value of the business. 
Figure 5-5 shows among the RSC’s incomes, ‘received interest’ and ‘remittance 
service fees’ held 62% and 28% of the 1840s total income respectively and occupied 
42 % and 33 % respectively of the 1850s total income. Besides these two, incomes 
from the ‘silver weight and purity disparities’ and ‘other incomes’ together occupied 
8% and 25% of the total income in the 1840s and 1850s respectively.  
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From the 1860s, income from ‘remittance service fees’ increased abruptly to 99% 
while other types of income almost vanished from the RSC’s balance sheet. This 
change can be explained by the change of the RSC’s income sources classification. 
From their business letters and balance sheets my thesis has identified in the 1840s 
and 1850s, the RSC combined the interest earned from loan drafts and loan business 
together and designated them ‘received interest’. However, from the 1860s, to make 
their letter writings quicker, they separated the two and ascribed the interest from loan 
drafts to the ‘remittance service fees’ and this explained the reason of the ‘remittance 
service fees’ rise. As time went to 1902-9, with an increase of loan business (Figure 
5-3), income from the ‘received interest income’ emerged with a share of 13%. 
Corresponding to the income structure, Figure 5-3 shows expenses structure for the 
RSC. As it shows in the 1840s there were five types of expense with ‘paid silver 
weight and purity disparities’ had the largest share of 40%, followed by ‘other 
expenses’, ‘paid interests’, ‘board expenses’ and ‘property rents’. Expenses on the 
‘bad loan amortizations’ occurred in the 1850s, with a share of 3%.  
Figure 5-6: Expense structure for the RSC in the 1840s, 1850s, 1865-9 and 1902-9 (Tls) 
 
Sources: Ibid. 
Note: The size of each stacked column is the proportion of different businesses, and the figure 
next to the column is the value of the business. 
As with the income structure, in the 1860s, the piaohao separated ‘paid interest on 
original drafts from paid interest on deposits. This change made ‘paid interest on 
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remittance’ climb from zero to 40%. Moreover, ‘board expenses’ also increased their 
share by 10% to 50%. In the period of 1902-9, ‘postage, banquets, and office 
operations’ expense occurred, with a share of 5%. Furthermore, ‘paid remittance 
interest’ grew further from 30% to 70% and became the largest expense for the RSC 
in this period. An increase in ‘paid remittance service fees’ in the 1900s indicates 
competitions between the Shanxi piaohao and other financial institutions intensified. 
To win the competition, piaohao had to pay more remittance service fees on original 
drafts.
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Table 5-6 shows the annual revenue and profits for all the Shanxi piaohao during the 
1840s-1900s. It finds that as with their business, these piaohao experienced a similar 
rise and decline in their revenue and profits. From the 1840s to the 1900s, the piaohao 
annual revenue increased 16 times from Tls.1.5 million to Tls.25 million. Far from a 
big jump in annual revenue, their annual profits increased only three times from 
Tls.1.4 million to Tls. 4.4 million and this could be attributed to growing expenses. 
For example, for the RSC piaohao, between the 1840s and the 1900s, ‘board 
expenses’ soared from Tls. 5,952 to Tls. 45,713,114 ‘paid interest’ increased from 
Tls.6, 073 to Tls.125, 749, and ‘paid remittance service fees’ grew from Tls.0 to Tls. 
567,767.
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 Competitions between piaohao and other types of financial institutions will be further 
examined in 6.2 and 6.3, below. 
114
 As my thesis has illustrated in 3.2 (p.83.) when modern Chinese banks just set up, they 
preferred to hire piaohao employees. Therefore, an increased cost in ‘board expenses’ could 
be a result of retaining members of staff.   
115
 As my thesis has illustrated on p.139, in the 1840s and 1850s, the RSC combined the 
interest paid to original drafts and deposit business together and designated them ‘paid 
interest’. However, from the 1860s, my thesis has found they separated the two and ascribed 
the interest paid to original drafts to the ‘paid remittance service fees’. This explained why 
this type of expense appeared and grew quickly. 
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Table 5-6: Average annual income and profits for one piaohao branch, one piaohao, and 
all the Shanxi piaohao from the 1840s to the 1900s (Tls. 1,000) 
Sources: Ibid. 
 
Note: my thesis uses business letters and balance sheets of various piaohao to estimate 
average annual income and profits for one branch and one piaohao.  
a 
Annual income and profits for all the Shanxi piaohao are calculated by multiplying average 
income and profits per piaohao with the number of Shanxi piaohao in operation in each 
period. 
5.4 Concluding remarks 
Based on a comprehensive data set, this chapter studies the historical development of 
the business, incomes and profits under scrutiny. By compiling statistics on the 
piaohao’s government business, the present chapter can for the first time demonstrate 
that the piaohao’s government business occupied only 10% of its total business and 
the income it earned from the government on average occupied only 1.4% of its total 
income. Therefore, the decline of the Shanxi piaohao cannot be ascribed to the reason 
given by Chen (1937 p.132.) and Kong (1984): “the piaohao lost their largest client, 
the Qing government, and dissolved.” When estimating the piaohaos’ business 
volumes, my thesis finds although it experienced troughs, the piaohaos expanded their 
remittance, deposit and loan business over time. Among these three types of business, 
remittances always occupied more than 80% of the piaohaos’ total business, followed 
by loans and deposits. When my thesis further calculates the piaohaos’ debt/asset 
ratios in different periods, it finds that a high financial leverage indicated high risk in 
the piaohao. Last but not the least in importance, when my thesis examines the growth 
of the piaohaos’ incomes and profits, it finds that, piaohao’s profit margins narrowed 
after the 1900s. After investigating this historical development, the next chapter, 
drawing on some preliminary results, explores the piaohao’s sudden decline in the 
1910s. 
1840s 1850s 1860-4 1865-9 1870s 1880s 1890-3 1894/5 1896-9 1900/1 1902/9
Average per branch
Income 12 4 4 7 11 14 16 16 43 3 52
Profits 9 2 2 5 3 8 9 9 24 2 9
Average per piaohao
Income 143 63 39 120 194 244 411 397 1,066 65 934
Profits 112 29 25 79 57 139 233 225 605 37 163
All the Shanxi piaohaoa
Income 1,791 1,064 621 1,927 5,036 5,866 10,274 9,917 26,640 1,695 25,231
Profits 1,401 493 394 1,261 1,482 3,332 5,835 5,633 15,132 963 4,414
The number of branches 12 17 11 17 17 18 26 25 25 21 18
The number of Shanxi piaohao 15 17 16 16 26 24 25 25 25 26 27
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 Epilogue: Explorations on the piaohao’s decline  Chapter 6.
As the above chapters have shown, the Shanxi piaohao during its development lived 
through much political turmoil. However, when the 1911 Revolution broke out and 
endless civil wars ensued, most Shanxi piaohao went bankrupt and in the 1910s the 
bank collectively declined.
116
 Drawing on some preliminary results, this section 
explores the piaohao’s decline by examining the impact of the 1911 Revolution and 
the expansion in China of the foreign and modern banks. It also shows what efforts it 
made to save itself when facing its greatest crisis. 
6.1 The impact of 1911 Revolution and the piaohao’s last efforts  
The Shanxi piaohao survived the Taiping Rebellion, the First Sino-Japanese War and 
the Boxer Rebellion. However, these political disruptions were more or less 
forewarned and therefore the Shanxi piaohao could minimize its losses by escorting 
silver back to Pingyao and shutting down branches in advance.
117
 However, unlike 
previous political disturbances, the 1911 Revolution broke out overnight and quickly 
spread nationwide.
118
 Although it ended with the abdication of the Qing Emperor Puyi 
on 12th February 1912, his action brought no peace to China but cast it into endless 
civil wars between warlords who were ambitious to control the country; the resulting 
massive looting and atrocities caused the piaohao huge losses. 
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 As my literature review illustrates, the piaohao’s decline has led to many different 
arguments. Some scholars (Chen 1937, Kong, 1984) argue that it was due to their intimate 
relationship with the Qing government. As the Qing regime was overthrown, the piaohao 
dissolved with it. Another scholar (Jang 2006) attributes the decline of the piaohao to China’s 
currency reforms in 1907, while yet others maintain that the piaohao’s decline was their 
limited working capital and competition from the other institutions. Since no comprehensive 
study so far has analysed how the 1911 Revolution and the expansion of the foreign and 
modern banks impacted on the Shanxi piaohao, these have become the focus of the present 
thesis. 
117
 From the RSC’s business correspondence, this thesis has found that, during the Taiping 
Rebellion and the Boxer Rebellion, the head office requested branches to shut and their staff 
to go back to Pingyao if they risked harm from the riots (Huang, 2002a pp.1060-70.). 
118
 The 1911 Revolution or the Xinhai Revolution was an uprising led mainly by the 
Chinese United League [Tongmenghui 同盟会]. It overthrew the Qing court and aimed to 
establish a republic. Four months after the 1911 Revolution, two-thirds of the Chinese 
provinces declared independence and joined the revolutionary army. 
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The impact of the 1911 Revolution on business and commerce can be found in 
newspaper reports and official memorials. As the Military Memorial [Junlu 军录] 
recorded on 15th October 1911, the news of the revolution shook the Beijing market, 
to set prices soaring and runs on the native banks.
119
 The Tianjin guild also reported in 
May 1912 that, since the Wuchang Uprising,
120
 most of the financial institutions in 
Tianjin had been closed and other firms were operating in difficult conditions.
121
  
Like many other firms, then, the Shanxi piaohao also suffered considerable losses 
during the revolution. On 30th September 1912, the RSC and eleven other Shanxi 
piaohao submitted a joint letter to the newly established Beiyang Government and 
applied for compensation for their losses.
122
 As the letter stated:  
“The Shanxi piaohao have run the remittance business for a century and have won 
nationwide trust for our professional service and reputation. Besides our business, 
we also play active roles in supporting national industries, relieving the 
government financial constraints and natural disasters. Although we suffered 
losses during the First Sino-Japanese War and the Boxer Rebellion, we had 
adequate capital and profits to enable us to go on running. However, the Wuchang 
Uprising broke out without warning and caused us huge losses. Since our business 
was based in southern China, the independence of Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong and 
other southern provinces forced our business in these provinces to grind to a halt. 
Our loans could not be recovered and our deposits were exhausted. Since the 
remittance business is crucial for our country’s financial and commercial 
activities, we sincerely hope the government can help us out of this difficulty.” 
                                               
119
 “御史玉春为粮价骤增旗营兵米请提前开放的奏折[Official Shi Yuchun’s memorial 
to the throne regarding the increase in rice prices and application to distribute army’s rice in 
advance]”, in Huang, Archival materials of the Shanxi piaohao, p.483. 
120
 The Wuchang Uprising was the first uprising of the Xinhai Revolution. 
121
 “众钱上禀  [Joint reports from money dealers]”, 天津商会报告 [Tianjin Guild 
Archives], 业务类 [Business], volume 150, 1912, in Huang, Archival materials of the Shanxi 
piaohao, p.486. 
122
 The term ‘Beiyang Government’ refers to the government of the Republic of China, 
which was internationally recognized as the legitimate Chinese government from 1912 to 
1928. 
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In addition to this letter, the piaohao also attached two letters which listed their 
property and cash losses and their loans and deposits during the revolution. On the 
basis of these two lists, Table 6-1 and Table 6-2 show corresponding descriptive 
results. 
Table 6-1: Descriptive results for the property and cash loss list (Tls. 1,000) 
 
Mean S.d. Min Max Sum 
Silver in cash 111 94 8 304 1,335 
Properties 30 24 0 77 308 
Sum  137 100 8 349 1,644 
Sources: Compiled from ‘The joint letter of the Tian Cheng Heng and the other eleven Shanxi 
piaohao to the Beiyang Government’, 30th September 1913, Ministry of Finance Archive, 
Beiyang Government (Huang 2002a, p.488.). 
Table 6-1 shows that, on average, each of the twelve Shanxi piaohao lost a cash 
reserve of Tls. 111 thousand and properties valued at Tls. 30 thousand. In total they 
lost Tls. 1.6 million in cash and properties. Combining this figure with an estimate of 
all the Shanxi piaohao’s annual profits (Table 5-6), we see that this value equalled one 
fourth of all the annual profits made by the Shanxi piaohao in the period 1902-9. 
Besides the losses from looting, innumerable bad loans and the continuous withdrawal 
of deposits also worsened the piaohao’s situation. Table 6-2 sets out details of the 
loan and deposit business that the twelve Shanxi piaohao reported to the Beiyang 
government; these suggest that during the 1911 Revolution each piaohao on average 
reported Tls. 1.7 million in deposits and Tls. 2.2 million in loans. According to its 
statement to the government, from late 1911 to 1913, less than 10% of its loans had 
been recovered.
123
  For a piaohao which had about Tls. 1 million paid up capital, a 
loss of this kind could be devastating.
124
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 “山西票号维持商况之情愿  [Petition of the Shanxi piaohao to maintain their 
business]”, 3rd January 1914, 申报 [Shenbao Newspaper] in Huang, Archival materials of the 
Shanxi piaohao, p.504. Besides the Shenbao, other documents, e.g. Li (1917, pp.5-6.) and 
Wei (1944, p.21.) also documented that, in order to keep their reputation, the Shanxi piaohao 
allowed continuous withdrawal of deposits, but bore many bad loans. 
124
 This estimation is consistent with Chen (1937, p.38.), who points out that since the 
Shanxi piaohao had a policy of taking deposits in the north and making loans in the south, 
when southern China declared independence many piaohao could not recover their loans and 
went bankrupt. 
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Table 6-2: Descriptive results for the loan and deposit Business during the 1911 
Revolution (Tls. 1,000)
 
 
 
Mean Min Max Sum 
Deposit 1,792 499 3,051 25,100 
Loan 2,251 507 3,519, 31,500 
Total 4,043 1,006 6,555 56,600 
Sources: ibid 
The loss of the Shanxi piaohao was not limited to the above. As Zhang Zhongquan, a 
former piaohao employee, stated in 1961: “When southern China declared 
independence, the warlords were desperate to issue paper money and force it into 
circulation. The over issuance caused inflation and the later suspension of 
convertibility caused the piaohao’s deposit to become the equivalent of useless paper 
notes (Zhang, 1961, citied in Huang, 2002a, p.500.).”125   
Facing the risk of elimination, these Shanxi piaohao turned to the Beiyang 
Government both for loans and for help in chasing their own loans. But their lack of 
connection with this newly established government dimmed their hope. In January 
1914, the Shanxi piaohao elected six representatives to visit Xiong Xiling, the 
Minister of Finance. These piaohao representatives proposed to maintain their 
business by borrowing funds from the government or from foreign banks guaranteed 
by the government. Although the Finance Minister promised he would to his best to 
meet their requests, he resigned six months later.
126
 As the State Council replied on 
20th December 1914, ‘The Shanxi piaohao has been excellent in its reputation and 
performance for a long time, and the government should help the piaohao out of its 
present difficulties. However, since the government is also facing financial constraints, 
if the piaohao could rely on itself, it would bring about notable results.’127  
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According to Zhang the provinces which issued paper notes but suspended 
convertibility later included Sichuan, Shanxi, Guangdong, and Hunan (Zhang, 1961, citied in 
Huang, 2002a, p.500.) 
126
 “山西票号维持商况之情愿[The petition of the Shanxi piaohao to maintain their 
business]”, 申报 [Shenbao Newspaper] 3rd January 1914, in Huang, Archival materials of the 
Shanxi piaohao, p.504. 
127
 “山西汇商天成亨等号沥受战事影响商业颠危公肯救济有关文件 [Documents 
relating Tian Cheng Heng and other Shanxi piaohao calling for government rescue]”, 北洋政
府档案  [Beiyang Government Documents], No.1027, Volume 206, in Huang, Archival 
materials of the Shanxi piaohao, p.505. 
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The Shanxi piaohao’s second effort was to unify all its branches into establishing a 
Shanxi Remittance Industrial Bank [Shanxi huitong shiye yinghang 山西汇通实业银
行]. According to the bank’s regulations, piaohao needed to dissolve before joining 
the bank, and a separate bank would be established. The bank was planned to have a 
paid up capital of 3 million silver dollars with 30,000 shares for subscription. 
However, in its setting up, it stated that before subscribing enough capital from the 
public it planned to borrow 3 million silver dollars from domestic and foreign firms, 
guaranteed by the government.
 128
 This meant instead of itself investing some or part 
of the initial capital, the bank planned to borrow all the initial capital from elsewhere.  
However, the road to establishing such as an enterprise as a bank is hard from the start. 
The Shanxi Remittance Industrial Bank also planned to borrow 2 million pounds from 
an Austrian firm. This loan agreement was in fact finalised, but it was aborted by the 
start of the First World War.
129
 Besides Austria, In 1916 the Shanxi Remittance 
Industrial Bank planned to borrow 5 million silver dollars from an American banking 
syndicate to start business, but the agreement to do so had been delayed because the 
Beiyang government would not agree to use the taxation revenue from a Chinese 
province to underwrite this loan. 
130
  
The last effort made by the Shanxi piaohao was to ask the government to repay the 
nation’s debt to the bank. In 1908, under the persuasion of the Qing court and the 
patriotic sentiment of the piaohao merchants, the whole Shanxi piaohao lent the Qing 
court Tls.1.6 million to redeem the Shanxi province’s mining rights from the British 
and allow a firm named the ‘Protect Shanxi Company [baojin gongsi保晋公司]’ to 
be established.
131
 Again, in 1910, facing the shutdown of the “Datong-Huashan 
                                               
128
 “美国商务委员安脑尔函复洽议山西钱业商借中国通用洋五百万元文件[Letter in 
Reply of the US Commerce Committee to the Shanxi Merchants Regarding its 5 Million 
Silver Dollars’ Loan]”, 北洋政府档案  [Beiyang Government File], No 1027, in Huang, 
Archival materials of the Shanxi piaohao, p.511. 
129
 “记山西票号[Documentary of the Shanxi piaohao]”, 东方杂志 [Oriental Journal], 14th 
June 1917, in 山西票庄考略 (Investigation of Shanxi piaohao) Qitian Chen, 商务印书馆 
(Commercial Press), 1937, p.49. 
130
 Ibid. 
131
 “晋人踊跃从公[Shanxi people are active in supporting infrastructure construction], 大
公报 [Dagong Newspaper], 25th February 1908, in Huang, Archival materials of the Shanxi 
piaohao, p.337. 
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Railway [tongpu tielu 同蒲铁路]”, the whole Shanxi piaohao invested another Tls. 
600 thousand.
132
 However, when the Qing court was overthrown by revolutionaries, 
the firm Bao Jin went bankrupt and the Datong-Huashan Railway was nationalised.  
When it borrowed the money, the Qing court promised to repay it by the proceeds of 
land taxation. However, from the piaohao’s joint letter to the Beiyang Government, it 
appears that the Qing court never paid either interest or principal. In 1914, when the 
piaohao asked the Beiyang Government to pay back this loan to help it out of trouble, 
the reply was that there was no record of the loan.
133
  In 1916, during the short period 
of restoration, these Shanxi piaohao made their last claim for repayment. But 
according to the existing evidence, the piaohao never received a reply.
134
   
From the above illustrations, it can be inferred that the political and military turmoil 
in 1911 and afterwards severely impaired the piaohao business. Although these 
piaohao merchants made efforts to save themselves, the lack of capital and 
government support worsened their situation. 
6.2 Expansion of foreign banks 
Besides the political disruption, the rapid expansion of foreign and modern Chinese 
banks after the 1910s also endangered the piaohao’s survival. In 1845, a British-
Indian joint venture, called the New Oriental Bank, established a branch office in 
Shanghai and opened the foreign banking business in China. From this beginning, the 
British enjoyed a forty-year monopoly of foreign banking business in the country. 
Later in the 1890s, Russian, German, Japanese, French and American banks came to 
China as their international rivalry for interest continued to grow. By the end of 1910, 
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 “同蒲铁路开办有期 [Datong-Huashan Railway will be constructed as planned]”, 大公
报[Dagong Newspaper], 7th May 1910, in Huang, Archival materials of the Shanxi piaohao, 
p.344. 
133
 “财政部调查各省财政金融有关文书[Investigations of the Ministry of Finance into 
local business conditions]”, 北洋政府档案 [Beiyang Government Files], in Huang, Archival 
materials of the Shanxi piaohao, p.345. 
134
 As my thesis has illustrated in Table 5.3, the government remittance in average 
occupied 4% of the piaohao’s remittance. Income earned from the government remittance 
took up 1.4% of the piaohao’s total income. Therefore, the loss of the government business is 
not a key factor in the piaohao’s failure.   
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about 15 foreign banks were functioning in China, opening about 65 branches there 
(Allen and Donnithorne, 1954). 
Foreign banks, by virtue of their extraterritorial rights, operated free of Chinese laws. 
Not only did they monopolise Chinese international remittance and foreign trade 
financing, but also issued banknotes circulated in China, accepted deposits from 
Chinese officials and citizens and made loans to Chinese native banks (Cheng, 2003 
p.19.). After 1895, their increasing loans to the Qing government gave them a new 
opportunity to handle the revenues from the Chinese customs which had become 
pledges against foreign loans (Wang, 1983, p.89.).  
The remittance business undertaken by these foreign banks comprised international 
remittance, Chinese domestic remittance and Chinese overseas remittance [华侨汇款]. 
Although no concrete data on their Chinese domestic remittance are left, foreign 
banks, according to Wang (1983 p.177.), began to penetrate the Chinese remittance 
market in the 1880s. As the 1882-1892 Hankou Decennial Report stated: ‘Foreign 
merchants’ business in Hankou, especially tea and other local products, used to 
transacted in cash, but recently we have found that Chinese merchants have begun to 
employ foreign banks to send money. Chinese merchants’ trust in foreign banks, 
especially the HSBC, is increasing (Hankou Decennial Reports in 1882-1891, cited in 
Wang, 1993, p.177.).  
From the 1900s documents were reporting that the competition between foreign banks 
and the Shanxi piaohao was becoming intense. As Li Mianlin, Jiangxi’s Provincial 
Governor stated in a memorandum of 1901, due to a growing number of foreign 
banks set up in treaty ports, the piaohao’s profits were diminished.135 Tadashi also 
reported in 1908 that, to make up the funds to the value of Tls.10 million for cotton 
yarn remitted from Tianjin to Shanghai, foreign banks transferred 50%, the Shanxi 
piaohao committed 20% and other firms remitted the remaining 30%. But for cities 
with no foreign banks, the Shanxi piaohao still monopolised the local remittance 
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 “江西巡抚李勉林中丞复奏变通政务折搞  [Memorandum of Jiangxi Provincial 
Governor Li Mianlin]”, in Huang, Archival materials of the Shanxi piaohao, p.372. 
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business.
136
 In the same year, the Dagong Newspaper also reported that foreign banks 
took the lion’s share of the piaohao’s business.137 Besides this anecdotal evidence, my 
estimates of the piaohao’s business (Table 5-4), also finds that in the 1900s the 
growth rate in the piaohao’s volume of remittances slowed down.138  
Table 6-3 illustrates the number of foreign banks that operated in China between the 
1840s and 1920s. It shows that in total 31 foreign banks traded and the number of 
banks in operation steadily increased from one in the 1840s to 23 in the 1910s. The 
most striking growth occurred between the 1880s and 1890s, when this number grew 
from six to 13. Moreover, it is noticeable that it was during the 1910s, when many 
Shanxi piaohao went bankrupt, that the number of foreign banks reached a peak. 
Table 6-3: Numbers of foreign banks that operated in China from the 1840s to the 1920s 
Period  the number of foreign banks  
entered into China 
the Number of foreign banks  
in operation 
1840s 1 1 
1850s 2 3 
1860s 3 6 
1870s 3 8 
1880s 0 6 
1890s 7 13 
1900s 2 14 
1910s 10 23 
1920s 3 19 
Total 31 19 
Source: Based on Wang (1983, p.296) ‘A list of the Foreign banks operated in China’. 
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 Kishine Tadashi, “天津的票庄 [Shanxi Piaohao in Tianjin]”, 清国商业总览 [Business 
conditions in China], in Huang, Archival materials of the Shanxi piaohao, p.373. 
137
 “信义银行招股启示 [Subscription on the Xinyi Bank’s stock]”, 大公报 [Dagong 
Newspaper], 8th March 1908, in Huang, Archival materials of the Shanxi piaohao, p.373. 
138
 On the basis of Table 5-4, my thesis calculates that between the 1880s and the period 
1896-9, the remittance volume for all the Shanxi piaohao doubled, and from the period of 
1896-9 to that of1902-9, this volume grew by 37%. Moreover, according to Wang’s statistics 
on China’s imports and exports (Wang, 1987, p.150.), during the same periods, China’s 
import and export volumes increased by 63% and 75% respectively. This means that in the 
1900s the growth rate of the remittance volume of the Shanxi piaohao did not keep up with 
the growth rate of the trade volume. 
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Table 6-4 shows the nationalities of these banks: overall it was the British banks that 
had the largest number (10), followed by Japanese, American, French and German, 
Russian, and Belgian banks, in that order. The year that each country set up a bank in 
China closely follow the dates of the countries’ treaties with the Chinese 
government.
139
 Regarding the average paid up capital of these foreign banks, Table 6-
4 shows that when they were set up it was the German banks that had the largest paid-
up capital. Compared with this, the British and Japanese banks had relatively small 
paid up capitals at first, but it grew rapidly. By managing the Qing court indemnities, 
issuing banknotes, financing international trade, loaning to the native banks 
(qianzhuang) and providing remittance services, these foreign banks once played an 
important role in the Chinese financial market. However, when the WWI broke out, 
many foreign banks closed their Chinese offices and left room for the growth of 
modern Chinese banks (Cheng, 2003 pp.75-77.). 
Table 6-4: Description of foreign banks operating in China
140
 
Country  Number of 
foreign banks 
operating in 
China 
Net number of 
foreign banks 
operating in 
China in 1926 
The year that 
the country’s 
first bank 
entered 
China 
Average paid-
up capital 
when set up 
(Tls. 1,000) 
Average 
paid-up 
capital in 
1926 
 (Tls. 1,000) 
America 6 4 1902 4,570 4,335 
Britain 10 7 1845 5,038 35,859 
Belgium 1 1 1902 - 101,351 
France 3 2 1860 26,500 273,600 
Germany 3 1 1872 40,804 7,500 
Japanese 7 7 1893 5,250 74,970 
Russia 1 1 1896 6,000 15,000 
Source: Ibid. 
Note: ‘-’ means data are not available. 
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 For example, after the Qing government signed the Treaty of Nanjing with France and 
Britain in 1842, British and French banks opened branches in China. With the notification of 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan in 1895, Japanese banks entered the country. After 
signing the Treaty of 1901 with Belgium and ten other countries, a Belgian bank opened 
branches there. 
140
 Exchange rates between silver tael and different currencies are calculated according to 
the terms of treaties and loan agreements between the Qing government and other nations 
from the 1890s to the 1910s. They include the Treaty of Shimonoseki [马关条约], the Russia-
Franco Loan [四厘借款合同], the Anglo-German Loan [英德借款] and the Treaty of 1901 [
辛丑条约]. These treaties and loan agreements involved many silver taels in exchange for 
local currencies that the Qing had to pay to these countries. 
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6.3 Development of Chinese modern banks141 
6.3.1 General growth of the Chinese modern banks 
The first Chinese modern bank was established in 1897 in response to China’s new 
financial demands from modern industries, infrastructures and other modernization 
programs (Cheng, 2003 pp.22-27.). On 27th May, 1897 the Imperial Bank of China 
(IBC, hereafter) [zhongguo tongshang yinhang中国通商银行] was established, with 
3.5 million silver dollars as paid-up capital and 1.4 million silver dollars as working 
capital. As the first Chinese bank which borrowed running models and regulations 
from Western banks, the IBC was invested and controlled by the Qing court.
142
  
Under the patronage of the government, the IBC enjoyed privileges in managing 
governmental funds and issuing banknotes. Two years after its establishment, its total 
assets reached 10 million silver dollars, with eleven branches spread nationwide. 
However, from the outset, this bank suffered more misfortune than blessing: in 1900 
the Boxers plundered its Tianjin and Beijing branches of hundreds of thousands of 
silver dollars. In 1903 the diffusion of 300,000 silver dollars in counterfeit banknotes 
from its Shanghai branch heavily damaged its reputation.
143
   
Compounding these false steps, a badly-judged business strategy also hindered the 
IBC’s development. As the largest and the first modern Chinese bank at the time, the 
IBC saw official remittance as its only source of profit and overlooked other banking 
business (Cheng, 2003 p.29.). However, although the central court required local 
officials to employ the IBC for governmental remittance, the Shanxi piaohao still 
remitted substantial government funds and it was not until the Great Qing Bank (GQB, 
hereafter) [daqing yinhang 大清银行] was established in 1907 that the piaohao’s 
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 The term ‘modern banks’ here mainly denotes banks organized in joint-stock form and 
run on the model of Western banks. 
142“中国人民银行上海分行金融研究所 [SHCPB Institute of Finance, Shanghai Branch, 
Chinese People’s Bank]”, in Cheng, Banking in modern China, p.25. 
143
 Ibid., p.27. 
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government business began to decline.
144
  Unlike the IBC, whose sole mission was to 
monopolise the government remittance business, the QGB had a very broad vision, 
and their business included commercial remittance, note issuance, deposit and loan 
business.
145
Therefore, besides the government remittance, piaohao also confronted 
competitions from the QGB in other business.
146
 Besides the QGB and IBC, the 
General Post Office [youzheng zongjv 邮政总局] was established in 1911 and ran 
remittance business, the Postal Remittance and Saving Bank [youzheng chujin huiye 
zongjv 邮政储金汇业总局] was set up in 1930 with 3,000 branches. (Xu, 2007 
pp.148-50.). All these newly established banks could be threats to the piaohao with 
their greater capital power and intensive branch networks.  
In the 1910s there were a total number of 17 modern Chinese banks. These modern 
banks were not only engaged in remittance, but also took deposits from the public, 
loaned to industries, and discounted bills of exchange which had been ignored by the 
piaohao (Cheng 2003, p.34.).  
Table 6-5 lists the twelve principal Chinese banks established between the 1890s and 
the 1920s. From this it can be found that, unlike the Shanxi piaohao whose 
headquarters were in three small towns in the province of Shanxi, all these banks had 
their headquarters in centres of trade, such as Shanghai, Beijing or Tianjin. Such 
locations gave these banks first-hand business information and enabled them to make 
timely decisions. Moreover, apart from the four official banks, eight private banks 
were established and run by merchants from Jiangsu or Zhejiang provinces, who were 
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 According to my statistics on the volume of the piaohao’s government remittances 
(Appendix II), between 1898 and 1906 this volume increased from Tls. 10 million to Tls. 22 
million. But in 1907 the piaohao’s government remittance business fell back to Tls. 10 
million and dropped further to Tls. 5 million in 1911. This estimate is consistent with the 
findings of Cheng (2003, p. 28), who judged the IBC’s remittance volume to have been Tls. 
one million in 1897, plummeting to Tls. 646 thousand in 1905.    
145“试办银行章程[Experimental constitution of the Daqing Bank], Article 1, Daqing Bank 
Clearance Office”, in Cheng, Banking in Modern China, p.31. 
146
 Before the Qing court was overthrown in 1911, the value of the annual notes issuance, 
deposits and loans in the GQB climbed from Tls. 0.8 million to Tls. 25 million, Tls. 8.5 
million to Tls. 63 million, and Tls. 8 million to Tls. 59 million respectively (Cheng, 2003, 
p.32.). Combining these values with my previous estimate of the piaohao’s business (Table 5-
4), it can be found that, although the annual loan volumes for the whole Shanxi piaohao in the 
1900s (Tls. 34 million) was comparable with that of the modern Chinese banks, the piaohao’s 
deposit business (Tls. 6.3 million) was much smaller than that of the GQB. 
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collectively known as the ‘Jiangzhe Financial Clique’ [jiangzhecaifa 江浙财阀 ]. 
Although at first these modern banks hired experienced piaohao staff members as 
middle-level managers, these were gradually replaced by graduates of prestigious 
overseas universities (Cheng, 2003, p.171). Moreover, most private banks started with 
invested capital of hundreds of thousands of taels, but usually within a decade their 
paid-up capital had expanded to several million. This is in contrast to the Shanxi 
piaohao, whose paid-up capital remained at about Tls. 1 million (Huang, 2002a, 
p.581.). 
Table 6-5: Principal Chinese modern banks  
 
Sources: Based on Huang (2002, pp.373-376.) and Cheng (2003, pp.34-36., p.47.) 
Note: ‘-’ means data are not available. 
In addition to Table 6-5, Table 6-6 shows the total number, total paid-up capital and 
total business volumes of these modern Chinese banks between 1897 and 1936. It can 
be found that the first modern Chinese bank was established in 1897, but, largely due 
to the effects of the Boxer Rebellion (1900/1), the second Chinese bank was not set up 
until 1905. After this, the number of Chinese modern banks grew steadily from 3 in 
1905 to 164 in 1936. As well as the number of banks, their total paid up capital, note 
issuance, loan and deposit volumes increased substantially during the same period. 
  
Bank English translation
Year of 
establishment
Head office
Paid-up capital when set 
up (Tls. 1,000)
Paid-up capital in 
1927 (Tls.1,000)
Type
中国通商银行 Imperial Bank of China 1897 Shanghai 1,000 - Government
大清银行 Great Qing Bank 1905 Beijing 10,000 - Government
交通银行 Bank of Communication 1908 Shanghai 5,000 - Government
浙江实业银行 Zhejiang Industrial Bank 1908 Shanghai 511 1,296 Government-private venture
信诚银行 Xincheng Bank 1906 Shanghai 3,600 - Private
浙江兴业银行 National Commercial Bank 1907 Hangzhou 180 1,800 Private
四明商业银行 Ningbo Commercial and Saving Bank 1908 Shanghai 1,500 - Private
上海商业储蓄银行 Shanghai Commercial and Saving Bank 1915 Shanghai 50 1,800 Private
盐业银行 Yien Yieh Commercial Bank 1917 Beijing 900 5,400 Private
金城银行 Kincheng Banking Corporation 1917 Tianjin 360 5,040 Private
大陆银行 Continental Bank 1919 Tianjin 720 5,760 Private
中南银行 China South and Sea Bank 1921 Shanghai 3,600 - Private
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Table 6-6: Total paid-up capital and business volume of the Chinese modern banks from 
1897 to 1936 (Tls. 1,000) 
Year number in operation Paid-up capital Note issuance Deposit Loan 
1897 1 2,520  0  2,592  3,895  
1898 1 2,520  207  2,635  3,899  
1899 1 2,520  455  3,917  5,695  
1900 1 2,520  75  2,307  3,640  
1904 1 2,520  67  1,867  2,577  
1905 3 3,528  978  13,335  12,404  
1906 5 5,400  2,699  15,284  13,964  
1907 6 8,650  4,856  25,215  17,973  
1908 11 15,743  7,117  59,144  50,877  
1909 13 16,934  11,952  75,422  56,304  
1910 14 23,321  18,019  101,980  90,997  
1911 17 25,276  14,973  97,824  92,048  
1920 103 63,420  89,058  341,110  371,140  
1925 158 121,781  169,660  655,178  676,781  
1926 159 117,945  189,486  753,911  751,360  
1927 160 120,195  216,963  785,477  768,256  
1936 164 289,941  1,401,624  3,276,914  2,495,606  
Source: On the basis of Cheng (2003, p.36; pp.42-43; pp.65-69). 
 
Note: the reason why this list ends in 1936 is that the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) 
started one year later and China entered a stage of total resistance.  
Based on Table 6-6, Figure 6-1 plots the business structure of Chinese modern banks. 
Like the Shanxi piaohao, this dissertation calculates the total debts/assets ratios of 
these banks in the 1890s, 1900, 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s. It finds that these ratios 
increased from 0.5 in the 1890s to 0.8 in the 1900s, and further to 1.1 in the 1920s and 
1.7 in the 1930s. Although the financial leverage in these banks increased over time, 
compared with those of the Shanxi piaohao they were small (Figure 5-4).  
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Figure 6-1: Business structure of Chinese modern banks 
 
Source: Ibid. 
6.3.2 Difference between the modern Chinese banks and the Shanxi piaohao 
The above section illustrates the general growth of the modern Chinese banks. 
Drawing on some preliminary results, this section attempts to trace the differences 
between the Shanxi piaohao and modern Chinese banks in order to explore their 
different fates. 
The first major difference between the Shanxi piaohao and modern Chinese banks lies 
in the different backgrounds of head office managers. As my thesis has illustrated in 
Chapter 2, the piaohao head office managers were trained under Confucianism. These 
managers entered the piaohao as apprentices who learnt about calligraphy, accounting, 
the abacus and traditional Chinese literature. After 20-30 years’ hard work and a 
series of performance evaluations, outstanding employees would be appointed as the 
head office managers.  
Unlike the piaohao’s managers, most modern banks managers were trained under a 
Western ideology. They had either studied overseas or attended Chinese missionary 
schools, and then worked for the Chinese offices of foreign banks or official banks 
(Cheng 2003, pp.47-52.). Having witnessed the foreign banks’ operations, these 
young entrepreneurs established modern Chinese banks and made it one of their 
objectives to compete with foreign banks to restore Chinese financial sovereignty 
(Cheng, 2003, p.75.). Despite these examples of ambitious managers of modern banks, 
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when Li Hongling the branch manager of the WFH piaohao in Beijing sought to 
persuade his head office to send employees overseas and reform the piaohao as a 
joint-stock bank, the head managers simply ignored Li’s suggestion (Li, 1917 p.59.).  
In addition to the backgrounds of the head office managers, the piaohao and the 
modern banks also had different recruiting strategies. As my thesis has illustrated, in 
the Shanxi piaohao, employees were selected from the local people. Potential 
employees came as apprentices to the piaohao at the age of 15-17 and after many 
years’ hard work they would be promoted or granted dividends. Unlike the Shanxi 
piaohao, there is a shift in modern banks recruitment strategy. When they just set up, 
they preferred to hire piaohao staff, but as they developed they found piaohao 
employees have difficulties in adapting to new business models, therefore, they began 
to recruit graduates of prestigious overseas universities (Cheng, 2003, p.171.).  
In order to encourage these people to work for them, the modern Chinese banks 
designed an attractive welfare and pension system. A good member of staff in a 
modern Chinese bank earned Tls. 40-90 per annum, equal to the annual income of a 
formal piaohao staff member with no dividends.
147
 However, compared with the 
piaohao employees who worked late every day and had few vacations, the staff in the 
modern banks worked six days a week from 8 am until 7 pm and had seventeen days’ 
paid leave per year. Banks including the Bank of China and the Jin Cheng Bank also 
gave all staff 60 days’ paid sick leave and 30 days’ maternity leave for female 
employees.
148
 Moreover, many modern banks also had pension schemes for 
employees who had worked for them for more than ten years and were aged 65 and 
above. Employees’ pensions were 30% to 70% of their salary at the time of 
retirement.
149
   
The third difference between the piaohao and modern Chinese banks was the way that 
they dealt with profits. As my thesis illustrates in Chapter 3, the Shanxi piaohao 
distributed as dividends an increasing share of their profits, from 33% to 90%, as 
these expanded. In contrast, the modern Chinese banks reserved their profits for 
                                               
147
 “上海银行行员服务待遇规则[Regulations of the Shanghai Bank’s staff member’s 
salary and bonus]”, in Cheng, Banking in Modern China, p.178. 
148
 Ibid. 
149
 Ibid., p.180. 
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possible loss (Cheng 2003, p.182.). According to Chen Guangfu, the most prestigious 
contemporary banker and the founder of the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank 
(SCSB, hereafter) ‘a bank’s profits should be first used to write off bad loans as far as 
possible.’ Like the SCSB, other major Chinese banks also set aside half of their 
profits as special capital reserves.
150
 This measure guaranteed these banks had enough 
solid capital to resist political and economic turbulence and ensure their positions in 
the Chinese financial market (Cheng 2003, p.183.).  
Last, the Shanxi piaohao and modern Chinese banks had different business strategies. 
In the Shanxi piaohao, remittance was the backbone and, as they grew, their loans 
increased but deposits remained the same. Unlike the Shanxi piaohao, modern banks 
treated deposits as their prime target and tried by every means to attract deposits from 
clients (Cheng 2003, p.137.). The control of large sums in deposits enabled the 
modern banks to make loans and issue banknotes. Besides this, in contrast to the 
piaohao whose drafts were used only in clearing transactions between two branches, 
modern banks had bills of exchange which could be endorsed. In addition, unlike the 
Shanxi piaohao which awarded loans on the basis of personal reputation, modern 
Chinese banks required their loans to be backed up by material guarantees (Cheng, 
2003 p. 148.)    
The above four features show that the Shanxi piaohao and modern Chinese banks 
were largely distinct. Looking back with today’s hindsight, there is no doubt that 
modern Chinese banks were more advanced in many ways. Therefore, in a situation 
where China was under the threat of invasion by foreign powers and of civil war, as 
well as the expansion of the foreign banks and modern banks, the Shanxi piaohao as 
an indigenous financial institution, began collectively to fall. 
6.4 Fall as a group  
Just as in its rise, in its decline, the piaohao fell almost as one. Table 6-7 lists the 
years in which the Shanxi piaohao closed, which shows that the first Shanxi piaohao 
to go out of business was the RSC piaohao, and after this a chain of piaohao followed 
                                               
150
 “Chen Guangfu’s letter to Yang Dunfu”, in Cheng, Banking in Modern China, p.183. 
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its example. By 1920, 14 Shanxi piaohao had closed and in the 1920s another six shut 
down; in 1940 the last two closed. 
Table 6-7: The years when the Shanxi Piaohao closed 
Year Name Year Name 
1911 Ri Sheng Chang 1917 Jin Sheng Run 
1912 Qi Chang De 1918 Tian Cheng Heng 
1913 Xie Tong Qing  Bai Chuan Tong 
 Xie Cheng Qian 1920 Wei Chang Hou 
 Da De Chuan 1921 Wei Tai Hou 
 Yi Cheng Qian  Xin Tai Hou 
1914 He Sheng Yuan  Bao Feng Long 
 Da De Yu  Shi Yin Xin 
 Zhi Cheng Xin 1924 San Jin Yuan 
1916 Wei Feng Hou 1929 Da Sheng Chuan 
 Wei Sheng Chang 1940 Da De Heng 
 Cun Yi Gong  Da De Tong 
Source: Huang (2002a, p.549.) 
Table 6-7 shows that the DDT and DDH piaohao survived longer than the other 
Shanxi piaohao. Both these piaohao belonged to a shareholder, Qiao Zhiyong. As 
Qiao Dianjiao, his former employee, remembered, the reason for the longer life of 
these piaohao was the shareholder’s strong capital power. Although these two piaohao 
also suffered considerable loss in 1911, Qiao Zhiyong injected about Tls. 1 million to 
help his piaohao to maintain operations.
151
 Surviving the political chaos did not, 
however, bring these two piaohao back to their previous splendour. After 1911, the 
DDT and DDH had only seven branches each and by 1935 only four branches were in 
operation (Qiao, 1961, cited in Huang, 2002a p.558.). Here it should be noted that, 
besides strong capital power, a somewhat different governance structure may also 
have been a reason for their longer survival. Unlike other Shanxi piaohao, in which 
the shareholders let head office managers take charge of everything, the DDT 
shareholder Qiao Zhiyong supervised his piaohao. As Qiao Dianjiao recalled, “Our 
shareholder always enjoined us to be cautions and avoid transactions that looked 
profitable but risky” (Qiao, 1961, cited in Huang, 2002a p.558.). 
                                               
151“中国实业志  (山西省) [Chinese Industrial Annals (Shanxi Province)]”,in Huang, 
Archival materials of the Shanxi piaohao, p. 560. 
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The above illustration has shown that the Shanxi piaohao declined after the 1910s, 
before ending this chapter a last question needs to be answered: after the closing of 
the piaohao, what became of its shareholders? Did they transfer their fortunes to other 
businesses or did they decline with the piaohao? Compiled from their descendants’ 
reminiscences, Table 6-8 shows the fates of these piaohao owners. 
Table 6-8: Subsequent lives of the piaohao shareholders 
 
Sources: ‘平遥县志[Pingyao County Annals]’, ‘李兰泽墓志铭 [Epitaph of Li Lanze]’, ‘侯怀
奇，候承文回忆整理 [Reminiscence of Hou Huaiqi and Hou Chengwen]’, ‘毛国玺口述整
理 [Dictation of Mao Guoxi]’, ‘冀氏族谱 [Family Pedigree of  Ji]’, ‘冀孔瑞回忆整理 
[Reminiscence of Ji Kongrui]’, ‘王振邦口述整理 [Dictation of Wang Zhenbang]’, ‘常氏家
乘  [Family Pedigree of Chang]’, ‘常国彪回忆整理 [Reminiscence of Chang Guobiao]’ 
(Huang, 2002a, pp.771-779.). 
As shown in Table 6-8, eight families owned fifteen piaohao. After the piaohao 
business ended, five of them went bankrupt and three of them invested elsewhere, in 
the Shangfu Match Firm [shuangfu huochai gongsi双福火柴公司] which had a paid-
Shareholder’s surname Piaohao they invested Ending
Li Ri Sheng Chang Went bankrupt in 1911.
Wei Tai Hou
Wei Feng Hou
Tian Cheng Heng
Xin Tai Hou
Wei Sheng Chang
Wei Chang Hou
Wei Tai Hou
Ji Qian Sheng Heng Went bankrupt in 1911.
Xie Tong Qing
Xie He Qing
Chang Da De Yu Opened two weaving mills and invested in 
the Shuangfu Match Firm.
San Jin Yuan
Chang Sheng Chuan
Bai Chuan Tong
Da De Tong
Da De Heng
Qu Invested in the Shuangfu Match Firm.
Qiao Invested in the Shuangfu Match Firm and 
ran tea and grain shops in northwest China.
Hou Opened a printing factory and a weaving 
mill after 1911 but bankrupted later.
Mao The whole family addicted to opium and 
went bankrupt after 1911.
Wang Successor Wang Qishi addicted to opium 
and bankrupted after 1911.
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up capital of 20,000 silver dollars when set up in 1920 and increased its capital 
tenfold after ten years.
152
 In contrast to the demise of the Shanxi piaohao, the foreign 
banks and Chinese modern banks rose as new financial powers in China and finally 
replaced the piaohao altogether (Cheng 2003). 
6.5 Concluding remarks 
Focusing on the impact of 1911 Revolution and the expansion of foreign and modern 
Chinese banks, this chapter explores the reasons for the Shanxi piaohao’s decline. As 
it indicates, although the Shanxi piaohao survived a series of political disruptions, the 
1911 Revolution impaired its business fundamentally due to the immense amount of 
looting, bad loans and continuous cash withdrawals. As the Shanxi piaohao 
approached bankruptcy, the foreign banks and modern Chinese banks gradually took 
over the lion’s share with their greater capital power, more advanced business 
strategies, and more humane personal arrangements. Under these internal and external 
threats, investors in some piaohao declared themselves bankrupt, while other 
shareholders invested elsewhere and abandoned the piaohao.  
                                               
152“山西最早的民族工业创始人之一乔殿森 [Qiao Diansen – One of the founders of 
the Shanxi nationalindustry]”<http://www.tydao.com/jinshang/2012/120312qiaodiansen.htm> 
(accessed: 2
nd
 December 2015). 
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  Conclusion Chapter 7.
7.1 Main findings  
This dissertation has studied the Shanxi piaohao, one of the most important 
indigenous financial institutions in nineteenth century China. By an extensive use of 
primary sources, I developed a unique firm level set of data from which to examine 
the Shanxi piaohao’s governance structure, business strategy and historical 
development.  
Placing the Shanxi piaohao in a theoretical framework of the theory of the firm, I have 
found that in an environment with little power to protect shareholders’ capital, the 
Shanxi piaohao developed a centralized vertical structure and collective punishment 
in its horizontal management structure to discipline their far-flung employees. Such a 
management structure lowered the cost of pursuing inconsistent objectives and 
successfully disciplined the banks for many years.   
Besides sticks, the piaohao shareholders also provided carrots in the form of attractive 
incentive payments to employees. Through analysing the piaohao’s income and pay 
structure, I have found the piaohao granted expertise shares to 20% to 30% of their 
employees; these paid the same dividends as the shareholders’ capital shares. Once 
entitled to these shares, the employees’ income increased by ten times and often to 
hundreds of times. Since these dividends were paid according to employees’ 
performance and tenure as well as the piaohao’s profitability, they at first were 
successful in motivating the employees. 
The piaohao’s management and incentive structure worked efficiently during its 
initial development and before any other similar financial institution had emerged. 
However, as with their expansion, the cost of working from poor information 
increased and the head office gradually reached its operating capacity. Moreover, 
from the late 1900s onwards, modern Chinese banks expanded and began competing 
with the piaohao for business and for experienced staff. The piaohao employees who 
anticipated the decline of their institution therefore moved to other banks for a more 
reliable source of income and a more humane work environment. It was in these 
circumstances that the piaohao’s governance structure began to malfunction.  
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After addressing the piaohao’s governance structure, this dissertation went on to 
examine the piaohao’s business strategy, looking mainly at the determinants of its 
remittance fees.  Using the RSC piaohao as a case study, I demonstrate that the 
Shanxi piaohao made local business conditions and safety its priority in deciding to 
set up a new branch. Throughout its development, its largest client group was always 
the ‘firm’. To reduce the cost of amassing and transporting silver, the piaohao also 
designed four types of draft to balance the silver reserve in each branch. Moreover,  in 
setting its fees, the piaohao took into account such factors as the amount of silver 
being remitted, the distance between the branches, the interval between the reception 
and the submission of silver, the type of client, type of draft, and ways of sending the 
draft in question.  
In its examination of the historical changes in the piaohao’s business, income and 
profits, this dissertation demonstrates quantitatively that the piaohao’s government 
business occupied only 10% of its total business and refutes the claim that most of its 
business came from the Qing court (Chen 1937, Kong, 1984). Moreover, during its 
analyses, this dissertation also finds that, although the piaohao’s business volumes 
and profits grew over time, a very high debt/asset ratio should have revealed 
extremely high financial risks before 1911 and rising expenses on human cost and 
remittance service fees also weakened their profitability.  
The piaohao lived through a series of political disruptions. The 1911 Revolution, 
however, not only brought to an end China’s last feudal dynasty but also drove most 
of the piaohao out of the market. By examining the piaohao’s losses during the 1911 
Revolution, I have found that incessant looting, bad loans, and withdrawals 
fundamentally impaired its business base. As the Shanxi piaohao suffered in this way 
from the revolution, the foreign banks and modern Chinese banks developed and 
encroached on the piaohao’s business. Although the Shanxi piaohao sought help from 
the government, its hope was dimmed by its lack of connection with the newly 
established regime. It was in this situation that the investors in some piaohao declared 
themselves bankrupt after the 1910s, while other shareholders invested elsewhere and 
the piaohao had to close. 
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7.2 Contributions and future work 
My thesis contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, by 
digitizing the substantial primary sources, my thesis provides considerable 
quantitatively detailed data on the Shanxi piaohao. It not only fills the data void where 
this subject is concerned, but also empowers the present study to offer in-depth and 
comprehensive analyses and allows us to make comparisons with China and the rest 
of the world  as regards banking and finance. 
Second, by combining economic models with historical evidence, this study provides 
an interesting case study on economic theories. For example, the path dependence 
model enabled me to trace the origin of the Shanxi piaohao as a sequence of reactive 
decisions, and the principal-agent model and tournament model allowed me to 
scrutinize the underlying functioning of the piaohao’s governance structure. All these 
new findings provide new interpretations of the piaohao’s rise and decline.  
Besides this, this dissertation also tackles important but long unsolved questions on 
the piaohao’s business strategy, such as the determinants of its remittance fees and the 
identity of its clients. These findings are crucial for us to understand how the piaohao 
developed its business despite the turbulent context. Moreover, for the first time, my 
work estimates the historical changes in the piaohao’s business volumes, incomes and 
profits. It not only provides scholarship with a new view of the growth and decline of 
the Shanxi piaohao, but also corrects scholarly misunderstandings of the piaohao, i.e. 
its relationship with the government.  
Finally, by contrasting the decline of the Shanxi piaohao and expansion of the modern 
Chinese banks and foreign banks, my study reveals the differences between the 
indigenous and exogenous financial institutions in China and touches on the big 
question of the great divergence between China and the West. 
It is at the same time necessary to critique the limitations of this thesis. One lingering 
question I would like to pursue is that of the domestic remittances paid by the foreign, 
official, and private banks in China. Although I have illustrated some of the quantities 
handled by these banks and examined their paid-up capital, the limited data have 
prevented this dissertation from further analysing these banks’ Chinese domestic 
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remittances, which are critical to understanding the piaohao’s decline. Another 
intriguing question that I would like to examine, once data became available, is the 
market structure of the Chinese remittances business. This dissertation has shown the 
Shanxi piaohao as a whole played an important role in the Chinese remittance market, 
but questions such as how much of the market it occupied, whether it had a monopoly 
or not, what its relationship was to other financial institutions and what its internal 
relationships were like are also important and require much deeper inquiry. 
On top of this, as most of the estimations in this thesis were made from the data of 
one Shanxi piaohao, some may contain errors. These defects will be remedied as soon 
as I replenish the data set. To conclude, although my work has identified some 
similarities and differences between the Shanxi piaohao and contemporary modern 
banks, a more stimulating research project would be to compare the Shanxi piaohao 
with one of the latter banks, to shed light on the debate about the great divergence 
from a comparative perspective. 
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Appendix A 
Table: Shanxi piaohao’s government remittances and loans to the government, 1862-1911 (Tls. 1,000) 
Year 
Capital 
funds 
Assistant 
funds 
Imperial household 
expense 
Western 
movement 
funds 
Copper 
Silver 
Foreign 
loans 
Other 
funds 
Sum 
Advanced by Shanxi 
piaohao 
1862 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
1863 140 0 0 0 0 0 0 140 0 
1864 562 0 0 0 0 0 0 562 100 
1865 1,279 80 79 0 0 0 0 1,438 92 
1866 2,351 0 35 0 0 0 0 2,386 156 
1867 4,128 0 394 0 0 0 0 4,523 0 
1869 2,766 30 110 0 0 0 0 2,906 0 
1870 371 0 130 0 0 0 0 501 0 
1871 145 20 0 0 0 0 0 165 0 
1872 2,831 90 96 0 0 0 0 3,018 35 
1873 1,550 118 122 0 0 0 0 1,791 151 
1874 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
1875 4,578 325 479 0 190 0 0 5,572 0 
1876 3,836 958 118 30 0 0 0 4,942 0 
1877 2,334 448 0 124 0 0 0 2,906 871 
1878 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 0 
1879 1,790 10 110 15 0 183 20 2,128 677 
1880 2,959 756 0 765 10 306 13 4,809 1,361 
1881 2,400 678 100 60 20 67 163 3,488 782 
1882 1,425 354 0 117 10 40 0 1,946 603 
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1883 2,214 552 0 279 30 0 0 3,075 0 
1884 243 26 0 20 0 6 0 295 896 
1885 2,831 307 121 0 0 0 0 3,259 1,307 
1886 2,796 506 100 466 0 224 0 4,092 0 
1887 104 30 0 45 0 0 0 179 0 
1888 6 50 0 120 0 0 0 176 0 
1889 1,518 1,080 243 404 120 124 0 3,490 80 
1890 3,294 2,397 91 578 80 0 0 6,440 1,446 
1891 2,901 825 131 180 0 280 17 4,334 946 
1892 3,133 467 166 415 0 21 17 4,218 1,600 
1893 2,660 1,428 82 999 0 26 58 5,254 737 
1894 960 88 10 478 110 0 15 1,661 0 
1895 4,217 2,180 517 372 140 0 100 7,526 460 
1896 3,727 1,929 70 100 26 38 12 5,902 1,193 
1898 1,866 901 65 52 20 35 0 2,939 145 
1899 2,888 557 360 110 35 6,782 0 10,732 1,172 
1900 2,428 1,082 31 0 0 105 0 3,646 464 
1901 155 87 0 10 0 4,646 0 4,897 0 
1902 747 1,001 174 0 0 8,321 0 10,244 581 
1903 1,309 1,404 0 0 0 8,309 13 11,035 217 
1904 1,416 866 52 80 68 1,911 11 4,404 0 
1905 2,896 1,562 236 90 194 14,943 469 20,390 210 
1906 3,625 1,300 315 0 50 17,174 113 22,576 29 
1907 583 100 0 0 10 12,951 31 13,675 0 
1908 1,493 197 154 135 13 8,120 189 10,302 360 
1909 161 140 0 60 0 2,031 175 2,568 0 
1910 667 82 10 3 0 3,222 66 4,049 0 
167 
1911 177 0 151 0 0 4,975 28 5,331 0 
Source: Statistics and memorandums to the throne collected in Shanxi Piaohao Archival Materials (Huang, 2002a pp.74-138.). 
Note: By examining official memorandums, I have found that Huang’s statistic has following errors (Huang, 2002a pp.74-138.): In 1879, his estimation 
omitted that the piaohao remitted Tls. 10,000 ‘Self-strengthening Movement’ funds in Sichuan province (Huang, 2002a p.85.). Moreover, when calculating 
sums of governmental remittance volumes, he made sum errors in 1880, 1881, 1882, 1883, 1909, 1910, and 1911. All these mistakes have been amended in 
this dissertation.
168 
Appendix B   
Table: Sample data for remittance fees 
 
Source: Huang (2002a, pp.833-1100.) 
 
  
Date Destination Client Type Draft 
Amount 
(Tls)
Duration 
(Day)
Distance 
(km)
Remittance 
fees (Tls)
12/01/1850 Hekou de sheng shi firm direct original 3,000 100 1,649 0
12/01/1850 Hekou he sheng yong firm direct original 2,000 100 1,649 0
12/01/1850 Hekou yong xing yu firm direct original 300 40 1,649 0
19/01/1850 Hekou heng yi cheng firm direct original 1,500 100 1,649 4
19/01/1850 Suzhou heng yi chang firm direct original 2,000 80 1,569 2
19/01/1850 Suzhou wan sheng long firm direct original 1,000 60 1,569 3
19/01/1850 Suzhou wan sheng long firm direct loan 2,000 30 1,569 2
19/01/1850 Hekou da de chang firm direct original 4,000 100 1,649 0
06/05/1851 Qixian hao zhi xiong gentry direct original 325 9 629 0
06/05/1851 Hankou fu sheng xun firm inverse loan 2,500 210 1,386 30
06/05/1851 Hankou fu sheng xun firm inverse loan 2,500 240 1,386 30
09/05/1851 Taigu wan sheng long firm direct original 306 85 825 0
09/05/1851 Qixian wan sheng long firm direct original 153 35 629 0
09/05/1851 Lanzhou xin sheng kui firm inverse loan 2,500 70 1,480 0
10/05/1851 Taigu yi he xing firm direct original 5,000 26 825 10
13/05/1851 Beijing li xiansheng gentry direct original 500 60 206 1
13/05/1851 Beijing li xiansheng gentry direct loan 3,000 60 206 7
13/05/1851 Qixian qian yu kui firm direct original 7,000 90 629 0
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Primary sources 
Account books 
Advanced Asia Studies Library, University of Tokyo: 
The RSC account books for 1849 one unnamed branch, 1852 Qingjiangpu, 1853 
Jiangxi, 1856 Suzhou, 1867 Yangzhou, 1906 Xian, Kaifeng, Zhoujiakou, 
Hangzhou, Guilin,Guangzhou, Changsha, Xiangtan, Guangzhou and Chongqing 
branch. 
Business letters 
Huang Jianhui ed, Archival materials of the Shanxi piaohao (山西票号史料), 山西经
济出版社 (Shanxi Economic Press), 2002a, pp.833-1214: 
Business correspondence of the RSC piaohao from the 1840s to the 1900s 
Business correspondence the WTH piaohao in 1844, 1845, and 1851 
Official Memorandums 
Huang Jianhui ed, Archival materials of the Shanxi piaohao (山西票号史料), (山西
经济出版社 (Shanxi Economic Press)), 2002a: 
Memorandum of Board of Punishment official Ma Xiang Ru  
Memorandum of Investigating Censor Liu Xi Jin  
Memorandum of Cui Mu Zhi  
Memorandum of Sichuan Financial Commissioner Wen Ge  
Memorandum of Fujian-Zhejiang Provincial Governor and the General He Jing  
Memorandum of Sichuan Provincial Governor Ding Baozhen  
Memorandum of Fujian-Zhejiang Viceroy He Jing  
Memorandum of Fuzhou General Mu Tushan  
Memorandum of Jiangsu Provincial Governor Wei Rongguang  
Memorandum of Jiangxi Provincial Governor Li Mianlin 
Memorandum of Guangdong-Guangxi Viceroy Zhang Zhidong  
Memorandum of Jiangsu Provincial Governor Wei Rongguang  
Memorandums collection under the reign of Daoguang, Xiangfeng, Tongzhi and 
Guangxu  
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Interviews  
Huang Jianhui ed, Archival materials of the Shanxi piaohao (山西票号史料), 山西经
济出版社 (Shanxi Economic Press), 2002a: 
乔殿蛟访问记录[An interview with Qiao Dianjiao] 
张仲权手抄稿[A manuscript of Zhang Zhongquan] 
侯怀奇，候承文回忆整理 [Reminiscence of Hou Huaiqi and Hou Chengwen]  
毛国玺口述整理 [Dictation of Mao Guoxi]. 
冀氏族谱 [Family Pedigree of  Ji].  
冀孔瑞回忆整理 [Reminiscence of Ji Kongrui].  
王振邦口述整理 [Dictation of Wang Zhenbang]. 
常氏家乘 [Family Pedigree of Chang]. 
常国彪回忆整理[Reminiscence of Chang Guobiao]. 
Reports and letters 
Huang Jianhui ed, Archival materials of the Shanxi piaohao (山西票号史料), 山西经
济出版社 (Shanxi Economic Press), 2002a: 
- 中央银行月报 Central Bank Monthly Review, volume 6, No. 12 
- 天成亨等十二家票号呈北洋政府财政部文（The joint letter of the Tian 
Cheng Heng and the other eleven Shanxi piaohao to the Beiyang 
Government） 
- 山西票号维持商况之情愿 [Petition of the Shanxi piaohao to maintain their 
business]. 
- 山西汇商天成亨等号沥受战事影响商业颠危公肯救济有关文件 
[Documents relating Tian Cheng Heng and other Shanxi piaohao calling for 
government rescue], 北洋政府档案 [Beiyang Government Documents], No 
1027. 
- 美国商务委员安脑尔函复洽议山西钱业商借中国通用洋五百万元文件
[Letter in Reply of the US Commerce Committee to the Shanxi Merchants 
Regarding its 5 Million Silver Dollars’ Loan], 北洋政府档案  [Beiyang 
Government File], No 1027. 
171 
- 同蒲铁路开办有期  [Datong-Huashan Railway will be constructed as 
planned], 大公报 [Dagong Newspaper], 7th May 1910. 
- 财政部调查各省财政金融有关文书  [Investigations of the Ministry of 
Finance into local business conditions], 北 洋 政 府 档 案  [Beiyang 
Government Files]. 
- 信义银行招股启示  [Subscription on the Xinyi Bank’s stock], 大公报 
[Dagong Newspaper], 8th March 1908. 
- 中国实业志 (山西省) [Chinese Industrial Annals (Shanxi Province) 
Cheng Linsun, Banking in modern China: entrepreneurs, professional managers, and 
the development of Chinese banks, 1897-1937, Cambridge University Press: 
- 试办银行章程[Experimental constitution of the Daqing Bank], Article 1, 
Daqing Bank Clearance Office. 
- 上海银行行员服务待遇规则[Regulations of the Shanghai Bank’s staff 
member’s salary and bonus] 
北京大学历史系近代史教研室 (History Department of Peking University), 盛宣怀
未刊信稿  (Unpublished letters of Sheng Xuanhuai), 中华书局 (Zhonghua Book 
Company).  
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